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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Sue Dockstader  
 
Master of Science  
 
Environmental Studies Program  
 
June 2012  
 
Title: Engendering the Metabolic Rift: A Feminist Political Ecology of Agrofuels  
 
 
This thesis analyzes the gendered impacts of plant-based alternatives to petroleum, 
commonly called biofuels.  Synthesizing case studies, scientific research and policies 
papers, this theoretical work adopts the term “agrofuels” coined by the peasant 
organization La Vía Campesina to reflect the true nature of these commodities – one of 
dispossession and ecological destruction.  This paper documents the falsity of the claim 
that the fuels are “sustainable” by presenting facts linking them to deforestation, loss and 
pollution of water sources, destruction of important biodiversity and the knowledge that 
maintains this diversity, as well as economic exploitation.  Most importantly, I verify that 
the adoption of agrofuel expansion exacerbates gendered patterns of exclusion and, in 
most cases, worsens women’s positions within the communities targeted for feedstock 
production with regard to land tenure, household energy maintenance, independent 
income and physical integrity.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
It makes sense for us to collaborate for the sake of mankind. We see the bright and real 
potential for our citizens being able to use alternative sources of energy that will promote 
the common good. – George W. Bush1
 
 
On March 7th 2007, the day before the world celebrated International Women’s 
Day, 900 poor peasant women occupied Brazil’s largest sugarcane plant, the Cargill-
owned company, CEVASA.  As part of a national week of struggle dubbed Women in 
Defense of Food Sovereignty, the women were protesting a new energy pact between the 
US and Brazil to increase the production and funding of biofuels.  In a communiqué, the 
occupiers denounced the fuels as sources of biodiversity destruction, poverty, pollution 
and labor exploitation (Food First 2007).  In the financial district of São Paulo, ten 
thousand Brazilians to took to the streets to protest US President George W. Bush’s 
arrival.  The agreement between the world’s two largest producers of ethanol2
                                                 
1 Associated Press 2007. 
 made the 
fuel an internationally traded commodity and proposed increased biofuel research and 
development.  As police beat and tear-gassed largely peaceful students, trade unionists, 
farmers and landless peasants, Bush toured an ethanol plant with Brazil’s President Luiz 
Inacio Lula da Silva who declared, "We come to celebrate a strategic partnership between 
the United States and Brazil (BBC News 2007).”  The accord helped to set in motion a 
wave of legislation across the globe harnessing agriculture to fuel more tightly than ever 
before.  
 
2 Brazil and the United States produce 70 percent of the world’s ethanol from sugarcane and corn 
respectively (BBC News 2007).  
 
 
2 
Faced with the triple crises of dwindling oil reserves, financial woes, and global 
climate change, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
governments have begun to turn to plant-based “biofuels” to meet their growing energy 
demands.  Indeed, in 2008 Jad Mouawad writing for The New York Times noted that 
worldwide population is predicted to grow to nine billion people by the middle of the 
century with a corresponding rise in the number of petroleum burning vehicles to more 
than two billion.  Moreover, a study by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(USEIA 2010) forecasted that global consumption of petroleum and other liquid fuels 
would grow from 86.1 million barrels per day in 2007 to 110.6 million barrels per day by 
2035, eighty percent of which would be guzzled by the transportation sector.  The rise in 
petroleum consumption coincides with warnings that available supplies of oil may be 
running out (Simpson 2006).   
Mouawad’s (2008) article noted that though the developing economies of China 
and India were steadily increasing their oil demand, the United States was the only 
industrialized nation to see its oil consumption explode since the petroleum shocks of the 
1970’s and ‘80s.  The article stated that the country was living “beyond its means” with 
the least efficient fleet, the lowest gas prices, and the longest commutes, noted that its 
fuel efficiency attempts were “underwhelming” and quoted former US energy secretary 
James Schlesinger’s observation that the country was capable of only two approaches to 
energy policy: complacency or crisis.  The OECD nations have chosen the latter.  As with 
all crises capital’s response is innovation and the construction of a corresponding 
narrative to ease the transition to a new stage in its development.  Funded by 
agribusiness, supported by scientists flush with industry cash and looking to revitalize 
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their agricultural sectors, politicians in the North and growing economies of the South 
began setting “biofuel” mandates and introducing “flex-fuel” vehicles into their fleets 
(Mathews 2007; Rothkopf 2009).  
US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi called the new legislation “a shot heard 
‘round the world for energy independence” (Holt-Gimenez & Kenfield 2009, p. 26).  
Under the government of George W. Bush, Democrats and Republicans eagerly signed 
into law the United States Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 which calls for 
an aggregate of 36 billion gallons (~136.27 liters) of biofuels to be used in transport by 
2022.  In 2009 the European Union (EU) set a binding target of 10% biofuel (primarily 
diesel) use in transportation by 2010 to meet Europe’s growing demand.  Moreover, the 
EU Directive 2009/28/EC called on biofuels to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) by 
increasing their use from 35% to 50% by 2017.  In 2006, as part of its eleventh Five Year 
Plan, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) set a goal of 6.6 
billion liters of ethanol by 2010, but the government suspended the target in response to 
the precipitous rise in food prices in 2007/2008.  Nevertheless, in 2007, the NDRC 
mandated a 10% increase in renewable energy by 2010 rising to 15% by 2020 (Sorda, 
Banse & Kemfert 2010).  The result of these national mandates has been a rush to secure 
land and water.  Lacking the available land on which to grow the feedstocks for this new 
class of fuel, governments in the United States and Europe are looking to the rural areas 
of the Global South to meet their demands.  Prompted by International Energy Agency 
chief Claude Mandil who declared, “If the United States and Europe are serious about 
biofuels, they must turn to the South for their supplies (Mathews 2007, p. 3550),” biofuel 
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advocates are seeing win-win opportunities for consumers in the North, small farmers in 
the South, and the planet as a whole.  
This thesis rejects their claims and illuminates the grim consequences of large-
scale plant-based liquid fuels for the environment and local communities in order to show 
the real-world effects of their implementation on gender relations and on women’s 
particular position in those communities. This paper argues that corporate interests have 
hijacked the critical issues of environmental destruction, global climate change, and 
petroleum dependence to advance an agenda of capital accumulation in the form of these 
alternative fuels.  Far from preserving biodiversity and improving rural livelihoods, as 
proponents claim, large-scale cultivation of so-called “biofuels” on the lands in the 
Global South threatens food sovereignty, results in a worrying loss of biodiversity, erodes 
traditional ecological knowledge, and disrupts and reorganizes local gender relations 
(McMichael 2010; Danielsen et al 2008; Julia & White 2011; Tsikata & Yaro 2011).   
The development of biofuels in the Southern Hemisphere has ravaged both wild 
and marginal forests, fields, and grasslands, destroying biodiversity and threatening 
ecological knowledge for many already-impoverished people, particularly women.  
Because, in many rural communities in the Global South women are usually responsible 
for food supplementation, household water and wood provision, and medicine 
preparation, loss of biodiversity threatens their traditional ecological knowledge as well 
as posing a grave danger to health and food security. In many rural contexts women 
maintain and protect important genetic diversity through their underappreciated custodial 
roles in weeding, pruning, overseeing animals, seed selection, sowing, and harvesting.  
Moreover, gendered practices and spaces confine women to smaller and less arable plots 
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of land where they grow “minor” crops.  In sub-Saharan Africa, studies of biofuel 
development are showing that women’s low status in some communities has led to the 
loss of their crops in favor of feedstock production, resulting in significant loss of income 
and household stability (German et al. 2010; Tsikata & Yaro 2011). 
This thesis also exposes the cruel falsity of the contention that these alternative 
fuels are “sustainable” because they can be grown on “marginal” and degraded lands. 
Several cruel ironies have resulted from biofuel development.  Because they generally do 
not own land, cultural or informal arrangements enable women access to marginal lands 
where they collect wood, water, herbs, and animals for household use and sale (Julia & 
White 2011).  Encroachment into these lands has spelled a loss of income and access to 
the lands, impoverishing them and their communities.  Another perversity of biofuel 
development is that clearance of forest and marginal land forces women to walk farther 
for the fuel they gather for household use and sale, resulting in increased physical and 
economic stress (Tsikata & Yaro 2011).   
This paper shows that women do most of the world’s agricultural labor but they 
are not seen as improvers or owners of land and thus the capitalist equation of exchange 
value creation with ownership rights dispossesses women and as such is patriarchal 
(Waring 1988).  In fact, in communities where women have traditional rights to land, 
biofuel companies’ formal titling of  “heads of households” has privileged men and 
completely stripped women of any voice in land proceedings.  This case can be seen most 
clearly in Indonesia where the state’s masculinist approach to land ownership converged 
with local patriarchal decision-making to formalize male ownership and inheritance, 
excluding women’s traditional rights (Julia and White 2011). 
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I also show how the encroachment of alternative fuel monocultures on communal, 
state lands and even privately-held land is also displacing local men who must seek work 
as migrants on feedstock plantations and other casual, seasonal labor under miserable and 
dehumanizing conditions.  Additionally, biofuel development is also pitting poor male 
laborers (both indigenous and foreign) against indigenous communities, resulting in 
violent conflicts that, in turn, result in sexualized violence and prostitution of local 
women.  The increased displacement of male relatives and poverty exacerbated by the 
fuels’ feedstock development has resulted in changed gender expectations associated with 
women’s sexual-economic activities and is contributing to a rise in sexually transmitted 
infections, unwanted pregnancy, domestic violence, and poor women’s increased 
economic vulnerability and material poverty (Sirait 2009; Rey 2009).    
Capitalism’s drive to eliminate labor costs is resulting in increasing 
mechanization opening the door for women’s participation in the labor force as an 
underrepresented class of workers.  And while women’s independent earning has been 
shown to improve their bargaining ability within the household, the low wages and high 
piece rate quotas set by biofuel companies often demand that migrant men enlist their 
wives and children in unpaid labor (Nanda 1997; Razavi 2009; Rossi & Lambrou 2008; 
Schroeder 1999). Moreover, biofuel companies are availing themselves of the stereotype 
that women as more docile, precise, and with the knowledge that unions often exclude the 
concerns of women (Schott 2009), enabling them to capture even more value through the 
employment of women as scavengers and pesticide applicators as can be seen in Papua 
New Guinea and Malaysia (Rossi & Lambrou 2008; Houtard 2010; Julia & White 2011). 
The expansion of women’s unpaid or poorly paid contribution, in addition to their 
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domestic labor, comes at a price to households and communities in the form of food and 
financial insecurity as well as social consequences (Anderson 2006; Friends of the Earth, 
LifeMosaic & Sawit Watch 2008; Tsikata & Yaro 2011).  In some cases women’s 
participation in feedstock production has enabled them to retain their earnings and 
improve their domestic positions and that of their children in relation to their male 
spouses but has resulted in shaming at the hands of others in their communities 
(Anderson 2006).  In other cases, the price of stereotyping, coupled with poverty, has 
seen women’s exposure to toxic pesticides causing the risk of chemical insults to their 
health and reproductive capacities (Friends of the Earth, LifeMosaic & Sawit Watch 
2008; Houtard 2010).  
The foregoing evidence disproves the contention by biofuel proponents that the 
fuels improve marginal lands, benefit local communities with good jobs, halt biodiversity 
destruction and represent a “green” solution to climate change.   Accordingly, this paper 
eschews the life-affirming prefix “bio-” in reference to them in favor of the term 
“agrofuels,” coined by the international peasant rights organization, La Vía Campesina, 
to reflect their true nature, one of dispossession and misery for the people of the Global 
South, particularly women (Biofuelwatch et al. 2007, p. 4).  
 
Methods and Limitations 
 
My interest in this topic grew out of the food riots of 2007/2008 and the scuffle 
between the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) director, 
Jacques Diouf, and the agriculture ministers of the US, Brazil, and Europe at the 2008 
United Nations Food Summit.  During the furious debates over whether agrofuels were 
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contributing to the rising food prices, much was mentioned about the world’s urban and 
rural poor and the plight of farmers in the Global South but very few, if any, of the 
accounts gave voice to the very people affected. International nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the UN agencies responded to the crisis by issuing a flurry of 
reports documenting land tenure, food, and environmental issues related to agrofuel 
cultivation.  Meanwhile agrofuel development projects continued apace despite mounting 
evidence indicating that their spread was disrupting communities and devastating the 
environment. 
 Drawing on feminist political ecology, gender theory and critical political 
economy, this paper examines and rejects the contentions put forward by proponents who 
claim that large-scale production of these fuels is environmentally, economically, and 
socially sustainable.  It particularly refutes the assertion that large-scale cultivation of 
plant-based liquid biofuels is beneficial to women in the Southern Hemisphere. In order 
to prove that thesis, I have tried to foreground as much as possible the voices and 
experiences of those whose lives and livelihoods are affected by agrofuel development. 
The information presented here is a synthesis of policy briefs, non-governmental 
organization (NGO) reports, and scholarly articles.  In this thesis I have striven to avoid 
treating gender and race as simply add-ons grafted to a materialist approach.  Just as 
much as capitalism is grounded in institutional power, so gender and race derive their 
interactions and constructions from systems of power that are interlocking and constantly 
changing (Hill Collins 1995; Nakano Glenn 1999). This paper is, therefore, illustrative 
rather than exhaustive.  This work attempts a representation of what McCall (2005) refers 
to as a “partial crystallization of social relations” (p. 1781), ethnographic moments of 
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gender theorized at the intersection of race and class under agrofuel capitalism. To this 
end, I have tried to include the historical, cultural, and ecological backgrounds of the 
affected people to show how the changing landscape disrupts or exacerbates gendered 
interactions.     
 I worked with texts in political economy, gender/feminist theory, and 
development theory to form the framework of this examination.  I obtained most of the 
theoretical and critical material primarily from books and peer-reviewed journals.  In the 
interest of fairness, I sought information by and about agrofuel proponents such as 
international finance institutions (IFIs), energy policy experts, UN agencies, government 
departments, and agrofuel companies through both library and internet research.  Finally, 
with reference to specific geographic areas and affected communities, I engaged 
scientific papers, political economy journal articles regarding the impacts of agrofuels, 
newspaper stories, and policy documents generated by NGOs.  
Since the foundation of this examination is limited to case studies performed by 
NGOs and government and UN agencies as well as papers written by other scholars, one 
of the weaknesses of this paper is that those organizations expose what is in their interests 
to report.  Clearly, large NGOs like FOE and other environmental organizations focus on 
the most environmentally destructive practices, while human rights groups foreground 
abuses to indigenous populations but few focus specifically on gender.   Local gender 
issues can be more nuanced and variable depending on location, culture, and the relative 
strength of the people in a given area.    My concern here is highlighting the intersections 
of gendered macro-level energy policy with state and local micro-level gender regimes 
and how those detract or contribute to the welfare of women and men. 
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Another drawback is the dearth of literature backed by solid fieldwork 
documenting the effects on women of marginalized groups in specific areas of feedstock 
production.  Studies of the effects of agrofuel cultivation on social processes rarely 
mention race, and gender is folded into the generic category “and women.” Where 
peasant differentiation is observed, peasants are assumed to be male and occupying 
historically contextualized relations to their environments.  However when impacts on 
rural women are mentioned, they often present women’s roles in the domestic/social 
division of labor as a naturalized, ahistorical fact, even set apart from the general identity 
of the group to which they belong (Cotula, Dyer & Vermeulen 2008; Gaia Foundation et 
al. 2008; McMichael 2010).   
Accordingly, my lack of on-the-ground firsthand knowledge of the impacts of 
agrofuels on women in local communities presents an obvious gap in this paper.   
Drawing on firsthand observation and data collection enables the scholar to speak with 
people directly and view changes in people’s lives and the environment in which they 
live.  It also provides a glimpse into the complexities and subtleties of historic socially 
and economically constituted activities.  And, ideally the work occurs with the 
permission of the study group and exposes the researcher to the gaze and questions of the 
subjects such as “Why are you here?” and “Do you presume to speak for me?”  However, 
the strength of this paper is its theoretical synthesis of the available research with gender 
theory and political economy.   
This thesis is dogged by the obvious concerns of insulting or valorizing 
communities as essentialized, static, and “primitive” and showing the women of those 
communities to be the silent victims of oppression or “earth mothers” valiantly 
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preserving the environment.  As Salleh has noted (2010) both “free-trade” proponents 
and their adversaries on the political Left sometimes characterize women and indigenous 
populations in ways that serve their interests and not those of the affected people.  This 
concern represents the last and most glaring limitation to my work. Long before I began 
this thesis I asked myself, “Should I write this paper?” with the understanding that my 
privileged position as a white scholar in the Global North arrogates to itself the 
authorization to speak for others regardless of their consent and often to their continued 
or worsened detriment (Alcoff 1996). Certainly, to speak about the people affected by 
agrofuel capitalism is to expose the “mediated character” (Alcoff 1996, p. 9) of my 
interpretation. 
However, there is also a particular arrogance in choosing not to give these 
accounts.  Alcoff (1996), in her essay, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” observes 
that believing one can simply retreat from speaking for other people ignores one’s 
embeddedness in networks that affect them.  The silence resulting from such a retreat can 
also represent abandoning responsibility and allowing dominant discourses to fill the gap.    
I have observed with growing alarm the continued promotion of agrofuels as a 
solution to numerous environmental and economic problems.  From national policy 
papers such as President Obama’s “Blueprint For a Secure Energy Future,” through the 
websites of celebrities like the Indigo Girls and Melissa Etheridge, down to the local 
marketing advertisements of Oregon business Sequential Biofuels, the dominant narrative 
that “we” can shop our way to lower emissions and energy sustainability while “they” get 
jobs and poverty relief plays against the (ongoing) land grabs, environmental, and food 
crises of the Global South.  Therefore, it is my intent to speak with all the power and 
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conviction I have, to bring all my scholarly and intellectual resources to bear on this 
subject, and to accept the criticism and correction of any who know more than I do 
regarding it.    
 
Literature Review 
 
Most of the literature issuing from UN agencies and international NGOs such as 
Friends of the Earth (FOE), ActionAid, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) focus 
primarily on the environmental consequences, land grabs, biodiversity loss and increasing 
hunger where feedstock monocropping exists, yet few analyses of the impacts hold 
capital to account.  And though it is widely acknowledged that women comprise the 
largest fraction of the world’s poor and also the majority of farm labor in the Global 
South, only one study devotes all of its attention to the impacts on women – a 2008 
UNFAO report authored by Andrea Rossi and Yianna Lambrou titled,  “Gender and 
Equity Issues in Liquid Biofuels Production: Minimizing the Risks to Maximize the 
Opportunities.”  Rossi and Lambrou’s policy paper assesses the gender-differentiated 
impacts of environmental degradation/loss, socio-economic risks, food insecurity, and 
employment discrimination attendant with agrofuel production.  They predict that the 
economies of scale necessary for agrofuel feedstock cultivation could erode women’s 
decision-making power with regard to land-use as more of the land they access passes 
from subsistence into monetized production.  Deforestation, desertification, and pollution 
and loss of water sources are predicted to increase the time and physical burden of 
household energy provision and management borne by women.  Most startlingly, 
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biodiversity loss and depletion are predicted to result in a dangerous loss of food 
sovereignty, genetic diversity and traditional knowledge (Rossi and Lambrou 2008). 
A year later, Nidhi Tandon (2009) published “The Bio-Fuel Frenzy: What 
Options for Rural Women?  A Case of Rural Development Schizophrenia” in Gender & 
Development.  To date, Tandon’s article has been the only one to focus on the gendered 
aspects of agrofuels and also to critique the current development trajectory of “poverty 
alleviation” through agrofuel cultivation.  Tandon’s hard-hitting and excellent article is 
replete with facts about the environmental and social woes stemming from cultivation of 
the feedstocks, the profit motives of multinational corporations (MNCs), and the 
misguided development policies that drive monocropping; she even includes accounts of 
women resisting agrofuel plantations. Despite calling agrofuel development policy 
“schizophrenic,” her conclusion places faith in the market to solve these problems.  
Exposing the obvious fact that unregulated industrial development “can exacerbate 
inequalities” (Tandon 2009, p. 110), Tandon counterposes two agricultural systems: those 
of industrial capitalism’s large-scale plantations and the other of small-scale diversified 
organic farms (Tandon 2009, p. 116).  While Tandon certainly understands the issues 
surrounding agrofuel impacts on women in the Global South, she refuses to specifically 
condemn capitalism’s destructive role in their plight.  Instead, she extols the agricultural 
education of female farmers and their entrance into export markets as well suggesting 
that socially responsible certifications like Brazil’s Social Fuel Seal program and the 
benefits of organic farming are solutions to inhibit the spread of feedstock monocultures 
(Tandon 2009).   Yet, she fails to acknowledge that certification programs are dependent 
on volatile international markets.  Moreover, evidence shows that commercialization and 
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mechanization of agriculture generally favors male producers in the absence of economic 
and social independence for women (Cecelski 2004). 
 
Materialism and Nature 
 
Most radical political analyses chronicling the rise of agrofuel capitalism typically 
call on conceptions of class or relative economic relations originating in Marxist political 
economy.  In the middle of the nineteenth century Karl Marx laid the foundation for a 
critique of social relations with regard to material production as opposed to philosophical 
questions.  Marx correctly criticized Feuerbach by stating that sensuousness resides not 
only in objects but also in human praxis.  By placing emphasis on the material relations 
of people to themselves, others and nature, he realistically demonstrated how history 
unfolds.   Accepting the general arguments of his contemporaries regarding conditions 
under capitalism, Marx advanced a groundbreaking understanding of its history by 
explaining its dynamic social character.  In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
of 1844, Marx (1978) recalled “man’s inorganic body” (p. 75) – the interdependence of 
humans and their environment for the maintenance of physical and spiritual sustenance. 
By placing emphasis on the material relations of people to themselves, others and nature, 
he argued that history unfolds through a series of revolutions in the relations of humans 
to their environment.   In his later work, the Grundrisse (1978) Marx described this 
development in three stages.  The first stage would be the dissolution of the worker from 
the soil, followed by the dissolution of the worker’s relation to the instruments of labor 
and finally by the reduction of the worker to the objective conditions of production. Marx 
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claimed that capitalism deformed the very foundations of its prosperity, nature and labor, 
by effecting the laborer’s estrangement from both (Marx 1978).  
While Marx’s work lends itself neatly to agrarian political economy, Marxist 
ecology or ecosocialism emerged out of a new environmental awareness among social 
theorists.  The theory attempts to unite Marx’s materialism to an analysis of the ways in 
which social relations under the capitalist regime impact the environment. Geographer 
David Harvey (1996) notes in Justice Nature and the Geography of Difference, that the 
various attempts to marry Marxism to an environmentalist project have vacillated 
between two extremes.  In the first case, Marxists dismiss environmental-ecological 
politics “as a bourgeois diversion” and follow the traditional interpretation of production 
and the associated class struggle with environment as peripheral.  The other approach is 
to give in to the current popular rhetoric of the environmental movement and to “re-build 
Marxism-socialism on different theoretical and practical foundations,” (p. 92) departing 
from the grounding in working class political endeavors and activism.  However, some of 
these ecologists use Marx’s own philosophical development and textual references to 
nature to formulate a new analysis that places the environment alongside labor and 
capital as fundamental categories of analysis (Goldman and Schurman 2000). 
The most influential theory to emanate from these new formulations is the 
concept of the metabolic rift. In his book Marx’s Ecology, notable social theorist John 
Bellamy Foster (2000) was the first to show Marx’s analysis of industrial capitalism’s 
reach into nature and how its machinations simultaneously exploited labor and nature, 
rendering both destitute.  While Marx is primarily concerned with soil “robbing” 
whereby the soil is impoverished as value, in the form of nutrients, is transferred from the 
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country in which crops are grown to urban centers requiring ever-larger inputs of 
fertilizer to restore the tilth of the soil (Foster 2000), other theorists have extended the 
analysis to critique agrofuels  (Magdoff 2008; McMichael 2009; Otero and Jones 2010). 
However, these critics’ tacit agreement with traditional neo-classical political economic 
theory, specifically its conception of the production of use versus exchange value, reifies 
the binary between the public and the private spheres of society, even with regard to 
nature, and therefore dismisses much of the unpaid work performed by women in and 
outside the home. By forsaking any genuine attempt to examine this new form of capital 
accumulation within the context of changing gender relations, the conception of the new 
proletariat embedded in these critiques remains “resolutely male” (Mackenzie 2010, p. 
33). 
One of the first radical critiques of agrofuel development from a materialist 
perspective appeared in the July-August 2008 edition of Monthly Review.  Fred 
Magdoff’s (2008) “The Political Economy and Ecology in Biofuels” describes the 
subsidization of ethanol in the form of legislation and agribusiness tax breaks as capital’s 
response to volatile corn prices in the US.   Magdoff further notes the contradictions 
between food and fuel production in the Global South and condemns feedstock 
cultivation on so-called “marginal” and savanna lands because they support livestock 
(Magdoff 2008).  What Magdoff fails to mention is that many people use marginal lands 
and grasslands and for thousands of women around the world these “wastelands” are all 
they have on which to grow food for their families, graze their livestock, or manage and 
collect building materials, fuel, and medicines.   
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Subsequently in 2010, The Journal of Peasant Studies devoted all of its pages to 
critical assessments of agrofuel development. The journal featured several excellent 
political economic perspectives, notably White and Dasgupta’s (2010) examination of the 
agrarian changes wrought by agrofuels and McMichael’s (2010) analysis of their effect 
on food sovereignty.  Stating that agrofuel development may have “unprecedented” (p. 
605) impacts on local communities, White and Dasgupta argue for the continued use of 
traditional political economic concepts and questions to interrogate agrofuel capitalism 
through the examination of ownership and labor regimes and commodity chain networks.  
Specifically, they urge scholars to reach beyond the usual technical assessments and 
extend their analyses to the power relations involved in agrofuel expansion with 
particular focus on development agencies, corporations, and governments (White and 
Dasgupta 2010).  
McMichael (2010) employs the metabolic rift concept to explain the effects of 
agrofuel expansion on food “regimes” (historical moments in food production). He 
specifically calls to account development practices aimed at “poverty alleviation” with 
the implicit goal of capital’s “green accumulation” (p. 615) resulting in depeasantization 
and the prioritization of capitalist value relations in all aspects of society (McMichael 
2010).  McMichael’s paper condemns the “invisibilisation” (p. 615) of non-monetized 
social reproduction and the territorial imperative under capitalism to capture it but only 
briefly mentions the impacts on women with a passing reference to a United Nations 
paper (Cotula et al. 2008).  He fails to mention the report’s finding that smallholder 
women in the Global South perform most of the farm labor and water provision and will 
most likely suffer the worst consequences of agrofuel capitalism.  
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Materialism and Gender 
 
Despite the continuing call by feminist and now gender scholars, for more 
nuanced treatments of capitalist accumulation in agriculture, the majority of critics still 
adhere to binary categories that obscure the work of women in rural (as well as urban) 
settings.  Writing just the year before McMichael in The Journal of Peasant Studies, 
Shahra Razavi (2009) noted that, while gender analyses have questioned the dominant 
themes in agrarian political economy, scholars still refuse to seriously engage gender to 
critique the most important questions of the changing rural landscape.  Faulting both neo-
classical economists and Marxist critical theorists, she states: “For all the references to 
‘reproduction’, the political economy of agrarian change never seriously considered the 
relations between the largely feminised unpaid reproductive sphere and the more visible 
labour and commodities that entered the circuits of accumulation” (p. 198).  This is not a 
new problem.  
While Marxist theory’s powerful critique of class domination has inspired 
revolutionary struggles and spawned new fields of critical theory, it has also drawn critics 
seeking a more inclusive analysis. Marxism’s tacit agreement with traditional neo-
classical understandings of economic activity, particularly the conception of the 
production of values, reifies the binary between the public and the private spheres of 
society and therefore leaves out much of the unpaid work performed in and outside the 
home.  In the 1980’s feminist scholars (Hartsock 1983; Waring 1988) challenged 
Marxism’s acceptance of the common understanding of economic value relations that 
traces its roots to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, among others. They have charged that 
by refusing to acknowledge the gendered nature of the division of labor and account for 
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women’s unpaid contribution to the economy, traditional and radical economists have 
tended to overlook the particular concerns of women.   
There can be no doubt that Marxist political economy assumes an inherent 
masculinity in the struggle between the worker and capital. In her book, Money, Sex, and 
Power, Hartsock (1983) points to the manner in which Marxism’s preoccupation with the 
confrontation between worker and capitalist (both male) causes women’s particular role 
in class relations to disappear.  She further reveals how gender-blindness in Marx’s 
theory leads him to postulate that all societal conflict stems from class conflict and not 
other systems of domination such as white supremacy or patriarchy.  Marx’s emphasis is 
on the labor power incorporated into commodity production and not on the labor 
embodied in the direct consumption of commodities for the subsistence of the worker 
(i.e. cooking, cleaning, etc).  As such women’s labor, through a theoretical sleight of 
hand, vanishes from the field of class relations. In Capital Volume 1, Marx’s chapter, 
“The Sale and Purchase of Labour-Power” outlines his theory of surplus value explaining 
that the value of a worker’s labor is equivalent to the amount of labor needed to maintain 
himself and to produce children to replace his labor.  Commodities, the fruits of the 
worker’s objectified labor, must be sufficient for his children to take his place in the work 
force when: “The labour-power withdrawn from the market by wear and tear, and by 
death, must be continually replaced by, at the very least, an equal amount of fresh labour-
power” (p. 275).   
Hartsock criticizes this and other passages in Marx’s analysis of the class relation, 
because it refuses any outright mention of women’s role in the reproduction of labor 
power and even disregards women’s necessary consumption of commodities to sustain 
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that function.  Called “provisioning” (Razavi 2009) the unpaid and invisible work of 
women in food production, child-care, energy management, and other household labor 
props up capitalism, yet escapes the light of political economy.  The gender-blindness 
that Marx employs in his theory of economic relations featuring the public struggle of the 
male worker vis-à-vis capital obscures the value of women’s labor and clouds Marx’s 
analytic power to conceive of the different ways in which women’s worth as unpaid 
laborers could be examined. Waring (1988) criticizes Marx’s successors in the field of 
political economy whose preoccupation with the separation between so-called 
reproductive labor, and that which has exchange value, relegates women’s unpaid labor 
to the realm of “housework.”  Accordingly socialist feminist Lise Vogel (1983) observes 
that the spheres of necessary labor and surplus production lose their specificity and 
distinction when practiced in real life, such as in agricultural societies. 
 Just as feminist scholarship produced detailed examinations of Marxism’s 
promise and shortcomings regarding the oppression and liberation of women with regard 
to labor and value, the new feminist environmentalists advanced their own critical 
appraisals of its efficacy in matters of environmental degradation.  Following on a 
parallel track with environmental social theory, feminist scholarship also began to 
incorporate environmental concerns into its project.  The emergence of “ecofeminism” 
grew out of feminism’s attempt to interrogate women’s oppression and its connection to 
environmental destruction.   
The moniker “ecofeminisme” was coined by Francoise d’Eaubonne, a French 
writer who called on women to save the planet from destruction (Merchant 1995, p. 5). 
The concepts embodied in ecofeminism emerged in the mid-1970’s and ‘80’s (Sturgeon 
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1997, p. 25) as greater awareness of environmental problems crept into the consciousness 
of the Global North, and as feminists began linking spirituality, anti-militarism, 
environmentalism, and women’s activism into a loose collection of principles connecting 
the salvation of Earth with women’s activism (Sturgeon 1997, p.182).  Ecofeminist 
theory identified the shared features of patriarchy and capitalist exploitation of the 
environment (Merchant 1995, p. 7) as well as that of women, people of color, and 
children (Warren 2000, p. 1). Another aspect of the theory was an emphasis on the 
“connection” between women and nature and of a holistic spirituality between women 
and the earth (Merchant 1995, pp. 3 - 5). 
The ecofeminist response to Marxist ecologists restates some of the same 
arguments that Hartsock puts forward but it refashions them with an emphasis on 
women’s special connection to nature (Cuomo 2001, p. 150).  Ecofeminism seeks to 
break down the dualisms of subject/object, culture/nature and human/non-human.  A core 
criticism ecofeminism levels at Marxian analysis is that its reliance on the Hegelian 
dialectic guarantees that all conceptions of natural and social processes reify the concept 
of struggle inherent in arguments that position women and nature as subordinate. This 
Enlightenment idea, they claim, imposes a wedge between women and the environment, 
because it recreates the duality of forces inherent in modern science and technology 
(Mies and Shiva 1993, p. 5).  The most prominent ecofeminist to challenge ecosocialism 
with regard to gender is Ariel Salleh.  While I agree with Salleh’s assessment of 
ecosocialism and liberal feminism, I find her arguments positioning women (particularly 
“mothers”), “indigenous” and other marginalized people as a privileged class 
problematic.  She is right to identify the invisible work of women, peasants and 
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indigenous people as worthy of value, however she engages in a dangerous 
universalization that excludes the dynamic movement of identity and culture.  In many 
cases, cultural understandings of the supposed “connection” of women, and indigenous 
people to nature are rigid justifications for dominant economic and domestic divisions of 
labor that carry negative material consequences for the people involved. 
Salleh (1997), in her book Ecofeminism as Politics, critiques both feminism and 
Marxism for their passive acceptance of the Enlightenment-based separation of women 
and nature.  She argues that the tendency of both traditions to uncritically embrace the 
subject/object relation and ground their theories of liberation in opposition to that binary 
simply reproduces the problem of dichotomies and obscures a liberatory ecology, one 
that recognizes the connection of women to their environment (p. 13 and p. 70).  She 
argues that Marx’s prioritization of productive labor and omission of reproductive labor 
from his political economy consigns women to nature not history (Salleh 2001, p. 447).  
While commending “eco-Marxists” for their tendency to be more deeply reflexive in their 
scholarship, she nevertheless insists that eco-Marxists reorient their thinking to 
apprehend the “deepest contradiction” underpinning the capitalist organization of 
production and the division of labor through privileging reproduction of material life in 
their theory-making.  She goes on to say that the deepest contradiction is materially 
embodied in masculinist theorizing that leads to the abstraction of the consuming 
industrial process.  Salleh points to what she calls “meta-industrials” who are the 
“classes” excluded by the Marxist preoccupation with industrial production.  The meta-
industrials are those that engage in reproduction; their ranks are filled with domestic 
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caregivers, indigenous hunter-gatherers, and peasant farmers.  She claims this class of 
people appropriates nature in “precautionary ways” (Salleh 2001, p. 448). 
In her 2010 article, “From Metabolic Rift to ‘Metabolic Value’: Reflections on 
Environmental Sociology and the Alternative Globalization Movement,” Salleh takes up 
Foster’s metabolic rift theory while recalling the predicament facing many Northern 
feminists who find it difficult to identify their labor in the “mediation of nature on behalf 
of men” (p. 208) because of the association of women as ideologically synonymous with 
nature. Criticizing progressives in general, including feminists, she goes on to say that, 
while they may reject capitalism, they are often materially dependent on it and thus the 
power of their arguments is undercut by the capitalist nature of the production of 
knowledge, as it mirrors the commodity form (p. 211).  Returning to metabolic rift 
theorists, ecological economists, and world systems theorists, Salleh warns that their 
work threatens to gloss over local cultural differences and the “sex-gendered” (p. 207) 
nature of capitalism.  She calls for a re-valuing of the work of small farmers, peasants, 
gatherers and mothers.  Salleh’s argument is difficult to escape, however her romanticism 
of “subsistence” labor performed by marginalized peoples fails to critique the oppressive 
circumstances under which they live and struggle to overthrow. 
While Salleh’s argument is compelling and provides an excellent basic framework 
for conceiving of agrofuel capitalism’s effect on women in the Global South, there is a 
lack of specificity in her work, as well as a static quality that valorizes certain categories 
while ignoring their multiple contingencies.  Salleh’s contention that women and 
indigenous people are often conservators of biodiversity whose agricultural practices 
maintain the integrity of the metabolic relation between humans and the earth and whose 
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knowledge must be valued is provisionally correct.  I say “provisionally” because in her 
attempt to include “meta-industrials” she seems to view the designations of “women”, 
“indigenous”, “peasant” and so on as stable categories when in fact they are constantly 
being renegotiated as communities change, not simply as a result of capitalist influence, 
but also in relation to calls for change from within and historical, cultural, and 
environmental developments from without.  
Her work critiques capitalism’s environmental vagaries but speaks of “mothers” 
(p. 207, p. 208 and p. 216) as the category of women with the most privileged knowledge 
of biodiversity.  In fact, in the Global South, work is often distributed among women (and 
men) depending on age, familial, and fertility status (Razavi 2009, p. 206; Waring 1988, 
p. 167); knowledge of biodiversity may also be mediated by gender relations that 
privilege men and men’s priorities such as control over the reproduction of the women in 
the community.  Women who are mothers often rely on their young female relatives as 
well as sons and daughters to provide the labor necessary for the family’s survival.  
Additionally, in many cases, the meta-industrials of which she speaks are living on 
marginal lands they were forced to inhabit during colonization.  The landscapes are often 
desolate, and the people perform whatever labor they can to survive including charcoal 
production, herb gathering for the market, the sale of milk and meat products, and 
crafting for the marketplace.    
When Salleh does speak of resistance to capitalism, it is not of the women who 
are attempting to negotiate the complicated social relations within their communities that 
restrict their mobility and wellbeing.  She ignores the very active work of women in the 
powerful peasant organizations - Movimento dos Trabalhdores Rurais Sem Terra 
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(MacKenzie 2010) and La Vía Campesina (Vía Campesina) – to be treated equitably 
within their ranks.  It is as if those organizations presented an uncomplicated and uniform 
identity untainted by gender, cultural, or racial politics.   
She refuses to interrogate the gendered nature of customary relations that 
privilege married women over those who are unmarried, “divorced” (in Western 
parlance) or widowed with regard to land and natural resource access.  And while she 
seeks to overthrow capitalism, she does not also call for the destruction of the gender and 
race oppressions that position the meta-industrials at “the base of the accumulation 
hierarchy” (p. 207) in the first place.  To do so would upend the very basis of the 
“privileged” knowledge they have and force a true assessment of metabolic relations.  In 
short, Salleh’s work, no more than the frameworks she critiques, eschews a feminist 
political ecology, one that recognizes that gender oppression, racism, and capitalism 
stand on their own as separate but intersecting social structures and sites of struggle (Hill 
Collins 1995; Martin 2004; Risman 2004) and that the relations within them are 
constantly changing.  
 
Towards a Feminist Political Ecology of Agrofuels 
 
This paper agrees with many of Salleh’s assumptions with regard to women’s 
marginalization in ecosocialist theoretical work.  However, it attempts to locate itself in 
the traditions of feminist political ecology, which recognizes the social, economic, and 
political relations regarding gendered environmental relations and management 
(Rocheleau et. al. 1996) and feminist environmentalism which takes a materialist 
approach to gender relations and environmental access/resource use (Schroeder 1997).  
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For the purpose of this thesis, the framework can simply be called a “feminist political 
ecology.”  
While this work critiques the basic premise of metabolic rift theory with regard to 
gender, it refuses to advance a totalizing view of agrofuel capitalism by adopting a world-
systems approach, nor does it lapse into meaningless relativism by highlighting only local 
impacts.  Instead, this thesis attempts to achieve the type of vision Haraway (1988) terms 
“partial perspective” (p. 584) by focusing not only on the global aspects of agrofuel 
development but also drawing on local stories to provide evidence for my claims. 
For this reason, I call on the work of gender scholars.  Feminist theorists and 
gender scholars have sought to address the schism in critical theory between macro and 
micro levels of analysis.  Specifically, they interrogate the role gender plays, not only in 
identity formation, but also in the culture of institutions. These scholars have challenged 
radical political assessments for their acceptance of the common macro-level 
understanding of economic relations and disregard of the gendered nature of the division 
of labor present in nearly all cultures (Acker 2004; Waring 1988).  
The racial and gender prejudices and assumptions embedded in agrofuel 
development, in addition to destroying the local environment and the manner of 
subsistence for many communities, disrupt gender relations forcing women and men to 
renegotiate their roles.  In this retooling of social relations, women’s social and material 
circumstances weaken. Capitalism’s indisputable preoccupation with and formalization 
of productive, rather than so-called “reproductive,” capacities favors men by reshaping 
their locally constructed masculinities (Acker 2004; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; 
Jessop 2003).  And by reinforcing men’s productive role in the market, women’s 
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considerable involvement in the preservation of biodiversity and food production is 
excluded from analysis (Howard 2003; Salleh 2010). Therefore, it is important to 
recognize the local character of gender and the ways in which it influences the division of 
labor, rights to land, and the conception of work.  Gender theorists propose that there are 
multiple “hegemonic” masculinities and femininities (Acker 2006; Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005; Jessop 2003) contingent on local and historical conditions and that 
these gender “regimes” (Jessop 2003) or “orders” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005), 
when influenced by capital and state organizations, spawn new contradictions and 
reformations.  Additionally, Acker (2006) argues that  “extra-local” places are local for 
the managers and bureaucrats who operate within them, thus macroeconomic agents such 
as the World Bank, agrofuel corporations, the UN and others impose their own gender 
cultures on local communities.   Marxist and feminist academics and activists in the 
Global North are no different: lacking the necessary local knowledge of women and men 
in specific locations in the Global South, we are left to draw on narrative and case studies 
to understand gender relations in particular locations (Acker 2006; Haraway 1991; Martin 
2004).  
The contention still remains that under agrofuel capitalism economic security, 
health, and decision-making capacity for women in smallholder and indigenous 
communities will be significantly diminished.  However, it is not enough to say that 
large-scale agrofuel plantations will destroy ecosystems, augment poverty, threaten food 
sovereignty, and displace pastoralists, smallholders, and particularly the poorest women 
and men of those communities resulting in the loss of their traditional ecological 
knowledge. They will do all that, not only because of the inequitable economic relations 
 
 
28 
between North and South, but because the economy supporting the fuels’ development 
reaches deeper into nature for “solutions” to its crises.  Employing the narrative that 
agrofuels can be grown on exhausted or “marginal” land, capitalism treats the 
unquantifiable value of nature as a free gift to be “improved” by employment in 
feedstock cultivation.  Yet, non-market activities of the people who use the land, 
particularly women, are not seen at all – they remain invisible.  
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CHAPTER II 
LIFTING THE VEIL 
Agrofuel production represents capitalism’s force as an environmental agent in its 
own right (Moore 2011) as it seeks new ground by extension of and through the North’s 
own metabolic rift.  Foster (2000) was the first theorist to show that Marx’s examination 
of capitalism was also an account of its environmental impacts as he recognized that 
human beings sustain themselves through the appropriation and transformation of nature 
in a process that is at once consumption and production.   Naming this universal 
metabolic relation Stoffwechsel, Marx (1990) described the process whereby human 
beings bathe the material body of nature in the “fire of labour” (p. 289), transforming it 
into products with various use-values vital to the sustenance of human life and 
reproduction.  This fiery baptism sears into each item a dual character as both the result 
and the condition of labor, a purposeful activity, supplying people with products for 
consumption or further production. The “metabolic rift” (Foster 2000, p. 155) refers to 
the irreparable break between humans and the environment entailed by commodification.  
The interruption of Stoffwechsel destroys the natural environment and displaces the 
humans who practice it while producing commodities for sale. 
Through the process of commodification the use-value of a product undergoes a 
transformation of its former self, transcending its singular sensuousness and taking its 
value from the social relation of objectified labor. Commodities cease to be accessible 
materials formed out of nature by direct human interaction and instead derive their 
importance from the separation of the producers from their natural environment, from the 
products of their labor, and from one another. This exchange value obscures a product’s 
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direct utility to people, endowing it with a mysterious life of its own. The predominance 
of social relations mediated by and through commodities appears both mystical and, at 
the same time, natural, as if it sprang of its own accord out of human society (Marx 1990, 
p. 163). The market dominates the discourse about the interactions between humans and 
nature and among people by constructing narratives that finesse their identities as 
consumers. Capital selectively enlists the scientific community in the business of 
knowledge production and message framing. The logic underpinning agrofuel promotion 
employs crisis narratives and neo-classical economic valuation to justify development of 
plant-based fuels and increase the public’s acceptance of the alliances formed among the 
auto, oil, financial, chemical, and seed companies. Raising the real crises of climate 
change and biodiversity loss, the industry draws on false dichotomies to perpetuate 
capitalist accumulation and advances a “solution.”  Thus just as the Golem arose from a 
lump of clay to assume a living human form, capitalism’s whispering endows products of 
objectified labor with fantastic autonomy enabling them to eclipse their humble origins 
and speak for themselves.   
In the conversation of the market those items and activities without exchange 
value cannot speak.  The unpaid work people do to maintain themselves, their 
households, their environments, and their communities is rarely seen and almost never 
heard.  Capital treats this provisioning as a free gift to be exploited.  Moreover, as Waring 
(1988) and Salleh (2010) argue, the work of indigenous people, particularly women, is 
invisible because they do not contribute to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or other 
monetary indicators, yet their reproductive labor sustains capitalism by providing crucial 
maintenance of the natural environment and human beings.  Over the last twenty or more 
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years we have seen the lowering of real wages, financial crises, the concentration of 
wealth in fewer hands, and cutbacks to the social safety net.  Against this backdrop a 
greater number of women in the Global North are performing waged labor than in any 
time in history. In addition to their jobs, the domestic division of labor requires more 
energy use as they drive to do grocery shopping, kid pick-up, and perform other tasks.   
Agrofuels extend the confrontation between labor and capital by pitting the 
unpaid labor of women in the Global North against that of women and men in the Global 
South.  While touted as a “solution” to fuel consumption, agrofuels are simply a backdoor 
to further capital accumulation and exploitation of the South’s natural resources and 
people. Moreover, this greed for energy “solutions” extends the perversity of the market 
by rendering the provisioning of women in the South more arduous by depriving them of 
even the low-grade and dirty fuels they use for their domestic and market labor.    
 
Cathy and Tendai: The Invisible Energy Managers 
 
Marilyn Waring (1988), in her examination of economics, tells a parable about 
two very different people: Cathy and Tendai.  Cathy is a “middle-class North American 
housewife” (p. 13) who occupies her time grocery shopping, preparing and serving 
meals, washing her family’s dishes and laundry, making beds, teaching and caring for her 
children, sweeping and vacuuming floors, cleaning the bathroom and kitchen, and 
performing other household work.  Tendai is a “young girl in the Lowveld, in Zimbabwe” 
(p. 13) who begins her day at 4 a.m. carrying water, then going out again at 9 a.m. to 
fetch firewood, coming home to wash dishes, helping to prepare food for the family meal, 
then venturing out to gather wild vegetables, helping to cook the evening meal, and 
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eventually ending her day at 9 p.m. when she helps put her younger siblings to bed.  
Cathy and Tendai could not be more different, but they share three things in common: 
they are both female, they both are performing housework, and they are both completely 
“unproductive” as far as the market is concerned.   
While Waring’s characterization of Cathy and Tendai, like all parables, is a highly 
rigid universalization of women in both the North and South, her point is that current 
economic models do not account for the gendered division of labor and resource 
allocation. Benería (2003) reports that UNDP 1995 “rough estimates” for the global level 
of unpaid labor, valued at 2003 prevailing wages, would amount to $16 trillion3
                                                 
3 Women contributed about 70 percent of the $ 23 trillion world total output (Benería 2003, p. 74). 
.  Women 
contributed almost 70 percent of that $16 trillion, an estimated $ 11 trillion (Benería 
2003, p. 74).  Waring goes on to show argue that the “production boundary,” the sphere 
that encompasses the measurable exchange of goods and services, excludes both the 
unpaid labor of women and also the unquantified and incalculably important 
environmental “services” nature provides.  The market appropriates the silent, valueless 
reproductive labor of nature, indigenous men and women and women in the industrial 
North as  “free gifts” and degrades them in the process.  In the film adaptation (1995) of 
her book, Waring exhorts women to invent job titles and descriptions reflecting the true 
value of their labor.  Certainly one of the main descriptions Cathy and Tendai could add 
to their resumes is “energy manager.”  The household work that women do, in both the 
North and South, consumes large amounts of energy.  While the gendered division of 
household labor consumes the temporal physical and mental capacities of women in both 
hemispheres, they are by no means equal in the eyes of capital. Cathy and Tendai’s 
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shared invisibilities with regard to labor and resources diverge and become adversarial in 
the realm of energy planning and policy.  In fact, Cathy’s average annual energy 
consumption is roughly 18 times that of Tendai’s (Gaye 2007, p. 2)!   
Historical capital accumulation and exploitation of its own natural resources as 
well as those in the South has enabled the North to develop well-established energy and 
water networks ensuring its citizens relatively comfortable lives free from drudgery and 
disease.  In the South, the legacy of imperial extraction has resulted in a lack of energy 
infrastructure and rural poverty forcing people to rely on low quality fuels that place 
multiple costs on the women who carry and burn them.  While promoted by governments 
in North and South as clean energy that will improve the lives of people in the Global 
South, the dispossession, environmental destruction, and social disruption stemming from 
these high-tech fuels will further impoverish the invisible female energy managers in the 
South.  
 
Tendai’s Invisible Production 
 
In the Global South where rural women are generally dependent on informal 
energy systems, their unpaid labor not only consumes the calories embodied in the 
biomass they use to supply their households but also their own physical capacities as they 
gather and carry it back to be used in their homes.  Cecelski (2004) states that following 
the 1973 oil crisis stemming from the OPEC embargo, the realms of energy policy and 
research separated and gradually embraced questions of pricing, conservation, and fuel 
substitution as areas of importance with regard to energy savings and balance (p. 6).  
While this was true on a global basis, the countries in the Global South found that their 
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“energy crisis” was in large part due to the fact that nearly 50 percent of their citizens, 
both rural and urban, consumed low energy density biomass, with the fuel accounting for 
almost 90 percent of total household energy consumption in Africa and Asia.   
Moreover, women and children act as de facto energy suppliers and managers 
through the use of their unpaid labor in the provision of household fuel in a complex web 
of economic/social relations linking forestry, water provision, biodiversity maintenance 
and degradation, agricultural, and even industrial processes.  All of these are affected by 
agrofuel development.  Cecelski goes on to say that the use of biomass and of the 
household energy sector remains “invisible” (p. 6) in energy planning and policy.  Doing 
laundry, grazing and watering livestock, visiting the market to sell vegetables and buy 
food, fetching water and wood is also invisible because it burns up hours and metabolic 
energy.  A study of the gendered division of household labor from eastern Zimbabwe 
found that women did 91 percent of the firewood collection and water fetching, spent a 
combined 13 hours and a total of about 4,000 food calories per week on just those two 
household chores (ENERGIA 2006).  
Additionally, the energy consumption of poor women in the Global South is 
invisible not only because of the persistent gendered division of labor that burns up their 
time and physical energy but also because of the type of energy consumed.  Wood, 
charcoal, field stubble, and animal dung are generally collected, traded, and consumed in 
informal settings and arrangements, effectively evading definitive economic valuation.  
In the Global North, energy is quantified, priced, and evaluated in order to carry out 
planning, policy, and strategic decisions.    
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Cathy’s Quantifiable Consumption 
 
A 2008 Gallup Poll of over 590 married heterosexual couples in US found that 53 
percent of the grocery shopping, 48 percent of the dishwashing, 58 percent of the meal 
preparation, 68 percent of laundry, 61 percent of the housecleaning and 54 percent of the 
childcare was performed by women (Newport 2008). Yet, while the market refuses to 
count women’s time-use, it quantifies with ease the energy use resulting from it.  Due to 
their domestic chores, women in the North have seen their automobile (Kay 1997) and 
public transportation (Crane and Takahashi 2009) use rise.  Research of a twenty year 
period in the US between 1985 to 2005 found that, contrary to the common notion that 
women’s car travel was shorter overall because of the gendered division of household 
labor, the gap between men and women had narrowed.  The study also found that 
“Black” and “Hispanic” women were driving significantly less than white women but 
were also taking public transportation for much longer durations than their male 
counterparts; Black men were commuting less than men of the other two categories 
(Crane and Takahashi 2009).   
The foregoing information shows, not surprisingly, that women use more energy 
in conducting their day-to-day business than their male counterparts.  All of that 
electricity and petroleum use is counted, because in the Global North, units of oil, coal, 
and natural gas are metered, purchased, and paid for regardless of how they are 
consumed.  Additionally, a culture that favors individual car ownership accounts for 
longer hours in the car and higher fuel consumption (Kay 1997).  Yet, it is not the Cathys 
or Tendais who are driving energy policy and research development.  
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The Real Drivers: Strategic Alliances 
 
“There’s only one thing that the ruling interests have ever wanted.  And that’s 
everything.” – Michael Parenti4
 
  
The global extraction serving capitalism depends on maintenance of production in 
both hemispheres, however the social and environmental costs associated with petroleum 
drilling and refining presents capital with challenges and opportunities. Undeniable 
evidence of global climate change, local environmental and social costs, rising resistance 
among people in fossil fuel-rich areas in the Global South, and Northern 
environmentalists’ demands of accountability all necessitated the reworking of 
capitalism’s myths.  Agrofuels provide a convenient avenue for the oil industry to 
advance accumulation while forming partnerships to maintain its viability beyond peak 
oil and extend its greed farther into the Global South.  Moreover, the ongoing destruction 
associated with agrofuel feedstocks does not capture the attention of the public like an oil 
spill. 
  Lacking the troubling images of drilling among caribou, oil spills in the ocean, 
or gas flares turning the sky black, agrofuels are touted as clean, renewable energy 
sources.  Oregon-based Sequential-Pacific Biodiesel’s (2012) website carries the motto 
“Advanced technology for high quality, low impact fuel,” extolling the sustainability of 
plant-based transport fuels.  The company began operations in 2005 refining used 
cooking oil from local restaurants and food processors to make transport fuel.   Diesel 
production rose to 17 million gallons by 2012, necessitating the inclusion of canola oil, 
since, according to the firm’s founder Tyson Keever, all the used cooking oil in Oregon 
                                                 
4 Big Noise Films, et al. (1999). 
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would only account for 3.2 million gallons of diesel (Stiles 2010).  The company is a 
member of the Sustainable Biodiesel Alliance (SBA), a non-profit organization that 
supports “community based” diesel production and whose founders and supporters 
include the celebrities Daryl Hannah, Willie Nelson and Woody Harrelson.  Community 
based production involves sourcing and refining feedstocks locally rather than importing 
them.  While the small producers who form SBA pledge to follow sustainable methods, 
they will not have a substantive impact on environmental, social, labor and food concerns 
in rural communities in the North or the South, as their affiliates lack the economic clout 
of agribusiness giants who control the start to finish processing (GRAIN 2007).  Keever 
acknowledges that agribusiness giants Archer Illinois-based Daniels Midland (ADM) and 
Minnesota’s Cargill supply Oregon with most of the agrofuel to offset the 720 million 
gallons consumed in the state (Stiles 2010). Capitalist competition and the integration of 
the global food and fuel markets favor MNCs who owe allegiance only to their 
shareholders and can deliver more and cheaper product while achieving vertical 
integration.  Moreover, the environmental and economic crises provide new narratives to 
fend off critics.  Small producers deliver a loyal market of “conscious” consumers and 
burnish the credentials of the fuels, paving the way for the big companies.  For instance 
the SBA’s website addresses the concern of indirect land use change by noting that 
destruction of the Amazon rainforest has been steadily dropping since the introduction of 
agrofuels (SBA 2012).  What the website does not mention is that, following 
international denunciation surrounding the loss of the Amazon, much agrofuel cultivation 
shifted to Brazil’s Cerrado, which proponents claim is a “wasteland” (Avery 2006; Klink 
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& Machado 2005).  Such claims hand agrofuel companies convenient advertising points 
in their drive to burnish damaged images. 
After years of waging war against the growing body of evidence verifying the 
existence of climate change and its connection to burning fossil fuels, oil companies 
began re-branding themselves to adapt to this new reality.  British Petroleum is one 
example.  In 2000 BP abandoned its green shield and adopted a bright green and yellow 
“Helios” (after the Greek sun god) to reflect its new mission: ‘better people, better 
products, big picture, beyond petroleum’ (BP 2011).  Seven years later BP linked up with 
public universities to create the largest industry-funded academic body in US history, The 
Energy Biosciences Institute, a $50 million/year partnership between BP, the University 
of Illinois, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.  The lab’s mission is to “explore 
the application of advanced knowledge of biological processes, materials and 
mechanisms to the energy sector.”  EBI’s research areas include “feedstock development, 
biofuels production and fossil fuel bioprocessing” among others (EBI 2011; Holleman 
and Clausen 2008).   
The petroleum companies followed a phalanx of powerful seed, chemical, and 
grain processing corporations who were actively searching for new ways to diversify 
their portfolios amid sagging profits. Together ADM and Cargill control 75 percent of the 
global grain trade while the US-based chemical giants Monsanto and DuPont, along with 
Swiss seed and pesticide company Syngenta, control close to half of the global hybrid 
and genetically modified (GM) seed share, but these companies were able to realize new 
prospects as agricultural prices began tumbling (Altieri 2009; GRAIN 2007).  The 
agribusiness sector forged agreements with oil and car companies providing them with an 
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opportunity to rehabilitate their reputations, tarnished as they were by reports of melting 
icecaps and drowning polar bears, by promoting their  “green” credentials while reaping 
hefty profits. To that end Monsanto, the manufacturer of Roundup, partnered with ADM 
and Conoco-Phillips while BP cooperated with DuPont and Toyota along with Monsanto 
and Mendel Biotechnology.  Investment firm Goldman-Sachs rounded out a partnership 
that consisted of Royal Dutch Shell, Cargill, and Syngenta.  This agroindustrial Hydra 
eliminates all the obstacles traditionally associated with agriculture by capturing both 
ends of the production cycle.  Genetically modified seeds, chemical fertilizers, and 
pesticides are produced and sold to farmers at the beginning of the cycle while the 
product is refined and sold to consumers as “biofuel” at the end (Holt-Gimenez and 
Shattuck 2009).     
The companies wasted no time cultivating politicians and environmental 
organizations in their quest for new markets.  Since 2000 ADM has contributed an 
estimated $ 3.7 million to state and federal politicians (Holt-Gimenez and Kenfield 
2009).  Holt-Gimenez and Kenfield (2009) report that the company donated $1 million to 
Kansas Senator Bob Dole and other Republicans during the 1992 election.  Dole returned 
the favor by helping the company garner billions of dollars in subsidies and tax breaks.  
As scientific evidence began to emerge revealing the detrimental social, environmental, 
and economic impacts of crop-based fuels, capital enlisted environmental and labor 
groups to preserve the narrative of agrofuel “sustainability.”  In November 2006 the 
Swiss university École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne convened the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) whose original members included BP, Shell Oil, Petrobras 
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(the Brazilian oil and ethanol company), Bunge, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
(Shattuck 2009).   
On the 23rd of March 2011, the RSB released its plan for voluntary third-party 
certification after consultation with over 120 organizations including farmers, refiners, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and retailers.  At the unveiling of standards, 
Elizabeth Bramble of the National Wildlife Fund (NWF) and RSB’s Steering Board 
Chair stated, “Now we look to the marketplace to recognize industry leaders who are 
getting it right by producing biofuels that benefit both people and the planet” (Maestas 
2011).  Shattuck (2009) points to the past performances of other voluntary standards set 
forth by industry, social, and environmental partnerships for a glimpse of what is to 
come.  In all cases, certifying bodies like the Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RRS), the 
Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
have been accused of illegal forest destruction and land deals as well as horrific labor 
abuses and land conflicts (Shattuck 2009).  In fact on the 7th of April 2011, IOI Corp 
Bhd, Malaysia’s second largest oil palm plantation owner and a major exporter of 
agrodiesel to the European Union with refineries in the Netherlands, was accused of 
illegal deforestation and land conflicts (Milieudefensie & FOEE 2010).  Others have 
documented how WWF, the Sierra Club, NWF and other environmental groups have 
given their stamp of approval to products and extractive practices or engaged in “fortress 
conservation” in exchange for hefty donations  (Hari 2010; Kelly 2011; McGahey 2008). 
What has resulted from these alliances is commonly known as “greenwashing,” a process 
whereby companies profit while maintaining an environmentally friendly image by 
association with well-known environmental organizations. 
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Leveraging the “Worried Well”5
 
: Agrofuel Fetishism 
The market, in the form of researchers, policymakers, corporations, finance 
institutions, and politicians, is employing a number of methods to increase public support 
for agrofuels through messaging stressing their importance as “green energy” choices 
with regard to “peak oil,” climate change, and energy security crises (Van de Velde, L., 
Verbeke, W., Popp, M. & Van Huylenbroeck, G., 2010, p. 5541). Researchers in 
agricultural economics are taking note, not only of the gendered decisions regarding car 
ownership, but also of the message framing necessary to promote agrofuels as an 
alternative to petroleum.  One of the more interesting documents in this vein is a study 
acknowledging European women’s car purchase decision-making and stressing the need 
“educate” consumers by avoiding revealing the drawbacks of agrofuels and advancing a 
positive image (Van de Velde et al. 2010, p. 5547).  
In their 2010 study, Van de Velde et al., of Belgium and the US, restated that 
women in the Global North have considerable influence in car purchasing, and their 
identification as potential consumers poses an “enormous growth potential” (p. 5547) that 
remains untapped by the automobile industry.  However, the scope of their research 
mainly focused on how to pitch agrofuels to consumers to increase “concern” for climate 
change and  “perceived consumer effectiveness” (PCE) (p. 5542) in the form of 
consumption of agrofuels.  The sample of 260 adults in the Flemish region of Belgium 
found that the men in their sample responded with more concern when addressed with a 
“negative” message stressing the “incalculable” (p. 5548) consequences for the global 
                                                 
5 DuPuis, E. M., Harrison, J.L., & Goodman, D. (2011), p. 296.   
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community unless energy efficient technologies and agrofuels were adopted but that their 
concern did not translate into effective PCE - a belief that their individual consumer 
actions make a difference.  However, they also found that a positively worded message 
stressing the dangers of climate change but advancing solutions through the adoption of 
“biofuels” and fuel efficient vehicles not only caused a large amount of concern for the 
environment among the women sampled, but also translated into positive consumer 
action. The authors concluded that:  
For people who have a less positive perception of biofuels, who show less 
involvement and who express lower knowledge and a perceived lack of 
information about biofuels, the perceived consumer effectiveness is increased 
when the possible solutions of the energy and environmental problems are 
stressed within the message.  Although, this type of message will also increase 
their level of concern, the risk to present the problem as insoluble is small because 
also an increase in PCE will be realised.6
 
     
 
This research appeared in the pages of the journal Energy Policy as charges of 
environmental unsustainability and the financial crisis of 2009 plagued agrofuel 
companies and their financiers.  Nevertheless, promoters of the alternative fuels could 
take solace in their powerful new alliances, the certainty of a rise in oil prices, and market 
receptivity among the “worried well” -- environmentally-conscious white people 
(DuPuis, E. M., Harrison, J. L., & Goodman, D., 2011, p. 296).  Promoting the 
“sustainability” of agrofuels is particularly effective in light of the current, yet often 
unreflective, discourse in the food, climate justice, and anti-globalization movements 
(AGM) sweeping the Northern countries.  
The racial and class conceptions of locally produced agriculture, heirloom seeds, 
and backyard organic gardens neatly articulate with the essentialist rhetoric of 
                                                 
6 Van de Velde, L., Verbeke, W., Popp, M. & Van Huylenbroeck, G., (2010), p. 5547. 
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ecofeminist Vandana Shiva (2007) and others (Salleh 2010) whose populist 
condemnations of corporations and runaway consumption play especially well with 
progressive whites in the North.  Shiva’s vigorous rejection of modernity draws on Hindu 
spirituality and “maternal feminism” (Cochrane 2007, p.176) to glorify the 
“embeddedness” of indigenous peoples, particularly women, in nature while refusing to 
interrogate the inequitable interplay of class, caste, and gender (Cochrane 2007; Nanda 
1997) among various groups.  
Lavin (2009) and others (DuPuis et al. 2011; Holt-Giménez 2011) have noted 
how local food organizations and activists, while espousing astute anti-corporate/anti-
capitalist sentiments, locate their discourse in the area of consumer choice rather than 
critiquing cross-cutting issues of race, class and geographical location.  Additionally, 
from a feminist perspective, Cochrane (2007) and Nanda (1997) observe that progressive 
and radical academics and activists’ uncritical acceptance of non-Western social and 
material inequality in the name of spiritual and cultural difference hands global capital a 
legitimacy it could never have dreamed of.   
Ecofeminists such as Salleh and Shiva ignore how this more savvy and flexible 
capitalism exploits local inequalities for its own gain, particularly the unpaid work of 
women.  Instead they castigate Northern intellectuals for owning washing machines while 
extolling the “joy” (p. 215) of the backbreaking work of poor rural men and women and 
their “special knowledge” of the environment that stems from their impoverishment as 
“life-affirming” (Salleh 2010, p. 212).  Moreover, the simultaneous glorification and 
wholesale acceptance of “indigenous” and “women” as essential positions, rather than as 
intersecting institutional categories with material embodiments that are also sites of 
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internal contestation and renegotiation, glosses over historical inequalities, struggles, and 
negotiations among and within those groups (Cochrane 2007; Hecht 2011; Pye 2010) and 
denies them the ability to voice to any opposition to this idealized image.  The populist 
rejection of all development as imperialist and patriarchal unconsciously opens the door 
to homegrown discrimination and capitalist expansion. Pye (2010), for example, notes 
that Vía Campesina and other agrofuel opponents’ framing of the fuels as “neo 
colonialism-imperialism” (p. 869) and their lack of a transnational strategy omits 
examination of dominant Southern companies and their exploitation of transnational 
migrants in agrofuel production.  However, as Nanda (1997) recognizes, the new global 
capitalism is no longer the “predatory West” but an “authentically global abstraction” (p. 
366) that is fluid and flexible geographically, economically, politically and culturally. 
And agrofuel proponents are listening carefully and adopting various indigenous sayings, 
theological perspectives, and values to put forward an image of the fuels as markers of 
“sustainable” consumption and promoters of economic development.  Nothing could be 
further from the truth.   
 
Linking Food and Fuel 
 
Currently, the trajectory of countries in the Global South, with the financing of 
large banks and corporations in both the North and South (Brazil, Indonesia, India, China 
and Malaysia), and the facilitation of development agencies and NGO’s is to identify 
suitable land on which to grow energy crops for local use and to meet the renewable fuel 
mandates in the growing Southern economies as well as the Global North.  However, 
integration of food and fuel into a single global market, high subsidies for agrofuel 
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production, and “free trade” agreements have contributed to rising food prices that 
disproportionately affect the poorest people in the world (Pahl 2005).   From 2001 to 
2007 worldwide ethanol production more than doubled rising from 20 billion liters to 50 
billion liters, while agrodiesel output grew from 0.8 billion liters to nearly 4 billion in the 
same six year span (Banse, 2007; Tenenbaum 2008). As food riots in Haiti, Cameroon, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Somalia, Senegal, Mexico, and Indonesia rocked the 
globe in the spring of 2008, the rich nations went on the defensive.  German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, whose country is Europe’s largest producer of biodiesel, blamed the poor 
nations for their woes:  
"If you travel to India these days, then a main part of the debate is about the 
'second meal'...People are eating twice a day, and if a third of one billion people in 
India do that, it adds up to 300 million people. That's a large part of the 
EuropeanUnion...And if they suddenly consume twice as much food as before and 
if 100 million Chinese start drinking milk too, then of course our milk quotas 
become skewed... (Heller 2008.)”  
Her US counterpart, President George Bush, admitted in an interview that food prices had 
risen but also noted that the middle class of India had grown to more than 350 million 
and so was placing a strain on the world’s food supply (Gerstenzang 2008).   
Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, warned G-7 finance ministers gathered in 
Washington that food prices had risen too rapidly for people in the poor nations to feed 
themselves.  In two months the cost of rice jumped 75% while wheat rose 120% (CNN 
2008). But at the U.N. Food Summit in Rome, Brazil’s president Lula da Silva and U.S. 
and European delegates fought back attempts to place a moratorium on agrofuels, 
claiming food prices are not linked to fuel.  Before the opening of the summit, the leaders 
of their agrofuel industries warned FAO director general Jacques Diouf not to raise 
concerns about the food-fuel link.  He ignored them and asked how $12 billion could be 
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spent on agrofuel subsidies and 100 metric tons of food could be diverted from human 
mouths to feed vehicles (Borger 2008). Rejecting Diouf’s and others’ protests, the U.S. 
Secretary of Agriculture claimed that agrofuels accounted for “only” 3% of the world 
food price hikes. At the conclusion of the meeting UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon 
deferring criticism of the US’s $11 billion agrofuel subsidies, instead called for a “greater 
degree of international consensus” on agrofuels (Wilkinson 2008).   Yet, despite the fact 
that women perform the majority of the agricultural activity under arduous conditions and 
often on marginal or degraded land  (Rossi & Lambrou 2008), the governments of the 
South eagerly began inventorying their marginal land, supported by their agribusiness 
sectors and local NGOs. Diversion of arable land to energy cropping is having a negative 
impact on food security because, in many regions, women cultivate staples for the 
household and also for market.  The prioritization of agrofuel crops has resulted not only 
in hunger but also in women’s loss of authority over land-use decisions particularly over 
the marginal areas they are often forced to access for income supplementation (Tsikata & 
Yaro 2011). 
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CHAPTER III 
GREENWASHING THE METABOLIC RIFT 
“The Maasai maintain that all humanity derives its spirit from Mother Earth, and 
therefore that all humanity has a right to roam and a responsibility to protect the land by 
maintaining its balance.  This principle is informed by an acknowledgement of resource 
scarcity: As elders explain: ‘You can never increase the land, only God can do that’”- 
Inter-American Development Bank7
 
  
“At night, bulldozers destroyed our rubber gardens and even our rice fields...What will 
happen to us?  The government has ambitious plans for new large-scale plantations.  
Actually there should be seven villages marked in this area.  But they are not mentioned.  
Does this mean, for the outside world we do not exist anymore?” - Icin, a Dayak farmer 
displaced from his “sleeping” land by PTPNXIII, the state-owned Indonesian palm oil 
company8
 
  
The increasing expansion of agrofuel feedstocks has pushed the agricultural 
frontier into wilderness and formerly degraded areas resulting in massive deforestation, 
water pollution, loss of biodiversity, and displacement of people, including the Maasai 
and Dayak.  While corporations and government promoters maintain that agrofuels are 
sustainable alternatives to petroleum, they threaten to turn hitherto uncultivated areas of 
the Southern Hemisphere into green deserts.  What is different about the fuels relative to 
other agribusiness endeavors is the new focus on “marginal” lands on which many 
women rely for household provisioning. Partly in response to the charge that agrofuels 
usurp fertile agricultural land in aid-dependent countries and divert food to fuel tanks, 
policy makers proposed that feedstocks be grown on degraded, idle, and wasteland, 
dubbed “marginal land,” in the Global South.  The United Kingdom’s Gallagher Review 
(2008) and The Royal Society’s Sustainable Biofuels (2008) as well as other policy white 
                                                 
7 Rothkopf 2009, p.78 
 
8 Gaia Foundation et al 2008, p. 4 
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papers admitted that agrofuel production risks transforming agricultural land with 
associated greenhouse gas emissions and suggested that agrofuel development on 
marginal or degraded land was not only desirable but would entail the co-benefits of 
revitalizing the land while providing carbon dioxide savings (Gallagher 2008; Mathews 
2007; The Royal Society 2008).  The suggestion that agrofuels grown on “marginal” land 
can be “sustainable” is disingenuous at best and reflects a cruel disregard for the world’s 
poor by elites in both hemispheres in the hunt to squeeze more profit out of every corner 
of the globe.  Furthermore, targeting marginal land directly affects poor rural women. 
A U.N. (Rossi & Lambrou 2008) study noted that often women do not have 
access to land, credit, or inheritance rights without the consent of living male relatives.  
Women, because of their inability to own land, obtain credit, and other factors, often keep 
their households together by farming, gathering fuel, grazing animals, and obtaining 
building materials on so –called marginal lands or “wastelands.”  These lands are usually 
common property resources where women gather items provide their households with 
subsistence items.  
Studies of how much marginal land exists vary widely from 386 to 500 million 
hectares.  The rhetoric among governments and multilateral organizations has focused on 
the term “marginal land,” yet the areas targeted for feedstock development are often those 
with higher value lands in areas rich in biodiversity.  Moreover, the terms “marginal 
land” and “abandoned land” have been conflated in many assessments.  One study 
deemed “abandoned” any land previously used as cropland since 1700 and subsequently 
not under use when modern satellite imagery showed it as forest or on the outskirts of 
urban areas.  Furthermore, no comprehensive evaluation has been done to determine 
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whether satellite imagery captures prior and ongoing smallholder subsistence activities 
such as fuelwood collection, grazing, and shifting cultivation (Vermeulen and Cotula 
2010, p. 903; Gaia Foundation et al. 2008, p. 2).  Additionally, indigenous people and 
smallholders are often actively managing biodiverse landscapes through selective 
breeding, weeding, cultivation of wild and naturalized species, and gathering activities.  
The monoculture that results from land concentration and fragmentation of the CPR’s of 
smallholders and indigenous peoples has a deleterious effect on biodiversity and 
consequently their food security (Franco et al. 2010).  
 
Marginalizing Land and People 
 
The so-called “marginal lands” of the southern hemisphere, in many cases, are not 
incorporated into the market and so are considered variously “wastelands,” “sleeping,” 
“idle,” and “degraded.”  Most of these lands support millions of people and are vital to 
their livelihoods, food sovereignty, and even the conservation of biodiversity.  Much of 
marginal land is not privately held but is land that has been under traditional or 
communal proprietorship for generations.  In other cases it has been reallocated under 
land reform without formal titles or is “state” or “public” land (White and Dasgupta 
2010, p. 600; Gaia Foundation et al. 2008, p. 2).  In areas of mixed arable and marginal or 
depleted land, women are often allocated the least cultivable areas (Gaia Foundation et al. 
2008, p. 2; Howard 2003: 34; Rossi and Lambrou 2008).  
Plant and animal biodiversity has diminished in much of the “developed” world 
due to urbanization and intensive cultivation of land for large-scale agricultural 
production.  As a result of this historical capitalist expansion, “nature” is considered a 
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thing apart from humans and set aside in reserves, evaluated on the basis of ecosystem 
location, species attributes, and economic value (Howard 2003; Kelly 2011; McGahey 
2008; Waring 2004).  In the Global South, the majority of poor rural communities reside 
near biologically sensitive areas as the result of historical, racial and ethnic, political, or 
economic circumstances.  Some of them are mobile herders or practice shifting swidden 
(slash and burn) agriculture whose experience under colonialism has consigned them to 
marginal or degraded landscapes.  Others have lived in their regions for a very long time 
but are seeing encroachment on their lands by agrofuel and other activities.  As a result 
they must rely upon a variety of animal and plant species adapted to local conditions and 
cultivated over centuries or contend with introduced species through practical experience 
and selection.  
The “marginal” or heterogeneous (mixed use) lands often have been impoverished 
by previous colonial agricultural and/or forestry projects, and the people living on them 
cannot afford to purchase high-yielding plant varieties and external inputs such as 
fertilizers and pesticides, veterinary products, and high-quality feeds needed to sustain 
their communities.  Women’s “subsistence” activities rarely provide adequate nutrition to 
their families, so they often rely on marketing wild-gathered herbs and fruits, handicrafts, 
and farm products to supplement the family income and diet.  
Poor women, because of their lower status, in many traditional rural cultures 
suffer the most from monocropping regimes because they have no concrete tenure over 
the arable land at their disposal and often are allocated degraded land on which to grow 
food or keep livestock.  They gather or cultivate “weeds” (Turner et al. 2011, p. 198) for 
supplementation to their diets, fodder for their domestic animals, collect wood and 
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grasses for housing and fuel for cooking and heating, herb species for medicinal 
remedies, as well as important cultural items.  Because of poverty, previous resettlement, 
and agricultural patterns these activities can and, in some instances, do degrade the 
natural environment and result in deforestation.  However, local communities also 
preserve rich genetic reservoirs of locally-adapted species that protect their stewards from 
crop failure and animal deaths, ward off malnutrition, disease, and hunger and are thus 
integral components of food security for the communities that manage them. In addition 
they hold global significance as living gene banks.   
 
Enacting the “Natural”  
 
The gendered division of labor, in its basic form, is the allocation of tasks to 
particular people where the tasks’ routine assignment becomes a proxy for normative 
identity and intrinsic ability - for what it means to be a “man” or a “woman” (Kabeer 
1994). The relation’s structural nature derives from the constraints it places on the people 
involved (Risman 2004; Martin 2004) through “sedimentation” (Kabeer 1994, p. 59), so 
that prior divisions of labor take on social and/or religious significance over time.  Within 
a given local context, the consistent and rigid consignment of activities and tasks to 
women and men based on their “natural” abilities and routine performance enhances skill 
sets, reinforcing the notion that women and men are naturally better at particular jobs, 
and determines whose knowledge and labor is worthy of visibility and acknowledgement 
(Ridgeway 2009; Kabeer 1994).  
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While being accepted on an individual level, these beliefs are institutionalized 
through their widespread dissemination and enactment at the social organizational level 
such as within religious, governmental, and other entities.  Moreover, though they appear 
to be universal, they directly reflect the practices and understandings of the dominant 
group (Ridgeway 2009).    For men in many cultures to be seen nurturing children or, 
worse still, performing domestic labor such as carrying water or fuel for the household, 
cooking, doing laundry, etc. is to risk emasculation before their peers in order to maintain 
the gender order.  Local and regional cultural conceptions of femininity and masculinity 
are also hegemonic, setting forth ideal norms of behavior for men and women (Ridgeway 
2009; Risman 2004; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005).  In addition to restricting each 
gender to certain responsibilities and activities, the gender order also constrains to whom 
women and men of different class positions can interact and in which physical spaces  
which they may conduct their day-to-day business.  In many cases women and men have 
different material access to natural resources such as plants, fields, and forests (Howard 
and Nabanoga 2007; Howard 2003).  Despite the claim by agrofuel proponents that the 
fuels’ introduction will end deforestation and result in the “greening of formerly waste 
and degraded lands” (Mathews 2007, p. 3556), there has been widespread clearing of 
both primary and secondary forests with negative economic and physical results for 
women. 
 
Deforestation 
 
Research shows that forests, as well as possessing incalculable value in furnishing 
“environmental services,” provide resources that play an important role in “poverty 
 
 
53 
mitigation” (Sunderlin et al. 2004, p. 1386).  It is nearly impossible to sum up the 
importance of forests. They sequester carbon dioxide, retain moisture and minerals, and 
act as habitat for plants, animals, and humans.  All forest types supply a range of fuels, 
foods, building materials, medicines, and religious, cultural, and household products to 
human communities. Forests are home to at least 300 million people worldwide.  
Additionally, 1.2 billion of the world’s poorest people, 70% of whom are women, depend 
on forests for some part of their livelihood (FAO 2009).  Because many communities use 
forest products for subsistence or informal trade purposes, there are no accurate measures 
of how much they contribute to household income, but the evidence suggests that it is at 
least 20% in poor households (UNEP 2009).   
Often the ways in which men and women relate to forests follows a general 
division of labor that locates men within the formalized sector while women occupy a 
more informal role in extraction and management. Men tend to extract forest resources 
such as sawn logs and other timber products for sale in the formal market while women 
generally collect wood for fuel, fencing, and housing, and non-timber forest products 
(NTFPs) for medicines, household items, food subsistence, and informal sale and trade.   
Studies show that poor rural women are generally more dependent on trees than are their 
male counterparts (UNEP 2009).   
 Two and a half billion of the world’s people rely on biomass (field stubble, 
animal dung, and wood) to heat their homes and cook their food (Clancy, Oparaocha & 
Roehr 2004). Women and their children, particularly girls, gather and carry that fuel. The 
work is backbreaking and consumes large amounts of time and metabolic energy 
(ENERGIA 2006).  In Zambia the time a woman spends collecting and carrying wood is 
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800 hours per year and in Gambia and Tanzania it is about 300 hours (Rossi and 
Lambrou 2008).  Additionally, in sub-Saharan Africa women’s responsibility for caring 
for relatives affected by HIV/AIDS robs them of the time they would devote to 
subsistence and income-generating agricultural activities, forcing them to rely on forest 
foods and the sale of fuel wood to make ends meet (FAO 2009). 
Ironically, the expansion of the agricultural frontier as the result of agrofuel 
feedstock monoculture and the consequent deforestation forces poor women to walk 
longer distances to obtain their own fuel, narrowing what precious time they have to 
make household decisions or engage in activities that ensure the economic and food 
security of their families, or they must spend precious funds to buy charcoal, 
impoverishing them further.  In areas of East Africa there is evidence that scarcity of 
wood has caused many pastoralists and smallholders families to skip meals to conserve 
fuel (FAO 2009).  In West Africa, deforestation is occurring rapidly, particularly in areas 
that are not considered economically important where women gather fuel in the dry 
season to make charcoal.   
Ghana has lost 46% of its dry forest and 31% of its fallow vegetation to agrofuel 
plantation development (German et al.2010).  Schoeneveld et al. (2010) found that fields 
growing so-called “minor” crops (those belonging to women) were cleared to make way 
for Jatropha cultivation. In the Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions of Ghana the 
researchers found that a “significant proportion” of the land acquired by the companies 
was also forested.  Women collected wild fruits, medicinal plants, shea nuts (Parkia 
biglobosa), dawdawa (Vittelaria paradoxa) and fuelwood from the nearby forests.  Loss 
of the cultivated “minor” plants, those associated with women, and access to nearby 
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NTFPs reduced household incomes and crops important to the food security of the local 
people.   
Deforestation impacts in the study area were “most profound” for women for two 
reasons: they lost sources of income, and the loss of land and forest access placed 
additional time burdens on their labor. Since women also make charcoal to sell in the dry 
season when income from farm products is less stable, they had to expend more time 
going to collect it; three quarters of the women from households in the study area 
reported that they had to spend more time walking to obtain firewood.  Moreover, the 
authors found that indirect pressure on the remaining forests increased as women 
continued to gather wood on smaller patches of forestland (Schoneveld et al. 2010).  
 A case study by Tsikata and Yaro (2011) of the impacts of Jatropha in Northern 
Ghana found that the presence of the Norwegian-owned Solar Harvest Ltd., formerly 
Biofuel Africa Ltd., increased land tenure insecurity but also had a negative 
environmental impact on both genders. The migrant Dagomba people of the villages 
Kpachaa, Jahse, Tugu, Kpalkore, Joro, Chegu, and Tijo saw their chiefs enter into deals 
with the company that enabled it to establish 400 hectares of the feedstock and half that 
amount for maize on the best arable land.  Most affected was Kpachaa whose people 
moved to a small area of marginal land sandwiched between the village and a forest 
reserve.   
The authors found that class politics within the community ensured that wealthy 
elites took advantage of the benefits of traditional power to the detriment to the poorer 
farmers who alternately became tools of resistance and acceptance of the project but 
reaped the least of the services and were cut off from community property resources.  A 
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quarter of the village was affected.  The wealthier farmers, based in neighboring towns, 
simply picked up and moved to other farming areas, while the poorest and, consequently, 
the most reliant on the local environment, suffered.  Men reported a decline in wildlife 
species and population lessening hunting opportunities (with the exception of mice) that 
previously attracted wealthy urban hunters.   Fulani herders’ controlled burning was also 
causing a shortage of roofing thatch.     
Poor women’s experience can be seen in 31-year-old Lareba’s story. Lareba 
moved to Kpachaa to take advantage of good harvests where she and her husband farmed 
yam, rice, maize, and peanuts on 7 active acres with 3 under fallow rotation.  Her 
husband had a good job with Solar Harvest, but was later fired when he tried to clear 
virgin forest to replace the four acres of farmland he lost to the project.  Lareba’s own 
farm is an acre of peanuts.  To make ends meet, she also gathered shea nuts to make shea 
butter, and she also collected firewood and made charcoal for free from the commons to 
sell in the dry season.  She earned enough from the sale of just the firewood alone to buy 
food to get her family through to the next farming season and enable her to afford 
expenses for her two children.   She has given up both of these activities because the 
resources are too far away to be accessible by foot, as the company cleared the “bush 
land” of all vegetation, and relocated farmers deforested their share of it as well. Now her 
family experiences food shortages from 4 to 5 months of the year.  Local gender politics 
articulated with agrofuel capitalism in the loss of the commons as male community 
members admitted to warding off government environmental officials to enable the 
company’s deforestation of the women’s economic trees in favor of commercial benefit 
of paid employment that would go to the men (Tsikata & Yaro 2011).   
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Shao reports that, according to cultural and spiritual tradition, patches of original 
forest are preserved and considered sacred because they are believed to contain ancestral 
spirits that protect the community.  These dawadawa and shea nut trees and other 
important tree species also harbor and protect biodiversity as well as retain moisture in 
the dry seasons (Shao 2002).  Community preservation of bush lands and forests for 
economic benefit, along with women’s management activities in the forested areas, often 
encourages biodiversity as well as ensuring the availability of water. 
 
Water Loss 
 
Along with deforestation agrofuel production’s displacing effect on land use has a 
negative impact on water resources exacerbating both scarcity and pollution as 
deforestation and chemical applications increase (De Fraiture, Giordano and Liao 2008; 
Gerbens-Leenes, Hoekstra and Van der Meer 2009).  Worldwide water demand is 
growing due to a number of factors including population growth, urbanization, climate 
change, and poverty.  As more land is appropriated for energy crops, water demand will 
rise and allocation of water resources will shift.  Increases in oil prices and agrofuel 
feedstock expansion will result in both a rise in water prices and competition for the 
available water for irrigation. Eighty-six percent of the world’s freshwater is dedicated to 
the production of food and fiber (Gerbens-Leenes et al. 2009), and access to clean water 
affects more than one billion people worldwide with most of the scarcity concentrated in 
the Global South (Roy & Crow 2004).  
Without accounting for agrofuel production, 7,130 km3 and 2,630 km3 of the 
world’s freshwater is lost to evapotranspiration and irrigation withdrawals respectively 
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each year.  For comparison, Lake Huron, one of the Great Lakes in the United States has 
a volume of 3,500 km3.   In 2007, about 45 billion cubic meters of irrigation water was 
used for agrofuel feedstocks; this number amounted to about 6 times more water than was 
consumed globally (Bringezu et al 2009).  Evapotranspiration and irrigation of agrofuel 
feedstock crops is estimated to pull an additional 100 km3 and 44 km3 respectively 
(DeFraiture et al. 2008).  Building on previous bioenergy research, Gerbens-Leenes et al. 
(2009) studied the water footprints (WFs) of the 12 crops that comprise 80% of all global 
crop production.  They also included Jatropha because of its relation to agrofuel energy, 
although oil palm was not included.  Calculating the number of liters of water to produce 
one liter of fuel, their study found that the WF of liquid agrofuels was large in 
comparison to conventional sources of energy.  The water-to-fuel ratios for the agrodiesel 
crops soy, rapeseed, and Jatropha were 13,676, 14,201, and 19,924 liters respectively to 
make one liter of fuel.  While the agroethanol crops sugarcane and maize accounted for 
2,516 and 2,570 liters of water to produce one liter of ethanol, leading the authors to 
question whether “we should use our limited water resource base for food or energy” 
(Gerbens-Leenes et al. 2009).    
Agrofuel and commercial banana growing operations are competing with small 
farms for water on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao.  Following the Philippine 
government’s 2007 agrofuel off-set mandate, approximately $1 billion and $1.3 billion 
changed hands between the state-owned Philippine National Oil Co. and Biogreen 
Energy (Malaysia) and NRG Chemical Engineering Pte. (UK) respectively for the 
establishment of a 1 million hectare Jatropha plantation with refineries replacing at least 
500 hectares of farmland on which the indigenous B’laan tribe cultivate food.  In 
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Sarangani, the B’laan women grow rice, bananas, corn, and root crops to feed their 
families.  Speaking to people assembled to address violence against women, Lorna Mora, 
a leader of the B’laan, told how agrofuel plantations were encroaching on indigenous 
land and displacing food crops.  Citing government policy in favor of short-term gain, she 
said,  
We cannot eat three times a day like we used to [because only a few parcels of 
land have been left to till]....The [establishment of] jatropha plantations may 
appeal as an immediate solution to [the] local energy [problem], but this initiative 
does not [consider] the social effects (Caluza 2008).   
 
Smallholders abandoned planting rice in favor of Jatropha but found that it is not 
as drought-tolerant as development agencies have claimed.  One farmer had not reaped 
the benefits after three years in production because of an infestation of pests and water 
access problems.  To meet its blending mandate the state has prioritized water allocation 
for large concerns such as banana and oil palm plantations, leaving rural women like 
Erlinda Garcia with fewer income options. Ponds that used to harbor cogon grass, a 
traditional roofing material, were drained to supply the nearby palm estates.  Garcia and 
other women gathered the grass and freshwater snails to sell in the market for money to 
supplement their incomes as gleaners, weeders, and harvesters in the rice paddies.  Now 
that the resources are no longer available to them, they must find other ways to replace 
the crucial income (Reyes 2007). 
The deforestation necessary for agrofuel production results in the loss of creeks 
and small rivers during dry seasons and flooding during the rainy seasons.  Rural 
communities usually have access only to such bodies of water, as water services are 
generally scarce and, when they are available, expensive. In many communities men and 
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women have different approaches and allocation priorities for water.  In much of the 
Global South the division of labor within the household dictates that women and their 
children, usually girls, are charged with providing water for the household, garden, and 
animals. In many cultures, the sight of a man collecting water would bring shame upon 
him and his family (Ahmed 2000).   Men generally engage in activities that have more 
market value and so allocate water to commercial use, such as their businesses, while 
women use water for household activities and informal economic purposes (Ahmed 
2000; FAO 2009).  Women and their children may walk from 2 to 8 hours a day to get 
water for the family’s needs, often waiting their turn to fill up their containers and carry 
them home.  The pollution and dessication of water sources associated with 
monocropping is forcing communities to go farther for their water as well as increasing 
impacts on local water sources (Holt-Gimenez & Shattuck 2009; Orth 2007).    
Typically production of agrofuel feedstocks is associated with soil erosion and 
nutrient runoff.  While tillage practices and chemical applications vary according to soil 
and plant type, the monocultural conditions demanded by agrofuel feedstock production 
makes fertilizer and herbicide input inevitable and consequent pollution of groundwater 
and coastal zones a strong possibility (Dominguez-Faus, Powers, Burken & Alvarez 
2009; Rossi & Lambrou 2008). Some of the so-called marginal lands tend to have lower 
tilth, necessarily requiring application of fertilizers and water to grow energy crops.  
Since these lands are more prone to degradation, topsoil loss, and chemical runoff, there 
is a real possibility that production would increase the burden of water demand and 
pollution as well as petrochemical applications (Dominguez-Faus et al. 2009).  
Dominguez-Faus, Powers, Burken and Alvarez (2009) reported that chemicals used on 
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crops grown in the US for energy feedstocks contributed to hypoxia (dead zones) in the 
Gulf of Mexico.  The nitrogen contributing to the condition was runoff from fertile 
agricultural land in the US “corn belt.”  However, the authors noted that the use of 
marginal land to grow agrofuel feedstocks would require greater tillage and inputs of 
fertilizers with a corresponding impact on water and soil quality.  
Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck (2009) report that Brazilian rivers and creeks are 
drying up as water is diverted to eucalyptus (a “second-generation” feedstock) 
plantations, while a case study by Orth (2007) found that water sources near oil palm 
plantations in Central Kalimantan had lower quality than those located farther away 
(Holt-Gimenez & Shattuck 2009; Orth 2007).  Orth reported that Palm Oil Mill Effluent 
(POME), a mixture of fats and crushed shells generated in the processing of agrodiesel, 
was found in rivers near her study area.  POME has a high biological and chemical 
activity that deprives aquatic life of oxygen.  Monitoring data conducted in the nearby 
Barito River found POME contamination had resulted in massive fish death (Orth 2007).  
Additionally, a water quality study in the Ketapang District of West Kalimantan by 
Carlson and Curran (2007) found that streams in close proximity to oil palm plantations 
had elevated temperatures, much greater turbidity levels, and higher biological activity.  
These factors affect fish species and in turn contribute to greater food insecurity (Orth 
2007).    
While there are no case studies available that detail the gendered water impacts of 
agrofuels, clearly diversion of water to feedstock irrigation, disappearance of streams and 
watering holes, and pollution of water sources deeply affect rural communities. Julia and 
White (2011) reported palm oil companies treated the water within palm plantations in 
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Sanggau as their property, forcing women who were fishing to throw back their catch.   
Further, as water collectors and managers, women often know the best sources of water 
and can detect pollution through taste and appearance (Ahmed 2000).  Yet, while those 
skills serve their communities well, pollution and the outright disappearance of water 
sources place more of a burden on them when they are forced to go farther in search of 
clean water.  Additionally, the loss of clean, viable water sources destroys the wild and 
naturalized biodiversity upon which many rural communities depend. This, in turn, leads 
to loss of traditional knowledge and skills.   
 
Disappearing Biodiversity 
 
Genetically diverse and naturalized species of plants and animals have the ability 
to perform under conditions that are too harsh for the common high-yielding varieties and 
serve as companion plants for main staple crops to ensure that there is something to eat in 
case of infestation, uncertain rainfall, price hikes/drops, and sociopolitical disruption.  
Generally it is the women of rural communities who are responsible for the resilience and 
security of the food supply.  Patricia Howard (2003), citing numerous case studies across 
the globe, states that women, because of their position as food providers, generally 
possess the greatest knowledge of landraces and are primarily responsible for in situ 
conservation of biodiversity.  Yet many (but not all) of the communities in which these 
women live consider their activities and expertise secondary to that of men who are 
deemed the true possessors of knowledge and managers of natural resources.  Because 
the domestic sphere is where most of the highly localized and non-monetary management 
and conservation takes place, women remain invisible to outsiders (Howard 2003; 
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Momsen 2007).  That invisibility, the destruction wrought by large-scale agrofuel 
monoculture, and the changing gender regimes due to their introduction will have a 
negative effect on this biodiversity and knowledge and practices that sustain it.  
Studies of agrofuel monocultures show a clear loss of biodiversity (Danielsen et 
al. 2008; Koh & Ghazoul 2008).  Moreover, naturally occurring biodiversity intergrades 
with the genetic diversity of food crops for all people.  Genetic diversity of plant and 
animal species is a cornerstone of human food sovereignty.  This diversity provides 
communities and, indeed, the world with protection against natural and economic shocks.  
Yet currently seventy-five percent of the world’s food is dependent on just 12 plants and 
5 animal species, and only 3 species of plants – wheat, rice, and maize – supply 60% of 
the calories humans consume (Lambrou & Laub 2006).  For various reasons, including 
poverty, cultural tradition, land settlement patterns, or lack of access to commercially 
available food, rural people’s dependence on natural resources often privileges them with 
an intimate knowledge of the conditions of their environments.  In harsh climates where 
high-yielding livestock and plant varieties fail, they maintain locally adapted species for 
subsistence.  Since women are often involved in the daily tasks of animal husbandry, 
weeding, selecting seed, gathering wild plants, cooking and preparing food, they possess 
knowledge and make decisions that ensure resilience of the food supply. Eyzaguirre and 
Dennis (2007) found that multiple uses for crops and a multiplicity of people involved in 
making decisions regarding crop characteristics maintains plant diversity and resilience.   
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Vanishing Rice Knowledge and Bees in Indonesian Simpukng  
 
Palm oil production has already taken its toll in South East Asia, which is host to 
a large amount of the world’s biodiversity.  Malaysia is ranked 14th out of 17 of the 
planet’s “megadiverse” countries.  Much of this biodiversity resides in and is dependent 
on lowland evergreen and tropical forests.  The IUCN lists 1500 plants and 143 animals 
in Malaysia as “threatened,” while 22 animals and 199 plant species are considered 
“critically endangered” (Smolker, Tokar, Petermann & Hernandez 2009, p. 39).  
Indonesia has the second most biodiverse rainforest in the world, covering just 1/3 of 
Earth’s surface and supporting 10% of its flowering plants, 12% of all its mammals, 17% 
of all its bird species, and 16% of its amphibians and reptiles.  Among its most famous 
inhabitants are the Asian elephant, Bornean and Sumatran orangutans, the Sumatran tiger, 
and the Sumatran rhinoceros.  Forest peoples have played an integral part in forest 
management and biodiversity maintenance (Smolker et al 2009; Mulyoutami, Rismawan 
& Joshi 2009). Together the two countries produce approximately 85 percent of the 
world’s palm oil.   By 2004, Malaysia had 4 million hectares of oil palms, while 
Indonesia had about 6.5 million hectares with plans to expand feedstock production to 26 
million hectares by 2025. Indonesia intends to add another 21 million hectares of oil palm 
by 2025, a 43-fold increase.  In 2005, Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono 
announced plans to establish ‘the world’s largest oil palm plantation’ on the 
Malaysian/Indonesian border in Borneo.  The Kalimantan Border Oil Palm Mega-Project 
would convert 3 million hectares of primary rainforest to oil palm plantations, including 
three national parks, and would have untold ecological and social consequences for many 
people, including the indigenous Dayak (Colchester et al. 2006; Smolker et al 2009). 
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In Central Kalimantan the Dayak Tawoyan (a sub-group of the Dayak Leungan 
people) people’s religion, kaharingen, dominates their forest management practices and 
long rotations of crops and land use. Meri Orth, studying three villages in the North 
Barito region, found that about five kinds of forest uses support Dayak Leungan peoples.  
Some of these forests appear to be degraded because the Dayak use them for rubber 
gardens, but they are secondary forests and actually support a wide variety of biodiversity 
as well as providing food security (Orth 2007).  Their swidden system of agriculture 
maintains landscapes of domesticated and semi-domesticated agroforestry environments 
called simpukng, in which 143 valuable species have been identified, and also rice 
cultivation fields called umaq. The forests are rich in biodiversity and contain most of the 
food, fuel, and medicine the Dayak use in their daily lives as well as rattan, rice, and 
honey that are traded and sold to generate cash for the communities.  As in many 
subsistence cultures, men do prepare the umaq and the simpukng, while the women 
perform maintenance work.  Mulyoutami, Rismawan, and Joshi (2009) argue that the 
Dayak system of agroforestry is crucial to biodiversity conservation and state that 
indigenous systems of knowledge must be given priority.  They further state that 
women’s knowledge, gained through their experience helping to manage the simpukng, is 
critical for biodiversity preservation (Mulyoutami et al 2009).  
Among the Benuaq and Bentian Dayak peoples in East Kalimantan, the division 
of labor makes it such that women’s work is seen only as reproductive.  Women perform 
a wider range of the tasks related to umaq (paddy field) and simpukng (fruit orchard) 
cultivation and maintenance than men. Additionally, while men perform the visible work 
of land clearing, felling and pruning trees, burning vegetation, and harvesting, women 
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perform less visible tasks such as seed selection, weaving, sowing, vegetable gardening, 
and food processing, and so their role in agriculture is overlooked by those outside the 
community (Mulyoutami et al. 2009).  Yet, the Benuaq people do have a goddess known 
as Luwikng who is honored when rice is harvested.  Only women and daughters from one 
family do the harvesting of a particular umaq at this time.  The farmers save and 
exchange seeds and practice seasonal rotation of rice varieties to ensure vigor and 
resilience.  
The swidden system follows nine steps consisting of 14 recognized growth 
patterns.  Men make the decisions about which seeds to plant, and women have some 
knowledge of seed varieties, however age and community rank play important roles in 
ethnobotanical knowledge transmission and skill level among Benuaq people. Hendra, 
Guhardja, Setiadi, Walujo, and Purwanto (2009) found that, of the 103 indigenous 
varieties of rice cultivated by the Benuaq, only the traditional leader (Mantiq), his wife, 
and three senior farmers knew all of them, while those farmers under 30 years of age 
could only identify 20 percent of the existing local cultivars.  The study concluded that 
Benuaq traditional knowledge is eroding when the global need for seed diversity is high 
(Hendra, Guhardja, Setiadi, Walujo & Purwanto 2009).  
In addition to their agricultural knowledge the Dayak also play a crucial role in in 
situ conservation of important species that are imperiled by the steady encroachment of 
oil palm plantations on their traditional lands.  Danielsen et al., in a meta-analytical study 
that compared published faunal research with actual palm plantation plots, found that 
palm monoculture not only contributed to a net gain in GHG emissions but also 
supported fewer, more generalized species, while species with more specialized diets and 
 
 
67 
habits were non-existent.  More disturbingly, they found that most bee species in the 
family Apidae (honeybees) were entirely absent in palm plantations, suggesting that 
forest pollination and regeneration in other areas could be imperiled with increased 
habitat fragmentation (Danielsen et al. 2008).  Dayak people depend on a wide variety of 
forest products that require pollinators as well as on honeybees and their products both 
for subsistence and trade.  They therefore act as beekeepers through the maintenance of 
special landscapes tailored toward honey production.   
Simpukng tanyut usually contain honey (tanyut) trees that are valued and 
considered sacred by the Dayak.  Generally men collect honey while women process the 
raw products into wax and honey products.  Apis dorsata, the dominant honeybee in 
South East Asia, is associated with dipterocarp forests consisting of jelemu or lomuq 
(Canarium pseudodecumanum), banggeris (Kompassia malaccenis), puti (Kompassia 
exelsa), kapur/ngoik (Dryobalanops lanceolata), bengkirai (Shorea laevis), and bilaas 
(Ficus albipila). These species in the honey simpukng are actively managed through 
weeding, as much as three times a year, to ease harvesting and protect the trees from 
accidental fire (Hendra et al 2009; Mulder, Heri & Wickham 2009; Mulyoutami et al. 
2009). Orth found the forest and agricultural products that sustain Dayak Leungan people 
could not be harvested due to reduced land availability, and the scarcity of wild food 
products and resources posed a grave danger to the food security of the communities in 
her study area (Orth 2007). Moreover, because knowledge is aligned with gender and 
age, the impacts of agrofuels threaten younger men and most women.  Lambrou and Laub 
(2006) note that widowed and single women are most affected by loss/lack of access to 
traditional knowledge systems.  Sugarcane and soybean cultivation for agrofuel is having 
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similar effects in Latin America.  There, women’s preservation of cassava and their use 
of herbs for contraceptive purposes is threatened by the possibility of large wildfires as 
the Cerrado dries up and land fragmentation prevents indigenous men from practicing an 
age-old sustainable burning regime.   
 
The “Other” Amazon: The Cerrado  
 
In Brazil indigenous people living in the grasslands targeted for sugarcane and 
soybean plantations face the loss of wild resources as well as erosion of their knowledge 
base in the cultivation of staple crops such as cassava and the gathering and processing of 
medicinal plants. In the 1990’s the international outcry over deforestation prompted 
efforts to save the Amazon rainforest through the establishment of funds, buying 
schemes, and calls for international protection.  Destruction of the Amazon continues 
apace, however the less glamorous but equally important Brazilian savanna, the Cerrado, 
has failed to capture the attention of schoolchildren and the popular media.  In fact the 
displacement of agrofuel feedstocks (soy and sugarcane) as well as ranching onto the 
Cerrado prompted a food policy analyst from the Hudson Institute to comment that 
“Greenpeace should be grateful” (Avery 2006) to the Brazilian biotech companies for 
developing soybean varieties that would thrive in the “wasteland” of the Cerrado (Avery 
2006; Houtard 2010).   
According to Conservation International, the Cerrado is one of the world’s richest 
tropical savannas. The 2 million square kilometer (the size of California and Alaska 
together) wooded grassland makes up 21% of Brazil’s land area and contains 10,000 
plant species, 800 freshwater fishes, 607 bird species, 411 species of reptiles and 
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amphibians, and 195 species of mammals including giant anteaters, the maned wolf, 
ocelot, and jaguar. Called the “father of the waters” (Mendonça 2009, p. 66) because of 
its importance as a watershed for the Paraguay and San Francisco rivers, the Cerrado is 
also home to many indigenous people who live in and actively manage its landscape 
(Klink & Machado 2005; Mendonça 2009). The Cerrado is home to 300,000 indigenous 
people residing in 200 distinct communities.  One of these communities is the Krahô 
people whose dynamic culture and identity have changed over time through contact with 
the Xerente, Apinayé, and Afro-Brazilian peoples (Bubela et al. 2008).  The Krahô 
manage their subsistence areas in the Cerrado with controlled burning and also possess 
important knowledge respecting medicinal herbs and other vitally important plant 
resources (Conservation International 2011).   
The savanna is a fire-adapted environment, and indigenous people have used fire 
for generations to manage and restore habitat, facilitate shifting cultivation, and to open 
up the landscape for hunting. Called “patch-mosaic fire regime” (Mistry et al. 2005: 380) 
the carefully timed controlled burn strategy practiced by indigenous people has, in the 
past, protected the Cerrado from devastating fires during the dry season, because the 
previously burned areas served as fire breaks.  This meant that deliberately set and 
naturally occurring fires could not become conflagrations that would destroy valuable 
trees and plants.  
A study of Krahô people in the northeast state of Tocantins found that nearly 75 
percent of the respondents cited fire protection as the biggest reason to use controlled 
burns.  Another important benefit of the indigenous method of controlled burning is the 
enhancement and maintenance of biodiversity microhabitats for plants and animals 
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resulting from various fire histories within the landscape.  The Krahô do not set large, 
uniform fires all at once but burn patches beginning in about April and lasting throughout 
the year until around September in different locations of their territory.  The controlled 
burns leave islands of lightly or unburned vegetation that provide shelter, forage, and 
water for different species (Mistry et al. 2005).  Krahô men usually carry out the burns 
between growing seasons to facilitate mineral deposition and also for pest control. 
Women, who are responsible for cultivating the staple foods in the roça, also set small 
cleansing burns called ahhihpoc in their garden grounds to eliminate pests and animals 
(scorpions and snakes) that could potentially be dangerous to children and older members 
of the family.   
Studies of the Krahô have confirmed their extensive knowledge of the savanna’s 
flora, particularly medicinal herbs and trees (Bubela et al. 2008; Rodrigues 2007; 
Rodrigues & Carlini 2005).  Bubela et al. (2008) found that the strongly patriarchal 
Krahô have a health care structure that authorizes male shamans, called wajacas, to guard 
and use ethno-pharmacological knowledge. During the rainy season contaminated water 
contributes to diarrhea, influenza, and other illnesses.  If one wajaca cannot address the 
illness, another is sought for consultation and treatment.  If all else fails, the community 
turns to the Brazilian health service for help.  While most adults are familiar with 
medicinal plants, wajacas are regarded as having exceptional communication with the 
spiritual world and so are the only ones allowed to practice medicine.  Their placement in 
Krahô leadership underscores the importance of ethnobotanical knowledge in the 
community.  The authors also noted that, contrary to the popular belief that indigenous 
people only pursue knowledge of species immediately useful to them, the Krahô are 
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interested in gaining a broad understanding of the growth habits, ecological requirements, 
and morphology of the plant and animal species in the Cerrado (Bubela et al. 2008).   
A study of 57 plants used for “restricted” purposes (abortion, contraindicated 
during pregnancy, contraception, to ease childbirth, prescribed in smaller doses for elders 
and children and poisonous to humans and animals) found that the Krahô were 
remarkably knowledgeable regarding contraindications, drug interaction, and toxicity of 
the species.  Not surprisingly, women were the most educated about 13 plants with 
abortive qualities, although some men in the community were able identify the species 
and explain their prescriptive use.  They also take contraceptive drugs mostly as 
decoctions (teas) and have specific doses for particular uses with carefully timed 
ingestion periods depending on whether the woman wants to become permanently or 
temporarily infertile (Rodrigues 2007).  Additionally, confirming an earlier study on the 
uses of plant species with possible action on the central nervous system, the author found 
wajacas followed a medical practice consistent with traditional Western pharmacology, 
prescribing one plant species at a time for illnesses and delaying treatment in order to 
observe the effects of the drugs (Rodrigues & Carlini 2006; Rodrigues 2007).   
In their 2006 study of 138 plants used by the Krahô, Rodrigues and Carlini (2006) 
found that only 11 had been evaluated for their pharmacological properties and, of those, 
indigenous indications for use of components from the tree species’ Cochlospermum 
regium (a headache remedy) and the herb Casearia sylvestris (an anti-inflammatory) 
were found to agree with scientific data (Rodrigues and Carlini 2006).  A common 
conclusion of research on the ethnobotanical knowledge of the Krahô and other 
indigenous groups inhabiting the Cerrado is that there are many plant species 
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unrecognized by Western science and that the particular wisdom of the people living so 
close to them is an ongoing process of great value on a global scale (Bubela et al. 2008; 
Rodrigues 2007; Rodrigues & Carlini 2005).   
With regard to women’s importance in the maintenance of biodiversity, 
observations of the Krahô confirm the patriarchal nature of the society, with women 
doing most of the invisible domestic work, including household labor and childcare as 
well as food provisioning, such as fishing, gathering wild plants and herbs, growing 
staple foods, and also hunting.  The Krahô diet is comprised of wild game, fish, beef, 
guandu beans, rice, cassava, sweet potatoes, pumpkins, and wild fruits from the 
Cerrado’s indigenous trees: Hancornia speciosa, Spondias mombin, and Scheelea 
phalerata (Bubela et al. 2008; Mistry et al. 2005).  Klink and Machado (2005), who call 
the Cerrado “underappreciated,” note that deforestation there has exceeded that in the 
Amazon rainforest, and pressure on the ecosystem is resulting in a loss of wild 
indigenous cassava (Manihot sp.) varieties that are important genetic reservoirs for 
protein content and drought resistance.  Cassava is a staple crop for more than 600 
million people in tropical communities worldwide.  However, because of encroaching 
industrial agriculture on the 41 areas in the Cerrado known to harbor indigenous Manihot 
species, only one locality remains intact (Klink & Machado 2005).   
The Brazilian government has identified abandoned farms and ranchland as 
potential feedstock plantations, and MNCs, such as Bunge (which controls over 90% of 
Brazil’s soy export market), are planning expansion into the Cerrado.  Mendonça (2009) 
states that despite a loss of 2 million hectares per year, the destruction of the Cerrado has 
not been as visible as that of the rainforest.  However by 2002 nearly 1 million square 
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kilometers had been decimated, and to date more than 55% of the savanna has already 
been destroyed; it is projected to completely disappear by 2030 (Klink and Machado 
2005; Mendonça 2009).  
 
The Settled Maasai 
 
In its chapter “The Culture of Green”, the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Blueprint For Green Energy calls on Maasai environmental wisdom and principles to 
unveil its vision of a bright energy future through agrofuel production (Rothkopf 2009).  
Governments and development agencies have advanced agrofuel cultivation as a strategy 
for poverty alleviation among rural people, particularly poor women.  In many cases the 
people’s way of life, usually part of the informal economy, and not historical, social, and 
cultural inequality, is seen as the source of their poverty, and they are encouraged to enter 
the market in the interest of economic development. Moreover, poor inhabitants are often 
blamed for environmental destruction. Such is the case with pastoral peoples in Africa.   
In Africa drylands support 59% of the continent’s ruminant livestock, and mobile 
livestock husbandry accounts for 66% of dryland use (McGahey 2008).  In East Africa 
and the Horn, pastoralism is a major contributor to both formal and informal economies 
(Hesse & MacGregor 2009). Governments, following the flawed research of rangeland 
scientists and development policy experts, blamed pastoral peoples for degradation in the 
arid grasslands, confined them to fenced ranches, and sought to replace their herds with 
commercially valuable hybrids.  This intensified environmental destruction and led to 
increased poverty and food insecurity, as well as conflict (McGahey 2008; Wangui 2008) 
and increasing traditional familial inequalities between men and women.  Now African 
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nations are targeting lands utilized by pastoralists for agrofuel production as a poverty 
relief strategy (McGahey 2008).  However, agrofuel development must be seen in the 
historical context of official discrimination and the changing roles between men and 
women as the result of gender-neutral sedentarization patterns.  
The pastoral people inhabiting the plains of Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, and 
Uganda maintained herds of cattle adapted over millennia to the harsh climate of the 
African rangeland.  In the unforgiving landscape of the drylands, indigenous Maasai 
people have multiple adaptive strategies to heat and drought that includes moving their 
herds seasonally to take advantage of good pasturage and water resources.  They also 
employ particular monitoring techniques for gauging rainfall and use phenological 
knowledge of the steppes refined over generations to time to track the movement of their 
cattle. Rotation of herds gives the land a chance to rest and prevents overgrazing 
(McGahey 2008).   Moreover, communities also share wood, water, salts, flora, and 
rangeland on common properties, and they donate female cows as seed stock to destitute 
members through a practice called ewoloto to protect against poverty and homelessness 
(Kipuri & Ridgewell 2008; Kipuri & Sørensen 2008; Hannah 2007).   
Gender dynamics among particular pastoral groups are poorly documented and 
understood, but Wangui (2008) found that Maasai women’s roles have changed over 
time with the introduction of exotic cow species and sedentarization policies (Wangui 
2008).   The common perception is that a Maasai family’s wealth (cattle) is the domain 
of men and that Maasai women occupy a minor, if oppressed, strata of the community.  
Historically, men spent much more time on livestock production than women (Wangui 
2008), because it was the socially determined job of women to do all the work associated 
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with milking and milk processing.  But women commonly kept detailed genealogical 
notes on desirable hereditary characteristics such as docility, milk production, and 
fertility.  However, with commercialization of cattle and milk production, they have seen 
their workload increase with a corresponding loss of economic options, because men are 
beginning to take over the sale of milk products as they become lucrative.  
Formerly, such close proximity to the cows imparted a thorough knowledge of 
animal lineage, temperament, milk yield, maternal fertility, disease resistance, and vigor. 
And women were, therefore, instrumental in advising their husbands on the selective 
breeding of this culturally important source of wealth (Kipuri & Ridgewell 2008).  
Through DNA analysis of African cattle, Hanotte, et al. (2002) found Maasai and other 
pastoral communities were responsible for the introgression (introduction of genetic 
diversity) of the indigenous African cow, Bos taurus with a cow indigenous to the Near 
East, B. indicus. The authors speculated that the Maasai diversified the genetic profile of 
their herds because the Eastern cow is resistant to smallpox; they concluded that pastoral 
herds are a crucial genetic resource of global importance because of their resilience 
(Hanotte et al.  2002).  
While Maasai people still engage in limited and varying degrees of traditional 
pastoral activities, they have a primary interest in the preservation of the plant resources 
found on their rangelands.  Maasai men are often familiar with the local species 
necessary to maintain herd nutrition as well as vigor. Accordingly, Maasai communities 
are important repositories of ethno-veterinary practices and remedies (Jacob, Farah & 
Ekaya 2004). Along with keeping genealogical information on the herd and keeping 
small livestock such as chickens and goats, women are also responsible for much of the 
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direct use of environmental resources, especially local flora. By the time a Maasai 
woman reaches adulthood she will have learned about the location, collection, and use of 
over 300 species of plants (Hannah 2007). 
However, a UNFAO (Oiye, Simel, Oniang’o, & Johns, 2009) report on 
indigenous peoples’ food security found that Maasai people in the Kajiado District of 
Kenya were experiencing a high level of food insecurity and declining ethnobotanical 
knowledge. Along with historical discrimination such as lack of access to traditional 
rangeland, one of the factors they attributed to this worrisome problem among the Maasai 
was their integration into the market economy as a short-term solution to their poverty. 
Many Maasai people are poor and undernourished owing to degradation and loss 
of grazing land, most recently stemming from conservation policies (Kelly 2011; 
Zoomers 2010) that prohibit them from moving their herds to wildlife reserves and 
encourage them to engage in farming operations.  The transition from pastoralism to 
agro-pastoralism has increased women’s time burden, as they now take care of livestock 
all year rather than assigning the task to unmarried men (Wangui 2008).  Additionally, 
wealthier Maasai women have seen the proceeds and control of milk products shift to 
their husbands, forcing them to seek other means of income.  
In the Arusha area of Tanzania, where the Dutch agrofuel company Diligent has 
established holdings, another company, Jatropha Products Tanzania Ltd. (JPTL), 
emerged from a Tanzanian NGO (KAKUTE) to incorporate poor Maasai women in the 
local soap-making market and establish a strategic niche for Jatropha cultivation and 
processing (Van Eijck 2008; Wahl 2009).  A report by Diligent-sponsored researchers 
exemplified the dual nature of agrofuel capitalism’s narrative.  On the one hand, the 
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authors cautioned against monocropping and food crop replacement while highlighting 
the fact that 59% of rural households in Tanzania already produced food crops to be 
processed elsewhere, and the low market value of those cash crops presented 
“favourable” (Van Eijck 2008, p. 318) conditions for Jatropha expansion.  They further 
cited a statistic from the year 2000 that 94% of rural households in sub-Saharan Africa 
used wood and crop residues for household heating and cooking.  The authors suggested 
that Jatropha oil could replace locally gathered fuel.  However they found that women in 
the community preferred to gather fuelwood for free rather than pay for the oil to put into 
stoves supplied by TaTEDO (a Tanzanian NGO) (Van Eijck 2008).  Despite these and 
other barriers, such as the uncertain nature of the Jatropha oil market, more than ten 
thousand smallholders in Tanzania joined the rush to cultivate Jatropha (Wahl 2009). 
In the Rift Valley of Kenya, some Maasai farmers substituted food crops in favor 
of Jatropha and saw their incomes triple as oil prices climbed. Initially, the local agrofuel 
economy provided an infusion of badly needed cash to farmers and brokers who were 
able to sell the seeds for up to $10 per kilo, but in a matter of months the price dropped to 
less than $0.5 per kilo.  Initially, poverty and hunger lessened considerably in the area. 
However, Esther Siteyia, a 28-year-old Maasai woman saw her fortunes plummet with 
the collapse of the local agrofuel market.  Siteyia became a Jatropha broker, buying the 
seeds from local farmers and selling them to Kenya Eco-Energy project: “For the first ten 
months that I sold Jatropha seeds, my income tripled. I would buy seeds from farmers 
and sell them to the highest bidder at a handsome profit.”   At first, she was able to buy 
and sell five tons of the seed for a good price but found her storeroom packed with unsold 
produce when trade took a downturn with no buyers and the nearest processor over 200 
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kilometers from her farm (Bwakali 2008).  Having created an artificial market and 
encouraged settled Maasai farmers to grow Jatropha, local NGOs, the Kenyan 
government, and the Dutch agrofuel company contributed to the food insecurity of the 
people in the area.   
In the North capitalist relations have replaced the notion of ethno-ecosystem 
management where domestication and wildness blur.  Instead, agriculture is conceived as 
a highly managed and specialized landscape relying on chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides, genetic management, vast tracts of land, and large machines (Howard 2003; 
Levins and Lewontin 2007; Waring 1988). Capital does not recognize the non-monetized 
management and conservation of diverse species in home gardens, on savannas, and on 
logged hillsides. What cannot be counted does not exist. Capitalism’s narrative locating 
their non-market activities in the realm of the worthless while commodity production 
occupies the category of “improvement” is not simply a gendered and racialized 
discursive distinction but also a material one.  
As seen in Ghana, the clear devaluing of multi-crop farming activities by Solar 
Harvest and its supporters in favor of large-scale Jatropha production resulted in loss of 
land and food security of poor farmers.  Not only does agricultural diversity ensure better 
food security and pest resistance but it has been proven to provide women with more 
autonomy and better bargaining power within their households (Nanda 1997).  
Additionally, because many agrarian communities maintain divisions between 
“women’s” and “men’s” crops and land allocation, women run the particular risk of 
seeing that improved bargaining disappear because their crops are not valued and are 
plowed under to make way for feedstock cultivation. This is an example of Connell and 
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Messerschmidt’s (2005) assertion that globalized hegemonic masculinity enacted in local 
communities forces a renegotiation of gender relations.  The power of local elite men 
coupled with class status among the farmers led to allocation of the land for Jatropha 
monocropping.  Previously, women’s rights to NTFPs in the bush lands were recognized 
by local men but were abrogated in favor of their own interests.  The result was that the 
community, in general, suffered as the land was cleared and deforested.   
 And just as in the case of deforestation, the massive amount of water required to 
supply agrofuel feedstocks is polluting rivers and causing some sources to dry up.  As 
women are generally consigned the task of household water provision, the disappearance 
of access to clean water may force them to travel longer distances to obtain it, thereby 
taking up more of their working day. Men and women may see their farms and businesses 
literally dry up with the diversion of water to feedstock, as in the case of the farmers on 
Mindanao.  Clearance of the land not only diverts and dries up water but also contributes 
to the loss of biodiversity, local species, and knowledge.  At a time when genetic 
diversity is dropping on a worldwide scale, the importance of species and knowledge 
such as the fire and medicinal plant knowledge of Krahô men and the rice varieties and 
knowledge of Benuaq men could be wiped out by agrofuel development.  Additionally, 
the preservation of cassava and other vegetables by Krahô women is also of vital 
importance.  Lastly, past sedentarization policies coupled with an agenda by the Kenyan 
government to advance agrofuel cultivation as a poverty-relief strategy has resulted in 
some Maasai farmers trading food security for increased income only to find no market.  
Moreover, the continued emphasis on a settled lifestyle means that Maasai women have 
seen their household labor increase, forcing them to seek other means of making money.  
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Settlement of the Maasai also has resulted in loss of diversity of livestock and traditional 
knowledge held and maintained by women.  As can be seen here local gender, ethnicity, 
and class articulate with agrofuel capitalism to disadvantage communities.  In many 
cases, gender, age, and class patterns also constrain knowledge and practices that will 
also result in loss of biodiversity of local but global significance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LAND-GRABBING 
If, as Marx (1990) claimed, the commodity is the cell form (p. 125) of capitalist 
production, then alienation is its DNA.  Described also as primitive accumulation, the 
imperative is the same – to divorce the direct producer, whether violently or by legal 
enclosure, from the environment from whence she or he draws sustenance.  This 
“dissolution” (1978, p. 267) of the worker’s bond to nature, clears the way for land 
privatization in the interest of commodity production.  Agrofuel cultivation depends on 
various forms of ownership arrangements, but its effect is dispossession either by gaining 
direct title to the land, by leasing it and clearing it, or by contracting. Land acquisition for 
the purpose of agrofuel feedstock cultivation is rupturing the tenuous connection between 
people and the land in the Global South.   
What has been missing from most critical analyses of agrofuels is how women in 
the South can and are being affected by land acquisition for the purpose of feedstock 
production.  As was noted earlier, this has global significance because women are often 
the ones who pass on important ethnobotanical knowledge and skills to the next 
generation.   Razavi (2009), along with Waring (1988), points out that whereas 
neoclassical economists are guilty of distorting gender relations, most Marxists simply 
ignore them by viewing “reproduction” as a gender-neutral process (Razavi 2009, p. 
198).  Razavi and Deere and León (2001) find that both formal and informal land titling 
have disadvantaged women and have knock-on effects when decisions are made about 
the use and disposal of land. Moreover Razavi states that gender advocates in 
international organizations such as the World Bank selectively took up feminist analyses 
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of women’s access to and ownership of land, most notably the work of Bina Agarwal, to 
advance a one-size-fits-all approach that privileges privatization of land as a solution to 
women’s poverty (Razavi 2009, p. 198).    
However, gender oppression does not simply disappear in a decentralized context 
or even in post-colonial socialist land redistribution because gender itself is historically 
embedded not only in individual practices and identity but also in social, cultural, 
economic, and political life (Acker 1990; Martin 2004; Risman 2004).  Moreover, gender 
dynamics are intimately linked (not added) to patterns of historical exclusion based on 
class, race, and ethnicity and are formed by interlocking macro-level operations filtering 
down to micro-level individual and group interactions (Acker 2004; Collins 1995; Glenn 
1998).  Agrofuel capitalism exploits local gender regimes that constrain or enable certain 
behaviors and often subverts the ability of women in local communities to negotiate for 
traditional privileges and rights.  Agrofuel advocates embrace privatization of land as an 
uncomplicated path to land concentration, and like other corporations, are exploiting 
historical patterns of exclusion, corruption, and the consequences of poverty to gain 
access to land.  Even with secure tenure under state and/or customary rights rural men, 
but particularly women, are literally losing ground in the face of rising competition for 
land or outright theft.  Women are generally dispossessed by the formalization of land 
titles to male heads of household or those who are seen to “improve” the land by 
companies and the state.     
In his essay on agrarian change and peasant studies, Borras (2009), states that to 
offset just 14 percent of the world’s current fleet requirements of petroleum, we would 
need to convert 25 percent of the Earth’s arable land to agrofuel cultivation, and that we 
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will also need to double agricultural production by 2050 to feed the world’s growing 
population as well as alleviate hunger for one billion people while still carrying out the 
business of commerce.  How, he wonders, can this be done 
“without putting further pressure on the already fragile environment, without 
aggravating climate-related problems, without putting the task under the 
monopoly control of greedy corporate giants, and without causing massive 
dispossession of the rural poor?”9
 
 
Dauvergne and Neville’s authoritative article poses questions to guide its 
investigation of agrofuel impacts on forests and rural populations.  Two of the questions 
ask: “which rural groups seem most likely to benefit or lose out from resulting economic 
opportunities and outcomes?” and “what are the direct and indirect consequences for 
forests (and nearby ecosystems and land) of an emerging political economy of increased 
biofuel production?”  In answer to the first question, the authors point to the likelihood 
that agrofuel production would exacerbate historical patterns of exclusion and land tenure 
while dispossessing communities of their claim to marginal land.   To the second 
question, they note that rural smallholders are often caught between the conservation 
efforts of NGOs who perceive local users as destructive to the sensitive ecosystems they 
aim to preserve, and the capitalist aspirations of large corporations intent on formalizing 
claims to the land (Dauvergne and Neville 2010). By most accounts it is clear that greedy 
agrofuel giants are contributing to dispossession of the world’s rural poor, particularly 
women, with devastating results for local communities.  Agrofuel production requires 
economies of scale, most notably extensive land holdings.  While about 14 million 
hectares of land support agrofuel plantings, land acquisitions for the purpose of feedstock 
production would require millions of hectares to meet the targets set by the Global North 
                                                 
9 Borras 2009, p. 9. 
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(GRAIN 2007; Rothkopf 2009). In much of the developing world there has been a 
dramatic increase in the demand for land by foreign investors.  
 
The Greedy Corporate Giants and Their Friends 
 
Recognizing that the OECD countries consume most of the world’s petroleum but 
lack the available land on which to cultivate agrofuels10
Policy experts agree that a large proportion of the Earth’s land is not suitable for 
agriculture because it is too arid, too cold, inaccessibly steep, not fertile enough, or a 
number of these qualities in combination.  In fact, the Global Agro-ecological 
Assessment’s satellite imagery found that, of all the world’s land, only about 3,000 
million hectares have the capability of supporting viable agricultural activity.  In Asia, 
Europe, and North America almost all the cultivable land is already being farmed; the 
rest is under a forest canopy that would suffer “severe environmental consequences” 
(Cotula et al. 2008, p. 20) if placed under cultivation.  In these regions large-scale 
development of agrofuels would require crop substitution or land clearing which would 
 to achieve their mandates, energy 
policy experts and multilateral organizations are looking to the Global South’s 
agricultural and “marginal” lands.  Promising rural development in the form of stable 
jobs and increased incomes, agrofuel advocates claim the countries of the South, with the 
help of private investors and multilateral lending agencies, will be able to “leapfrog” 
(Mathews 2007, p. 3559; Rothkopf 2009, p. 93) to the most advanced technologies and 
thus are calling for a “biopact” (Mathews 2007, p. 3550) between the OECD and the 
Southern Hemisphere (Mathews 2007; Rothkopf 2009).    
                                                 
10 Just 15 billion gallons of ethanol would consume 45 million acres of US farmland (Holt-Gimenez & 
Kenfield 2009). 
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imperil already fragile ecosystems. According to the FAO, agricultural holdings in sub-
Saharan Africa represent 98 percent of land under 10 hectares in size, while in Asia 88 
percent of farm holdings are less than 2 hectares (Haralambous, Liversage & Romano 
2009). However, these percentages are changing as wealthy investors gain access to large 
expanses of arable and “marginal” land. 
Africa and South America own 80% of the world’s “reserve” agricultural land.  
Figures vary on how much land is actually available but the rough estimate based on 
satellite imagery is 1359 million hectares (807 million in Africa and 552 million in South 
America) of cultivable (from “very suitable” to “moderately suitable”) land.  
Accordingly, governments in the Global South, urged by corporate interests, OECD 
member countries, and development agencies, are instituting small and large-scale 
agrofuel projects (Cotula et al. 2008). 
Governments in the Global South, encumbered by large external debts from the 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1980’s and facing widespread rural 
poverty, have responded favorably to agrofuel initiatives by opening the door to 
investment by private companies, reworking legal and regulatory frameworks, and 
establishing land banks (White & Dasgupta 2010). Through their partnerships with 
MNC’s and private investors, some countries are realizing the benefits of market access 
for their agrofuels. Brazil is on target to succeed in some areas of development while 
Mozambique is projected to see a 6 percent drop in poverty while gaining 0.6 percent in 
annual national growth.  However, macroeconomic changes belie specific local and 
historically constituted race, class, and gender relations with regard to land access 
(Dauvergne & Neville 2010, p. 647).  Colonization, waves of cash-cropping, customary 
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law, and post-colonial land redistribution have all produced power asymmetries that 
complicate the picture and present opportunities for changes in social relations. 
Agrofuel feedstock production contributes to land tenure and land use disruptions 
in rural areas of the Global South. While development agencies and policy analysts 
cheerily predict that agrofuel production, particularly the advent of so-called “second” 
and “third” generation fuels, will drive agricultural intensification and more efficient use 
of land, they also note that “impacts on land access” (Cotula et al. 2008, p. 18) continue 
to be a problem and will worsen as the industry expands.  The increase in competition for 
land is squeezing local rural populations. Agrofuel investors, through a number of 
mechanisms, have successfully acquired land in abrogation of the rights of local, 
customary users and also of people with formal tenure.  Cotula, et al. (2008) identify 
several key linkages between agrofuel production and land tenure/land use conflicts.  
Direct linkages such as expropriation and concentration through increased value results 
when land formerly used for some other purpose is appropriated for agrofuel cultivation.  
Indirect linkages involve agrofuel expansion elsewhere that triggers a disruption of local 
land use.  In the case of expropriation the state disallocates or withdraws land from local 
people and turns it over either to investment firms or large-scale agricultural producers in 
the country.  Another direct but more complex impact is the rise in land values resulting 
from world market pressures vis à vis agrofuel production.  In this case poor farmers 
cannot afford to rent or keep their land and are forced to move off the land they are 
renting or sell their land as they are priced out of the market (Cotula et al. 2008).   
While much discussion has centered on the mechanisms by which land is 
appropriated, the result of agrofuel purchases has amounted to land grabbing.  “Land 
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grabbing” is understood to mean extensive cross-border acquisition of land “carried out 
by transnational corporations or initiated by foreign governments” (Zoomers 2010, p. 
429), and it is occurring rapidly.  Land grabbing also includes large land deals by private 
investment firms and mega-entrepreneurs like George Soros of the US and Blairo Maggi 
of Brazil who buy and lease land under a variety of agreements ranging from unofficial 
use to common property tenure.  Consequently, weak governance, competing and 
overlapping land tenure regimes, and poor or nonexistent institutional frameworks 
governing land acquisition have enabled agrofuel capital’s incursion onto both arable and 
“marginal” lands. The new enclosures wrought by the national mandates originating in 
the North and being rapidly adopted in the South are already having alarming social and 
economic effects on rural marginalized communities.  
Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck (2009) have characterized this phenomenon as a 
“territorial restructuring” (p. 181) of physical places and political-economic spaces.  
International finance institutions prepare the conditions for capital’s penetration by 
setting loan conditions predicated on the restructuring of laws, regulatory frameworks, 
and governmental bodies within countries while on the ground agribusiness firms achieve 
a literal transformation of the landscape to ensure efficient extraction of the resource.  
There are grave and specific implications for the women of the smallholder communities 
that will be displaced by privatization of their land. 
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Owning the Back Forty?  Women’s Nonexistent Land Tenure 
 
Rossi and Lambrou (2008) argue that, despite the lack of aggregate data, women 
in the Global South are particularly affected by land conversion and changes in tenure 
regimes.   As men have left their rural communities in search of work elsewhere, the rural 
South has seen a ‘feminization of agriculture’ (Emanuelli, Jonsén & Suárez 2009, p. 37) 
with women generally producing 80 percent of the world’s food in the hungriest, most 
malnourished countries.  However, these farmers often have informal or no title to the 
land on which they farm. In their report on agrofuels, Rossi and Lambrou (2008), note 
that women in Cameroon supply 75 percent of the agricultural labor while owning less 
than 10 percent of the land.  In Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, and other Sub-Saharan 
countries have similar patterns of disparity.  Despite the land redistribution plans of the 
1960’s women in Brazil own an estimated 11 percent.    
Yet while women often lack formal title to land, they have access rights through a 
mix of statutory and customary laws.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, women generally gain 
access through male relatives, depending on the particular lineage arrangements of their 
communities.  Similarly, in South Asia, women acquire access to land by inheritance 
through the male line.  However, in very few instances do formal and customary laws 
recognize equality between men and women with regard to access and inheritance.  In 
Latin America, where the dominant form of access for women is inheritance, only an 
estimated 4 to 25 percent benefited from the much-vaunted land reforms of the 1960’s 
and 1970’s (Rossi & Lambrou 2008).  Moreover, women are often left out of the 
decision-making process with regard to land transfers and changes in land use (Behrman, 
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Meinzen-Dick & Quisumbing 2011; Nhantumbo & Salomão 2010; Rossi & Lambrou 
2008; Julia & White 2011).   
Non-market activities by members of marginalized groups are worthless in the 
eyes of investors and governments seeking to lease state land because they do not 
contribute to GDP or produce exchange value. For example Africa’s colonial legacy and 
subsequent post-colonial sedentarization policies with regard to pastoral communities has 
resulted in loss of land, conflicts with agriculturalists, and, most insidiously, a pervasive 
attitude among government officials that their herding and economic activities are of little 
value or even environmentally destructive (Cotula et al. 2009; Kipuri & Ridgewell 2008; 
Zoomers 2010).  Historic political persecution and systemic racism, as in the cases of the 
Dayak in Indonesia and Afro-descendents in Colombia, leave people vulnerable to 
violence and forcible expulsion from their land.  Moreover, traditional views in Africa 
and elsewhere treat women’s agricultural activities as being of little consequence to the 
preservation of food sovereignty and local economies, which, in addition to informal land 
access, works against their inclusion in negotiations. Because of the nature of their labor 
cultivating homegardens; gathering wood, water, and wild plants; selecting and 
maintaining seeds; weeding; engaging in pest control; and food processing, women are 
often left out of negotiations with government officials (Behrman, Meinzen-Dick & 
Quisumbing 2011).  This is an example of how actors within large institutions enact their 
own gendered assumptions and harmonize them with local ones as gender theorists 
suggest (Acker 1990; Connell & Messerschmidt 2005; Jessop 2003).  Clearly, this type of 
exploitation has an interlocking relationship with race and class, most notably the 
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concentration of wealth in the North coupled with disdain for local subsistence and small 
market economies, which are seen as inefficient. 
Despite a general stagnation of foreign investment to many countries in Africa, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia have seen their fortunes 
improve since the 1990’s.  At the heart of Africa’s foreign direct investment (FDI) boom 
is the perception that there are vast tracts of land available for food and fuel development 
(Mathews 2007).  Northern investors, seeing the Global South as a new source of revenue 
in the midst of the financial crisis, have pumped over US$30 billion (Cotula et al. 2009, 
p. 25) into sub-Saharan Africa and eagerly sought to buy and lease land for food and fuel 
exportation.  
Company Trickery in Ghana (Jatropha) 
 
 
 
Bakari Nyari (2008) describes how a Norwegian company took advantage of 
Ghana’s traditional land law and used trickery to obtain 38,000 hectares of forest and 
scrubland in Kusawgu near the northern town of Alipe. More than 80% of Ghana’s land 
is held in common, and while official permission to develop land is covered under the 
1993 Local Government Act 462, its disposal follows along traditional lines whereby the 
chief of the village has jurisdiction on behalf of the community.  
BioFuel Africa, is a subsidiary of BioFuel AS, whose mission statement claimed 
it wanted to create “the largest biofuel plantion in the world” (Rughani 2009, p. 2). The 
area in which the land grab took place relies heavily on agriculture for household income.  
Literacy rates among adults are low, with approximately 65% of adults having no formal 
education.  Climate change and little government support for farming activities leads 
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many people to migrate in search of wage labor. Contacted by BioFuel Africa, a 
government official hired a local business leader to promote agrofuels to the community 
with promises that the new Jatropha (an agrofuel feedstock) plantation would bring jobs 
and stable incomes to the region.  The people of Kusawgu were thus convinced that their 
“unproductive” land would finally yield regular income as well as a decent price, so they 
authorized their illiterate chief to sign the deal by affixing his thumbprint to the 
document.    
RAINS, a local community development and environmental justice NGO was 
able to invoke Ghana’s Environmental Regulations L1 1652 to stop bulldozing of the 
land but not before over 260 hectares had been leveled.  In the ensuing meetings between 
the company’s Director of Land Acquisition and the community, the company backed 
away from promising when and how many jobs would materialize for people in the area. 
The chief sought to withdraw from the agreement but was told that the document was 
legally binding.  In actuality, the claim made by Finn Byberg was false, as the company 
had by-passed the development authorization mandated by Ghana, however it was only 
after a protracted legal battle that the residents of Kusawgu succeeded in forcing the 
company to release the land (Nyari 2008; Rughani 2009). 
Among many traditional communities in rural Africa, land was, and in varying 
degrees still is, seen to possess three dimensions.  It has a spiritual dimension, meaning 
that it has divine qualities that must be respected. It has a physical dimension as an 
important site of production and sustenance, and it has a cultural dimension as an anchor 
of social identity.  While many of Africa’s statutory and tribal customary laws guarantee 
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women some access rights to land, matrilineal and patrilineal land tenure regimes vary, 
so inheritance is not guaranteed in most cases (Apusigah 2009).   
A small portion of Ghana’s land is in the hands of the state, while the remaining 
80 – 90 percent is administered under customary law with chiefs signing leasing 
agreements on behalf of their communities (Schoneveld et al. 2010; Vermeulen and 
Cotula 2010). Through the 2003 Land Administration Programme, the government 
attempted to harmonize access and ownership rights.  However, in (Bonye & Joseph 
2007) of northern Ghana where Nyari’s story unfolds found that women’s claims were 
limited under all current laws and would be further threatened by rises in land value and 
greater economic insecurity. 
Nyari noted that women in the community were the most vocal in opposition to 
the Jatropha project.  One woman raged at BioFuel Africa’s Chairman Finn Byberg for 
having lost her meager cash income obtained through gathering shea nuts and locust 
beans (dawadawa). The proceeds from those gathering activities enabled her to purchase 
household items and buy livestock to guard against hunger and economic instability:  
 
Look at all the sheanut (sic) trees you have cut down already and considering the 
fact that the nuts that I collect in a year give me cloth for the year and also a little 
capital. I can invest my petty income in the form of a ram and sometimes in a 
good year, I can buy a cow. Now you have destroyed the trees and you are 
promising me something you do not want to commit yourself to. Where then do 
you want me to go? What do you want me to do? (Nyari 2008, p. 6) 
  
 
Existing studies of agrofuel development have confirmed women’s increased risk 
of economic and food insecurity.  A study by Schoneveld, German, and Nutakor (2010) 
of the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions of central Ghana found the most profound 
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effects of large-scale Jatropha cultivation fell on women who saw their incomes drop as 
fields and forests from which they gathered and cultivated were cleared. In Ghanaian 
society gender and kinship relations are central to land tenure, and the way in which land 
is managed is the key to true ownership.  Much of the time women are prevented from 
exercising their use-rights to land regardless of ownership (matrilineal or patrilineal) 
because the gendered division of labor and/or customary norms prevent them from 
performing certain productive and ceremonial tasks such as making spiritual offerings 
and clearing trees.  However, women have developed ways of getting around social 
norms, through cooperation with male and female relatives (Behrman, Meinzen-Dick & 
Quisumbing 2011; Gray & Kevane 1999).  
In Ghana, women form what Shao (2002) calls the “cornerstone” of the village 
economy, performing over 70% of the labor associated with the maintenance of the 
household (Shao 2002).  In many cases, rural women’s socially determined position, 
along with a heavy reliance on natural resources, places in them in direct opposition to 
large-scale agrofuel development. Even though women are often involved in cash-crop 
agricultural production such as weeding, planting, and processing, their more visible role 
in subsistence activities such as growing cassava, home-gardening, and gathering means 
they are more likely to have smaller plots of land, since “use” confers ownership (Gray & 
Kevane 1999; Behrman, Meinzen-Dick & Quisumbing 2011).  Apusigah (2009), echoing 
Waring, notes that the cultural dichotomization of productive (as farm-hands to their 
husbands) and reproductive (processing and cooking farm products) activities in 
Ghanaian rural communities is a falsification that leads to minimization of women’s 
social importance and therefore undermines their entitlements and authority over land.  
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This “reproduction of the social relations between women and men” (Waring 1988) is 
clearly apparent when agrofuel companies approach traditional leaders for access to land 
on which to grow large-scale feedstock plantations (Apusigah 2009; Waring 1988), as 
was the case in Sanggau, Indonesia, where male community leaders by-passed women 
altogether by leaving them out of negotiations with oil palm companies. 
 
ReGendering Tenure in Indonesia (Oil Palm) 
 
Colchester et al. (2006) describe Indonesia’s development policy as following a 
trajectory from nationalization toward privatization of forested lands on the Outer 
Islands.  In the earliest period of palm cultivation, the state-owned palm oil company, 
PTPN, controlled land holdings.  In the early period before 1993, only lots smaller than 
100 hectares were permitted to be released for palm cultivation.  Usually the customary 
rights of indigenous communities were not honored, and schemes to resettle them were 
developed. Indigenous people were often relocated to villages elsewhere or inserted into 
mixed settlements of migrants from Java and Madura called Transmigrasi sispan. 
Indonesia’s dictator, Suharto, ramped up a massive campaign of privatization and 
direct foreign investment and a change in land-use law that enabled logged forests 
planted with oil palms to be classified as agricultural lands.  A four-year period after 
Suharto’s fall from power saw laws guaranteeing indigenous communities more access to 
natural resources and the establishment of protected forests (hutan lindung) that were not 
to be logged. International protests forced Indonesia’s Ministry of Forests to sign an 
agreement with the IMF to place a moratorium on any new palm development, however 
logging continues unabated  (Colchester et al. 2006).  
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Peasants grow approximately 30%, or 1.8 million hectares, of Indonesia’s oil 
palms on smallholder-nucleus estates schemes (NES).   The majority of these farmers are 
either indigenous people whose land was taken from them or formerly landless 
transmigrasi.  Under this plan the contractor is allocated 2 hectares of land on which to 
grow palms that supply a central mill and is given an additional half or 1 hectare plot on 
which to maintain housing and subsistence farming; the company holds the title to the 
land as surety for debt repayment.  In many cases indigenous people lack any formal title, 
regardless of recognition by the state, and simply lose their lands to logging companies 
(Colchester et al. 2006).  A 2007 report to the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination found that, in Indonesia,  “indigenous peoples’ 
property and other rights are disregarded, their right to consent is not respected, some are 
displaced...” (Smolker et al 2008, p. 38) 
In the Sanggau district of Indonesia Dayak (non-Malay/non-Muslim indigenous) 
people, lacking formal titles, continued to live off land that had been logged since 1980.  
Exercising their traditional right of access to the land on the remaining 25% of the land 
not logged or planted with oil palms, they engaged in traditional swidden agriculture, 
planting rice and maize for two years, then shifting to rubber and fruit trees with fallow 
periods interspersed. In 2000 the palm oil company, PTPN XIII, which had been granted 
formal concession to the land by the state, decided that the “sleeping” land in its 
inventory should be developed for palm cultivation.  In the night the company deployed 
bulldozers to clear the rubber gardens and rice fields, leaving Dayak occupying the area 
with nothing.  As of 2008, Dayak in Sanggau province were still trying to cultivate what 
they could in the clearcuts (Gaia Foundation et al. 2008). 
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In Kalimantan, the majority of Dayak retain customary land rights (hak ulayat) 
with the understanding that a family that continues working its ladang (an area dedicated 
to rice cultivation) owns the swidden through labor. The Dayak reside in large 
community longhouses with apartments for each family; these villages are the basic unit 
of organization. However, the longhouse as a whole has no collective ownership over the 
land.  Rather, the individual families do.  Each family living in the community longhouse 
is economically independent from the other families and works its own umaq/ladang 
alongside the others. Often the families cultivating the swiddens do not have formal title 
to the land, and the land may actually lie outside the village’s jurisdiction (Maunati 
2005).   
 While the Indonesian Constitution has provisions for the recognition of customary 
land law, government officials rarely recognize indigenous claims to land and almost 
never pay those whose land is seized for palm monoculture.  Further, those indigenous 
people who do “voluntarily” sign up to join the nucleus schemes are not informed that 
doing so results in permanent surrender of their ancestral lands.  The loss of tenure 
worsens the situation of rural women in Indonesia.  Many indigenous cultures in 
Indonesia provide not only for women’s access to land but also for joint ownership 
between men and women.  Customary law among the Minangkabau in West Sumatra 
enables women to hold land, while most Dayak peoples in Borneo guarantee equal 
ownership between men and women.  Additionally, the amount of inheritance of land is 
decided by which child will eventually take care of parents (Julia and White 2011). 
However, just as the environmental landscapes of indigenous peoples are 
transformed through oil palm monocropping, so are the legal and economic fortunes of 
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women with regard to land ownership.  Julia and White (2011) found that prior to the 
large land deals in the town of Anbera in Sanggau District, women’s ownership rights 
were honored.  However, with the arrival of large logging/palm oil concerns, shifting of 
land use and battles over land continued a steady erosion of women’s adat rights.   
The companies sought out male community leaders to sign land deals, 
disseminate information regarding land disposal, sign up NES farmers, and resolve 
community disputes (Julia & White 2011).  Julia and White explain that in Dayak Hibun 
custom, it is taboo for a woman to take part in the political process.  While women are 
not formally excluded from politics, cultural gender regimes confine them to the 
domestic sphere.  The public timidity and “natural” peacefulness of women is 
exemplified by Entulai Ndou Labaa’ a mythical female figure who found the courage to 
entreat community leaders to end inter-tribal warfare only through the power of a 
supernatural stone she encountered (Julia & White 2011, p. 11).  Because social 
proscription prevents women from entering public debates and negotiation, and because 
the women themselves trust their husbands to negotiate in their interests and the interests 
of the family, the companies spoke with only the male tribal leader to establish transfer, 
registration, and compensation.  The companies used a formal smallholder registration 
process that recognizes the head of household as the owner of the land.  And while 
registration is technically gender neutral, men are understood to be the head of 
household. The transfer of land to daughters as registered smallholders is allowed only in 
the case in which a family has extensive holdings.  
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Despite the fact that men hold sway over decision-making, a number of women 
engaged in acts of resistance against their husbands and the companies.  Mrs. Ayokng 
told the story of Mrs. Daum:   
Mrs. Daum was the first person who didn’t want to give up the land...she said, 
‘Kidoh nyorapi kelapa sawit, masi borah lonyu nyorapi’ (no one cooks oil palm 
fruit, still one cooks rice).  She wanted to keep all of her rubber orchard.  So, 
when her husband and father-in-law were still persuaded [to give up the land], she 
then moved...so desperately not wanting to give up the land, she ran away (Julia 
& White 2011, p. 12). 
 
Mrs. Ayokng, herself, refused to be shut out of the negotiations and was supported by her 
husband and other men, as well as women in the community.  She insisted that one of the 
smallholder plots allocated to her family be made in her name.  When she did not get the 
share, she went to the village head and requested that she be registered as a widow and 
failing that as a widower.  Her request was honored and she got the plot in her own name.   
Clearly, modesty had nothing to do with Mrs. Daum’s or Mrs. Ayokng’s actions.  
Each recognized her economic stake in the negotiations and challenged both the 
‘representatives of the company and the male members of the community.  But, this case 
also shows how organizations, such as the states or companies, impose hegemonic 
masculinity with regard to land tenure.  “Gender-neutral” practices and language amount 
to gendered discrimination when economic assumptions that privilege the visible labor of 
men over the less visible work of women are used to justify who gets to inherit or own 
land.  Local political gender regimes enabled male community members to transfer the 
land, ignoring the customary equality of women with regard to land tenure. 
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State Expropriation in Mozambique (Sugarcane) 
 
 
“I don’t have a farm, I don’t have a garden, because the only land that I have has been 
destroyed.  We are just suffering of hunger, because even if I go to look for another farm, 
they will just destroy it again.” – Elisa Alimone Mongue, 42, single mother of two 
displaced by sugarcane in Mozambique.11
 
 
In 2007 the Mozambican government placed over 30,000 hectares under a 50-year 
lease in the district of Massingir for development of a sugarcane plantation. The 
“ProCana” project was a joint venture between the government and the United Kingdom-
based Central African Mining and Exploration Company (CAMEC) to produce 120 
million liters of ethanol a year for export to its neighbor South Africa.  At the time of the 
deal, Mozambique’s President declared, “biofuel development will not dislodge 
Mozambican farmers from their lands” (Odeny, Leonhard, Borras, and Rocha 2010, p. 
32).   However, a fact-finding mission by a NGO found that the parcel leased to the 
agrofuel company contained the pastoralist villages of Chinbangane, Chitar, Zulu, 
Mahiza, and Mocatini in contradiction to the claim made by the district economic 
activities director, Mauricio Hou, that the area was marginal and uninhabited except by 
“squatters” who only engaged in charcoal production (Odeny et al. 2010, p. 32). The 
pastoral people living in the Massingir district engage in charcoal production, cattle 
herding, and subsistence farming, much of which is uncounted in monetary terms. 
Another problem complicating the project was CAMEC’s claim to land set aside for 
people displaced by a wildlife park.  
Part of the land had been intended for the resettlement of civil war refugees living 
since at least 1994 in an old hunting ground before the formation of the new wildlife 
                                                 
11 ActionAid, p. 2. 
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park.  Having endured the war, the villagers had already undergone one settlement when 
the national park was opened allowing a greater range for elephants from South Africa’s 
Kruger National Park.  The boundaries of the Limpopo Transfrontier Park enclosed the 
villages of Mavoze, Massingir Velho, Bingo, Makavene, Chibatana, Mainga, Machaule, 
Machamba, and Ximange and left the people open to attack by elephants.  The park 
enabled elephants access to the villages where they trampled villagers’ children and 
raided their crops (Cotula et al. 2008; Franco et al. 2010).  The village of Mavoze alone 
contained over 2,500 people.  The Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Agriculture 
negotiated a new area for the villages in the same land that ProCana wanted for the 
feedstock plantation.  ProCana was able, in the words of researchers, to “outbid” (Odeny 
et al. 2010, p. 32) the Ministry of Tourism in the relocation decision. The villagers had 
been promised running water and grazing rights as well as housing, electricity and jobs 
(Franco et al. 2010; Mousseau & Mittal 2011;Vermeulen & Cotula 2010). Researchers 
noted that the thousands of jobs (between 3,000 and 6,000) promised by the company for 
cane-cutting would mostly likely go to younger men; an elder of one of the affected 
communities, anticipating the company’s hiring practices, said he doubted that the 
company would hire a man of his advanced age (Odeny et al. 2010, p. 33). 
In the initial community-wide meeting with the villagers, the company and 
government representatives faced opposition when they asked the people to move their 
herds and farms to accommodate the project.  The villagers told the officials there was no 
“free” land, since they used it for grazing and other activities but they were reassured the 
district would limit the scope of the project to ensure their continued activities.  The 
consultation process was flawed in the way industry officials presented an either/or 
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decision to the people and limited any discussion of the project to how lands would be 
allocated and not whether the endeavor should go forward at all.  Additionally, ProCana 
seemed to be ignoring original agreements made with the communities about the 
boundaries of the plantation, and the villagers were not given a timetable with regard to 
resettlement.  Finally, the company and government officials approached male elites and 
elders for consent rather than the majority of villagers who felt misinformed by the 
company and thus opposed the project (Franco et al. 2010; Odeny et al. 2010).  Women 
were not consulted in the negotiations at all (Nhantumbo & Salomão 2010).   
Mozambique has one of the most progressive land allocation policies in Africa.  
Following its 1975 emancipation from Portugal and a crushing civil war that claimed 
approximately one million people, socialist Mozambique nationalized all of its land under 
a system called direito de uso e aproveitamento da terra (DUAT), reflecting peasant 
ownership through use and improvement.  The 1990 Constitution and 1995 National 
Land Policy Act rejected privatization of land titles and affirmed that men and women 
had equal rights over land by stating that land cannot be sold, mortgaged, or subject to 
any other form of private transfer.  The Land Act of 1997 officially recognized 
equivalence of customary law to DUAT and offered women more protection by 
subjecting customary law to the constitutional authority establishing men’s and women’s 
equality (Norfolk & Tanner 2007). However the entrenched prejudices of government 
officials with discretionary authority over land allocation and protection actually 
determines whether or not the state honors the rights of occupants.  The legal framework 
providing for “productive” use of land held by the state is subject to considerable 
interpretation.  Not surprisingly, productive use is generally understood to mean the 
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generation of commodities, and so the production of use-values inherent in the activities 
of smallholders and pastoralists is seen to be worthless (Odeny et al. 2010; Vermeulen & 
Cotula 2010).   
Additionally, Mozambique’s legal protections for women’s right to land cannot 
eliminate discrimination within these marginalized rural communities and the entrenched 
poverty that affects female-headed households.  In Mozambique, a fifth of the population 
lives in households headed by women.  These households have access to smaller, less 
fertile plots of land and derive the majority of their income from unskilled female labor in 
the agricultural sector.  In those households poverty and the percentage of income 
devoted to food purchases are significantly higher than that of households headed by 
men.  As in most of the Global South, women predominate in the production of food 
crops such as cassava and maize, and while they perform a nearly equal percentage of 
labor in the production of cash crops, much of the time male members of their families 
control their revenue. Moreover, local farmers’ associations are often the exclusive 
preserves of male community members who may not value the work of female farmers 
(Behrman, Meinzen-Dick & Quisumbing 2011; Vermeulen & Cotula 2010).   
Another factor that has affected women’s access to land in Mozambique, as in 
other countries in Africa, has been the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  Many women become 
heads of households because they are widowed or divorced.  Customary access is 
mediated through male members of the community, so women often lose usufruct rights 
when they are no longer connected to a man.  There has been considerable evidence 
linking HIV/AIDS and the dispossession of rural women from their land.  And while the 
Land Law enables women to opt out and register land in their own names, as of 2007, no 
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woman had challenged customary law (Norfolk & Tanner 2007).  Since customary laws 
privilege male disposal of land and collective voice on the matter, women are prevented 
from participating fully in deciding whether or not land will be leased.  Moreover, 
because women’s share of land is generally smaller, the proceeds from such 
arrangements are likely to be meager compared with the return from the use of the land.   
In 2008/2009 CAMEC was sold to the British firm BioEnergy Africa, which 
bought a 94 percent share of the company. The land granted to the company effectively 
took it out of the hands of local people for 50 years, extendable for much longer under 
DUAT, because CAMEC had made “improvements” and installed infrastructure such as 
a drip irrigation system. While CAMEC did not hold title to the land and did not “on 
paper” (Odeny et al. 2010: 33) violate the Mozambican Constitution, it would have been 
able to obtain a deed for the infrastructure after 50 years, amounting to de facto 
ownership.  
Essentially, ProCana was a pyramid scheme whereby the DUAT lease granted to 
the company was used to promote investment in CAMEC. Based on the ridiculous claim 
that the ProCana enterprise would produce four times as much ethanol per hectare as any 
plantation in Mozambique, the company raised $13 million with a projected goal of 
raising another $15 million in loans.  BioEnergy metamorphosed into “Sable Mining,” 
the business’s registered name in the British Virgin Islands, a well-known tax haven.   
Having cleared the land of people and planted only 8,000 hectares of sugarcane 
on the proposed plantation, BioEnergy abandoned the project in 2008, leaving shattered 
communities behind. The company lured investors with extravagant claims, gained 
control of “empty” land under existing use by “invisible” people, then simply packed up 
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and left. The Mozambican government canceled the company’s concession in December 
of 2009 but intended to find new leasers since the DUAT was no longer in the possession 
of the communities.  The World Bank, lamenting the situation, commented that local 
people had lost access to game meat, fish, forest products and water, which had the most 
negative consequences for women (Mousseau & Mittal 2011).  
In the case of ProCana, the informal economic activities of the resettled and 
migrant people were, in effect, feminized in the eyes of the state.  Contending that the 
people were just “squatters” and, therefore, not productive enough to be worthy of 
consideration under the country’s land tenure laws, the Ministry of Agriculture chose 
relocate them in favor of a “productive” endeavor.  Despite the fairly equitable legislation 
instituted by the socialist government, women are still constrained by traditional gender 
orders that undervalue their activities.  
In 2003 the World Bank’s policy document, Land Policies for Growth and 
Poverty Reduction, praised Mozambique’s land policies regarding local consultations and 
consent, overturning three decades of recommendations in favor of land privatization, 
monetization, and use as collateral to facilitate “productive” use.  On the other hand, the 
United States has repeatedly challenged the government’s laws, urging privatization. The 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) suggested the 1997 Land 
Law be changed to ease the use of land as collateral for loans.  In August 2011, the 
private US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) threatened to end further aid to 
Mozambique if it refused to institute the transferability of DUATs (Mousseau & Mittal 
2011).  Transferability of DUATs would disempower rural poor people and particularly 
female-headed households.  USAID’s involvement in land privatization for agrofuel 
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production has not only been discursive.  The agency has directly funded forcible 
expulsion of former slaves and indigenous people from their lands in Colombia.   
 
Resisting Terrorism in Colombia (Oil Palm) 
 
Impunity and violence against women is a huge roadblock to peace. We denounce the 
militarisation of our lives in the name of the war on drugs, the war on terrorism, the war 
on everything that threatens capitalism and their financial world. - Patricia Guerrero, 
founder of Colombia’s “City of Women”. 12
 
 
 
 In July 2000 US President Bill Clinton approved the incorporation of “Plan 
Colombia” into Public Law 106-246, waiving human rights conditions and allocating 
taxpayer money to anti-narcotics activities in Colombia (PCN & AFRODES USA 2010. 
p. 3).  Since 2002 the program has garnered approximately $75 million per year and was 
partially administered through USAID (Ballvé 2009, p. 28) for alternative development 
projects for palm oil production in Colombia.  As of April 2010, the United States had 
spent $6.7 billion (PCN & AFRODES USA 2010, p. 3) to help the Colombian 
government, supported by paramilitaries, carry out intimidation, massacres, 
assassinations, forced disappearances, illegal appropriation of land, and forced 
displacement of Afro-Colombians (Mingorance 2006, p. 27).  Professedly, the aid for 
partnerships between campesinos and agrofuel companies would serve the dual purpose 
of providing an avenue away from cash cropping coca and narco-trafficking in the United 
States’ “war on drugs” and quell the fires of the 50-year war between the government and 
the leftist guerrilla army the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  In 
reality, the funds supported backdoor “re-colonisation” (Torres 2008, p. 34) of Afro-
                                                 
12 Amiri 2011. 
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Colombian lands and drug money laundering by paramilitaries with ties to the palm oil 
industry and the highest reaches of government. 
For five centuries Afro-Colombians, the descendents of African slaves, have lived 
on the Pacific coast of the country.  One hundred years before slavery appeared in the 
colony of Virginia, their forbears were brought to replace the Carib and Chibchan people 
decimated by forced labor under Spanish colonial rule.  However, through uprisings and 
escapes, hundreds ventured to the south, Pacific, and interior of the country and 
established towns called palenques.  By the time Colombia freed itself from Spain in 
1810 under Simón Bolívar and Francisco de Paula Santander, three of every five soldiers 
in the army for independence were Afro-Colombian.  Yet Colombian slaves were not 
emancipated until 1851 (Bacon 2007).  
Despite its fraught history, Colombia has some of the most progressive laws of 
any Latin American country for the protection of indigenous and agrarian land. Its 1991 
Constitution recognizes the territorial and cultural rights of Black communities, while 
Article 1 of the 1993 Law 70 states: “The object of the present Law is to recognize the 
right of the Black Communities that have been living on the barren lands in rural areas 
along the river of the Pacific Basin, in accordance with their traditional production 
practices, to their collective property” (McDougall 2011, p. 4).  Since the passage of Law 
70 Afro-Colombians have recovered 6.1 million hectares of their former territories 
through lawsuits and protests by activist groups including the Proceso de Comunidades 
Negras (PCN), a coalition of over 140 organizations representing Black communities 
(Bacon 2007). The land on which their descendents settled holds significant importance 
as a source of refuge, culture, and wealth.  However, historic and systemic racism in 
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Colombia has resulted in poverty and vulnerability of Black communities to violence and 
land seizure.    
While indigenous and Black communities hold their land in common, Colombia 
stands out among all the Latin American countries (including Brazil) in its protection of 
women’s access to and ownership of land.  Colombian women’s land tenure includes the 
rights of female-headed households, mandatory joint titling and prioritization of special 
groups of women (Deere & León 2001; Taylor 2006).  In 1994, the Colombian 
government acknowledged the disproportionate effects its war with the FARC had on 
rural women by granting priority in land titling to “unprotected” women, regardless of 
whether or not they are mothers (Deere & León 2001, p. 40).  As in the wider case of 
Afro-Colombian land recovery, the progress has not come from the top down but is the 
result of the struggle by rural women, particularly the Colombian Association of Peasant 
and Indigenous Women, to carve out a space for themselves in Colombia’s land law  
(Taylor 2006).  Yet, while the laws on the books recognize Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous women’s equality and ensure the right of rural populations to secure tenure, 
the Colombian government’s agrofuel policies and its ties to paramilitaries achieve 
something quite different.     
The government’s national agrofuel blending mandates, coupled with its generous 
tax law regarding palm oil, serve the interests of capital while making plantation 
development an attractive proposition for money laundering and illegal property seizure.  
Colombia targeted the production and consumption of agrodiesel under Law 939, passed 
in 2004, which called for a 5 percent blend to fuel by 2008, while Resolution 1289, 
passed in 2005, established graduated blending up to 20 percent by 2012.  With Decree 
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1135, the government required 60 percent of all new vehicles sold in the country to have 
E85 flex-fuel technology, increasing to 100 percent by 2016.  There are no sales and fuel 
taxes for palm oil, and all income derived from oil palms used for fuel feedstock is tax-
exempt (Sorda et al. 2010, p. 6982; Torres 2008).  
At the same time that US dollars began flowing into Colombia, the amount of 
land planted in oil palms exploded. Between 2002 and 2006 the amount of land devoted 
to oil palms saw an increase of 11.5 percent, from an estimated 185,000 hectares to over 
300,000 hectares, making the country the fourth largest producer of palm oil in the world 
(Bacon 2007; Cotula et al. 2008; Torres 2008).  However, these figures do not cover the 
amount of land under illegal palm cultivation.  A government investigation found that 
private interests had seized, through illegal means and phony land titles, a conservative 
estimate of some 25,000 or more hectares of land granted to Afro-Colombian 
communities (Cotula et al. 2008).  Fidel Mingorance (2006), writing for the NGO Human 
Rights Everywhere (HREV), described the process of dispossession in five stages: 1) 
armed incursion into territory by paramilitaries; 2) occupation of the land; 3) theft or 
“purchase” using armed intimidation and displacement; 4) planting of the trees and the 
development of the “palm complex” - plantation and extraction plant; 5a) flow of palm 
oil to the state and for export; and 5b) tightening of territorial control, including social, 
economic and military control, land concentration, and the money-laundering of drug 
assets by declaring them palm oil income (p. 36).  
Much of the Plan Colombia money went to anti-narcotics activities, such as aerial 
fumigation of coca plants cultivated by narco-traffickers.  Flush with $87 million, the 
Colombian government initiated a massive 1997 offensive against the FARC.   A joint 
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covert operation between the military’s Seventeenth Brigade, under the leadership of 
School of the Americas graduate General Rito Alejo Del Río, and the so-called “sixth 
division,” paramilitaries linked to the Medellín cocaine cartel, the anti-guerrilla effort 
terrorized the Afro-Colombian communities in the biodiverse river regions of Curvaradó 
and Jiguamiandó, killing 140 farmers and displacing 17,000 people from their homes 
(Ballvé 2009, p. 28; PCN & AFRODES USA 2010).   
The wholesale spraying of Monsanto’s herbicide Roundup Ultra over Afro-
Colombian communities destroyed their crops and drove them from their land. This 
violation of the right to prior consent effectively dispossessed Black communities of their 
land, enabling paramilitaries to occupy it, and widening the area available to 
paramilitaries for coca production.  In 2000 Chocó registered only 2 counties where coca 
was being grown, but by 2007 the region reported 31 counties in which the crop was 
being cultivated (Murillo-Urrutia 2008, p. 142).   In 2010, PCN reported that in 1991, 82 
percent of the Pacific region’s Afro-descendent population claimed property while 
currently only 3.5 percent have property, and 72 percent of the people living in the region 
have lost access to land, crops, and jobs (PCN & AFRODES USA 2010, p. 5). 
For its war with the FARC, the Colombian military initially received eighty 
percent of Plan Colombia funds, but the emphasis shifted in the early 2000s in favor of 
“peace” programs aimed at ramping up oil palm development.  The alternative 
development initiatives put forward and funded by USAID aimed at demobilizing 
paramilitaries in favor monocropping of oil palm as the only viable alternative to coca.  
In 2005 the Colombian government negotiated an amnesty program with the paramilitary 
army Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) to demobilize and settle paramilitary 
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forces.  The Ley Justicia and Paz created opportunities for the combatants to give up 
arms in exchange for light sentences, avoiding extradition to the U.S. and allowing them 
to run oil palm plantations and refineries. Through these “strategic alliances” 
(Mingorance 2006, p. 64; Torres 2008, p. 34), paramilitaries turned poverty and systemic 
marginalization to their advantage and were able to solidify their “ownership” of the 
lands they stole from Afro-Colombian people.  USAID dispersed $650,000 to Gradesa 
S.A., a company overseen by Antonio and Carlos Zúñiga, whose cocaine and 
paramilitary connections landed them on a Colombian terrorist watch list.  In 2004, the 
agency gave $161,000 to Coproagrosur S.A., a firm owned in part by one of the AUC’s 
bloodiest generals, Carlos Mario Jiménez, better known as “Macaco” (Ballvé 2009).   
Another firm, Urapalma S.A., whose founding investors included the Zúñigas, almost 
obtained USAID money as well but was found, along with a dozen other palm oil 
producers, to have seized thousands of hectares of land from Afro-descendents in Chocó.  
An investigation by the government’s Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural 
(INCODER), the land reform agency, found that 93 percent of the land cultivated by the 
palm oil companies Urapalma S.A., Palma de Curvaradó, Palmas S.A., and Palmadó 
were stolen from Black communities (Torres 2008, p. 35).  By the time the 
demobilization program went into effect, a popular phrase was already ubiquitous in 
Chocó: “Sell your land or we’ll negotiate with your widow” (Ballvé 2009, p. 28; 
McDougall 2011, p. 10; Mingorance 2006, p. 40). 
The paramilitaries delivered on the threat, displacing over 4 million people and 
handing Colombia the distinction of containing the world’s second largest population of 
internally displaced people (IDPs) after Sudan (Amiri 2011; Ballvé 2009; McDougall 
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2011).  According to a 2011 special report to the UN Human Rights Council, one third of 
all IDPs were Afro-descendents, and of those a majority are women who are heads of 
household with children.  The report identified being Afro-Colombian, female and 
displaced a fatal combination resulting in a more vulnerable position than that of Afro-
Colombian men of similar circumstances.  The Colombian government stated that 
common experiences for Black women were rape, forced labor, and persecution and 
murder for membership in women’s organizations (McDougall 2011).   
In response to the high proportion of internally displaced women, the Liga de 
Mujeres Desplazadas (League of Displaced Women) founded La Ciudad de Las Mujeres 
(The City of Women) in 2003, whose majority leadership is Afro-descendent.  Led by 
Patricia Guerrero, a displaced human rights lawyer, members leveled the ground and 
began building housing for themselves outside the tourist town of Cartagena.  Following 
an investigation of Colombia’s Housing Law with regard to the rights of displaced 
persons and consciousness-raising to inculcate in members a belief in the human right to 
decent shelter, the group petitioned the government for housing subsidies.  For the first 
time in the country’s history 100 women received social housing allocations.  They raised 
an additional $500,000 from governments, the UN, and the Global Fund for Women 
among others; to raise more cash they rented nearby fields and grew corn to sell 
(Guerrero 2010). Taking shifts cooking, doing childcare, and crafting hundreds of 
thousands of handmade cement bricks, the women built a town with streets, flowers, 
trees, gardens and 100 houses (Rey 2006).  During the construction process the women 
were terrorized by the paramilitaries Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antiterrorista 
Colombiano (ERPAC) and Águilas Negras (Black Eagles), both of which were part of the 
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AUC.  In addition to death threats, the bodies of disappeared people were dumped in the 
fields bordering the new town and the husband of one of the women was gruesomely 
murdered while guarding the building materials.   
Despite the ongoing terrorism, including the 2011 murder of Keila Esther Berrío 
Almanza, a second-generation resident and Liga activist, the five-block community is 
home to 500 women, men, and children. After initial completion of the homes, the 
women added an aqueduct, a childcare center, a small farm growing corn and beans, a 
community center, a brick factory, a community restaurant, and numerous small 
businesses supported by the community credit fund which also gives grants for 
educational pursuits (Bouvier 2011).  Additionally, two hundred of the women did not 
receive state subsidies but did get job training to provide them with skills in construction, 
agriculture, and human development.  
Having witnessed and survived the murders of family members and sexual assault 
at the hands of the country’s armed factions, community members face ongoing threats of 
military abduction and assassinations from without and domestic violence within.  One of 
the programs developed by the Liga is a youth group whose primary aim is to change 
concepts of masculinity for husbands and boys and instill knowledge and confidence in 
citizenship rights for women and girls.  The specific mission of these consciousness-
raising sessions is to advance early intervention for families and children, reduce violence 
in homes, and encourage youth not to serve as combatants or prostitutes in the country’s 
armed factions (Rey 2006).  In addition to work on local/cultural gender norms with legal 
protections for displaced people, the Liga and Guerrero continue to advocate on the state 
level for the rights of IDPs, including land repatriation.  Failing redress from the 
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Colombian government, they also filed 144 cases, 15 of which are against sexual 
violence, before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which issued orders 
from 2009 through 2011 for the protection of Liga members (Bouvier 2011).      
Dauvergne and Neville (2010) found ownership of land shifting from 
public/communal to private tenure with MNCs gaining more power over time as local 
industries forego state oversight in favor of technology transfer and capital from their 
multinational partners.  Some critics (Salleh 2010) tend to support pre-colonial customary 
tenure regimes, arising as they do from local conditions, as more fair and equitable to 
women.  However, placing faith solely in traditional land tenure practices is romantic, 
and overlooks the material consequences of inequitable gendered relations for local 
women and status groups. Additionally, the dichotomous nature of many local gender 
relations privilege heteronormative expectations and responsibilities, leaving women who 
are not attached to a man or men without the option of exercising the informal channels 
through which other women (and “other” men) gain access to land (Razavi 2009).  In  
This can be seen in the case of Mozambique where HIV/AIDS has significantly 
weakened women’s ability to contest decisions regarding land. While different customary 
and post-colonial laws may privilege women with access and indeed rights to land, 
conceptions of local masculinities and femininities that position women as passive, 
emotional, and weak while holding men up as active, rational decision-makers, with 
according community representation, ensure women’s particular dispossession and 
poverty but also greatly degrade community stability as well.  Additionally, the 
Mozambique case shows how not all men or women have an equal footing in the 
community, as certain particular men were approached with regard to the ProCana 
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decision.  This was also the case with BioFuel Africa in Ghana where women lack any 
formal recognition of land rights under customary law and the community vests male 
chiefs with the authority to dispose of land for the good of all.   
Yet, even in the post-colonial socialist state of Mozambique, where women have 
the best formal recognition in Africa of their rights to land, government functionaries 
chose to “feminize” the non-market activities of both men and women to strip them of 
their land.  And when the last hurdle was to be cleared by the company – that of 
consulting the community – women were not among those who consulted with ProCana. 
Similarly, in Colombia, where women have won formal right to land inheritance and 
disposal regardless of their connection to male relatives, the masculinist and classist 
imperatives of the state’s military and elite landowners contradict its relatively 
progressive legal stance with regard to indigenous and Afro-Colombian women and men.    
In Indonesia, Dayak adat law recognizes a woman’s equal right to land 
inheritance while simultaneously formally excluding women from participating in 
community politics, while the agrofuel companies were able to leverage local hegemonic 
masculinities and femininities only up to a point.  This political exclusion resulted in 
recognition of only male heads of households as owners of the land by the government.  
However, women in the community resisted the structural discrimination of land tenure 
and at least one of the women was able to get her wish to be registered.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE “WEAK WINNERS” CONFRONT CAPITAL 
Writing in the Grundrisse, Marx exposed the two faces of capitalism; on the one 
capital is enabled (through money) to buy the “objective conditions of labor” (the land) 
and via this process it gains access to the living labor of free workers.  Thus “unbound 
from their land” these “free” workers pursue capital in order to negotiate the sale of their 
labor.   Governments, he explained, assist capital in the “stockpiling of workers” through 
legal and economic frameworks (Marx 1990, p. 271).  Many theorists have critiqued 
agrofuel development from this important perspective, explaining how this achievement 
of a metabolic rift subjugates all realms of social and natural activity to capitalist 
valuation and contributes to growing inequality between the North and South 
(McMichael 2009; McMichael 2010; Otero & Jones 2010).   Following from the new 
land arrangements, whether they result in complete dispossession or further peasant 
differentiation in the form of smallholder-owned enterprises that sell their feedstock to 
processors, agrofuel companies engage in practices that drive poverty (Biondi, Monteiro 
& Glass 2008; Mendonça 2009; Nyari 2008; Schott 2009; White & Dasgupta 2010). 
Yet few examinations of agrofuel expansion from a gender perspective call 
capital to account for the further disempowerment of politically and economically 
marginalized groups and in particular the women of those communities.  The introduction 
of wage labor and its disruptions play out differently for men and women based on the 
gender norms in their respective communities (Razavi 2009).  Agrofuel capitalism favors 
the privatization of land tenure, and access laws are harmonized with a dominant 
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masculinist view that distorts the nuances of women’s and men’s local claims to land and 
their own labor (Julia & White 2011; Sirait 2009).   
Acker (1988) notes that, with the advent of industrialization and the imposition of 
wage labor, wages become the method by which the means of survival are distributed.  
Under pressure from social unrest and the agitation of trade unions and worker uprisings, 
capital seeks to mediate its internal contradiction between production and reproduction 
by guaranteeing a family wage. However, because of the domestic division of labor and 
women’s invisibility both within local social relations and also in the eyes of capital, 
women are often dependent on male wage-earners and whatever state benefits are 
available.  When they do enter the labor force, the division of labor holds with women 
generally concentrated in lower paid work.    
Acker’s later work (2004) on the gendered influence of globalization recognizes 
the ways in which women in the Global South experience interaction with the market 
differently than women in the North as peasant subsistence is disrupted or completely 
uprooted.  In this case, women’s paid and unpaid labor is sometimes the only source of 
family/community welfare. Benería (2003) and others (Kabeer 1994; Razavi 2009) also 
point to the gendered nature of resource distribution within the rural families/kinship 
networks as well.  
Benería cautions against applying strict structuralist understandings that privilege 
a narrative of “women as victims approach,” (p. 78) because they are simplistic and 
exclude the empirical data showing women’s improved bargaining power within 
households when they are able to command their own income, leading Kabeer to dub 
them “weak winners” (quoted in Benería 2003, p. 78).  The feminization of labor with 
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regard to agrofuel companies cannot be seen as an overall improvement in the lot of local 
communities, because generally wage-earning in this case is driven by distress.  That is 
not to say that women should not or do not benefit from employment in the agrofuel 
sector.  However, the break up of farms, coupled with gender norms that constrain 
women to unpaid domestic labor and render them dependent on relationships with men, 
serve to extend their exploitation when they enter the workforce.   
 
Poverty 
 
Three quarters of the world’s poorest people live in rural areas, particularly in 
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, which have the highest incidence of hunger.  
Agriculture plays a prominent role with over 80 percent of rural households relying on 
farming and farm products for income and financial stability.  According to the Rural 
Poverty Report 2011 published by the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), 3.1 billion or 55% of the “developing” world’s people live outside urban centers.  
More than one billion people live on less than US$1.25 per day, and women constitute 
70% of those people (IFAD 2010). 
Governments in the Global South, encouraged by international development 
agencies and investors located in the OECD countries, are looking to incorporate rural 
people more deeply into the global economy.  Since the 1980’s the standard policy 
prescribed by multilateral organizations was faith in the market and the institution of 
austerity measures aimed at bolstering GDPs, enabling poor nations to pay their 
international debts.  Applying the capitalist notion that participation in the market is key 
to poverty reduction, and land privatization and intensive agricultural production are 
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pathways to national debt relief and individual self-actualization, governments and 
multilateral organizations are employing the rhetoric of development to push for small 
and large-scale agrofuel feedstock schemes.  In many cases agrofuel development has 
resulted in high land prices, conflicts over land, trickery, and outright theft of the land for 
feedstock monoculture, continuing a trend of poverty and displacement. 
 
Proletarianization 
 
The “development” schemes for agrofuel feedstock cultivation are leading to 
increased dispossession of rural smallholders.  While dispossession, like capitalism itself, 
appears universal, it involves embodied individuals who, by nature of their gendered 
roles, confront capital very differently.  However, contrary to the claims of international 
banks and policy experts, the true impacts of agrofuel expansion are responsible for a 
process that Farshad Araghi (2000) has called “depeasantization” whereby smallholders 
are not simply dispossessed by an agricultural differentiation but by complete 
displacement - that is by being bought out or thrown off their land – as a result of 
commodification of agricultural products.    Accordingly, rural communities have seen a 
rise in land prices with accompanying concentration of holdings by companies, and in 
some cases people have even been thrown off their land.  
In Brazil, increasing amounts of land are coming under the control of large 
corporations as a result of agrofuel production driving up land prices and forcing 
subsistence farmers to sell their farms. In 2007, Brazil’s landless workers’ movement, the 
Movimento dos Trabalhdores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), which claims a membership of 
1.5 million landless workers, reported that 47% of cropland is owned by just 1.6% of 
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Brazil’s population.  In an interview with the InterPress Service News Agency (Frayssinet 
2007), one of the leaders of the MST, Joao Pedro Stedile, mentioned that U.S. 
agribusiness company Cargill had recently purchased 356,000 hectares (roughly 880,000 
acres) and 13 ethanol plants, while billionaire George Soros’ company Adeco had 
invested $900 million in the construction of ethanol plants and $1 billion in land.  This 
rush has caused land prices to rise as much as 84 percent.   
Cotula et al. (2008) report that in the Brazilian Cerrado 70% of the land under 
sugarcane cultivation is owned by 340 industrial mills, holding an average of 30,000 
hectares, while the remaining 30% is occupied by smallholders averaging 27.5 hectares 
most of which is leased to the companies.  Several human rights groups had documented 
forcible expulsions from the land (Cotula et al. 2008; Klink & Machado 2005). 
Special Rapporteur to the UN Victoria Tauli-Corpuz reported that 60 million 
indigenous people will be displaced by palm plantations; approximately 5 million of 
those people are indigenous Dayak people living in Indonesia and Malaysia.  By the end 
of 2000 there had been 350 tenure-related conflicts in Indonesia.  Save Our Borneo, a 
NGO concerned with forest peoples in Borneo claims that the customary rights of 2000 
Dayak communities are at stake with the ramp-up of palm oil production (Ernsting 2007, 
p. 29). Many poor indigenous and rural people live in areas degraded by former 
agricultural activities and abandoned when markets shifted in favor of other industries.  
These “marginal” lands are now the target of agrofuel development.  The irony of 
capitalist development is that poor migrants from other regions visit destruction and 
misery on poor indigenous people in the accumulation process.  This is the case of 
Middle and Ulu Baram Malaysia where non-local Chinese Malaysian, Indonesian, and 
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Dayak Iban laborers logging companies associated with the palm oil have taken 
advantage of poverty and the lower political power of indigenous Dayak communities 
where human rights groups have documented the sexual assault of Penan women. 
 
Rape and “Marriage” 
 
Migration of male relatives and the encroachment of agrofuel fields on their lands 
by other men often leaves many women and girls vulnerable to sexual violence.  In 
Middle and Ulu Baram, Malaysia, the rapes of 7 young Penan women ranging in age 
from 14 to 30 years of age highlights the impacts of agrofuel disruption.  In Indonesia 
and Malaysia, land is first logged for timber then planted with oil palms.  Malaysia is 
committed to bringing its indigenous population into the ‘mainstream of development’ 
epitomized by the Ninth Malaysian Plan which espouses Konsep Baru (literally “New 
Concept”), the collectivization of all indigenous land into large concessions with one title 
rather than many customary ones.  This opens the way for oil palm cultivation by large 
corporations that set up temporary logging camps using migrant labor.  A fact-finding 
mission investigating the numerous instances of rapes, abductions and forced ‘marriages’ 
of Penan women and girls, found that, in all instances, men from outside the communities 
were the perpetrators.   
 In the case of 14-year-old “J,” a logger approached her proposing marriage to her 
while her family was out hunting.  When she refused he returned some nights later, 
entered her family’s house and raped her, then asked J’s father to agree to marry them. J’s 
father had initially refused to marry them, but because J was afraid the logger would 
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harm her family, she convinced him to let her go.  He took her to the logging camp where 
he raped and beat her repeatedly, eventually abandoning her when she became pregnant.  
Another woman, “N,” was abducted from her village by a logger and abandoned 
during her second pregnancy.  She eventually married an Indonesian logger who beat her 
in front of her children; N’s father attempted to rescue her from the camp but the logger 
prevented him from doing so.  In N’s case, her father stated to the researchers that he was 
afraid the logging company would harm his family, and the police would not do anything 
to help him; he further stated that he had no means to get to a police station since the 
village is so remote. 
  “E” was offered food by two loggers while she walked alone on a road toward 
her village; after she ate the food, they told her she was obliged to go with them.  They 
forced her onto a motorcycle and took her to the logging camp where they raped her.  
Men from her village came to rescue her and found her and the perpetrators whom they 
took and locked up in the village.  However, the logging company, instead of disciplining 
or otherwise sanctioning its employees, sent a squad of loggers to free them.  The 
villagers reported that they were afraid of the company and mentioned repeated 
incursions into the village by loggers looking to “marry” young women, so they released 
the perpetrators. 
Five companies whose logging and oil palm activities are closely tied to the 
Malaysian government operate in the area.  The temporary camps set up to serve the 
loggers are a source of violence and intimidation to the local Penan villages. The report 
identified that factors contributing to the violence were encroachment on Penan lands, 
poverty from the loss of resources, dehumanization of indigenous women who are seen as 
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sexual objects, the use of intimidation against Penan families and villages, and the lack of 
concern for indigenous people by state authorities (The Penan Support Group et al. 
2010).    
“Widows of Living Husbands”13
 
  
Agrofuel expansion not only causes vulnerability of local populations, but also 
forces people to migrate in search of income as they are pushed or bought out of their 
lands.  In general, the poorest men and women migrate to find work.  The Brazilian 
sugarcane industry estimates that there are 330,000 cutters throughout the country; the 
majority of migrants are young men who are illiterate or have incomplete educations 
(Biondo, Monteiro and Glass 2009).  Because of their poverty rural women are left 
behind to tend family farms while their male relatives, migrate picking up agricultural 
work.  In Brazil, such women are known as “widows of living husbands,” because they 
are left alone during the growing season and sometimes for years as their husbands work 
as migrant labor.  A 2009 report on agrofuels by the NGO Repórter Brasil (Biondo et al. 
2009) tells the story of Francisca Leila dos Santos who, during her three years of 
marriage to her husband Jeanciel, has only seen him 9 months on an intermittent basis 
since he migrated from their home in São José Dos Brasilios to work in the sugarcane 
fields.  In November 2008 Jeanciel told Leila that he would not be returning home at all 
until late 2009 in order to make enough money to secure a land plot on which to raise 
their daughter (Biondi, et al. 2009).   
   Dislocation and migration of poor people seeking work has different effects on 
men and women. In Brazil’s Mato Grosso do Sul, migrant male laborers from the north 
                                                 
13 Biondi, Monteiro & Glass 2009, p. 17. 
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of the country endure harsh treatment by the plantations, including overcrowding, lack of 
privacy, poor food, and beatings by security guards charged with maintaining order in the 
work camps.  Under such dehumanizing conditions, it is no surprise that agrofuel regions 
are seeing an increase in violence and prostitution.  Numerous NGO reports from areas 
targeted for agrofuel production document a breakdown of mores and customs preventing 
irresponsible sexual behavior and violence against women (Colchester et al. 2006; 
Maunati 2005; Siriat 2009; Suárez et al. 2008).  Guarani leaders told researchers that 
men returning from the sugarcane fields brought violence and addiction with them (Assis 
et al. 2007).   
Racism in Brazil contributes to a high degree of exploitation of indigenous men in 
the fields. In Mato Grosso do Sul, Guarani Kaiowá cane cutters are ordinarily given 
coupons by the company with which to buy food for their families at home, however the 
coupons can only be redeemed in shops chosen by middlemen.  The inflated prices of the 
food coupons causes the majority of cutters to incur debts, and indigenous workers 
reported that they were being remunerated with housing, food, and alcohol.  From 
February until around November, the only inhabitants in the Guarani settlements are 
women and young children (Suárez et al. 2008, p. 46).  The men’s absence from home 
prevents subsistence food cultivation and severely disrupts family life. “Sugar cane work 
takes us away from our culture, and then comes the alcohol, the drugs, those things which 
complicate family life...” a Guarani Kaiowá leader told a researcher (Assis et al. 2007, p. 
10). 
Survival International’s 2010 report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination explained the impacts migration of Guarani Kaiowá boys and men 
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from Mato Grosso do Sul to work in the sugarcane and soy fields (feedstocks for ethanol 
and agrodiesel respectively) has had on their communities.  Waves of destruction of the 
forests and savanna, first by ranching and now by sugarcane, have reduced their 
territories to a patchwork of farms, ranches and plantations forcing them to migrate for 
work, leaving their extended family groups in small, barren reserves.  Thirteen of the 
twenty ethanol factories in Mato Grosso do Sul are on Guarani land.  The migrant 
Guarani men and boys, having been separated from their families, they return to 
overcrowded communities with a sense of hopelessness.  Drug abuse, suicide, and 
physical and sexual violence against women and children along with a rise in sexually 
transmitted diseases and a murder rate of 210 people per 100,000 is the result (Survival 
International 2010, p. 10).  Acker (2004) notes that prostitution is part of the 
globalization process as poverty and inequality increase.  This is certainly the case where 
agrofuels are concerned. 
Prostitution 
 
The roles assigned to women in their respective communities often limit their 
mobility and leave them vulnerable to poverty and sexual exploitation following the loss 
of land tenure and/or migration or unemployment among men in the community (Acker 
2004). Additionally, job discrimination sometimes leads women to engage in sex work as 
the only means of feeding themselves and their dependents.  Assis, Zucarelli, and Ortiz 
(2007) found prostitution to be among the impacts on urban infrastructure in Brazilian 
towns close to sugarcane plantations.  One woman in Mato Grosso do Sul told the 
researchers: “I always come here at the end of the month when the guys (cane-cutters) get 
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paid.  Back where I come from there weren’t any alternatives, so the only option was 
prostitution” (Assis et al. 2007, p. 12).    
Similarly, other studies report that poor Dayak women and girls in Indonesia can 
often be found serving customers in the “karaoke bars” near palm oil plantation 
dormitories or along the highways leading into the plantations.  In fact the word 
“karaoke” has become stigmatized in Kalimantan because of its association with illicit 
sexual activity.  Historic state repression against Dayak men has contributed to loss of 
land, causing the poorest to seek casual agricultural labor away from their families.  In 
Sanggau district, PTPN XIII is one of the oldest corporations operating in West 
Kalimantan and one of Indonesia’s first NES plantations; it has benefited from the 
Indonesian government’s strong central planning and disregard for the rights of 
indigenous people.  During Suharto’s rule, when challenged by local Dayak people over 
land access and ownership, the company accused indigenous leaders of belonging to the 
banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).  To be accused of PKI membership is 
particularly feared as Suharto banned the group and exterminated a reported half million 
members in 1966.  To the present day former members face job discrimination and are 
prohibited by law from serving in government positions.  The plantations, established in 
1979, were part of the transmigrisi scheme and thus migrant workers were allocated up to 
90% of the NES land while local people occupied the rest upon transfer of their land to 
the company.  By 2006 the company had acquired in excess of 61,000 hectares for its 
operations and had devoted 720 hectares to housing and subsistence agriculture; the 
government had not issued permits to the 221 smallholders participating in the NES 
program (Colchester et al. 2006).  The desperate situation among Dayak people has 
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resulted in changing local concepts of the gendered nature of work and concepts of 
femininity and masculinity (Julia & White 2011; Sirait 2009).  Sirait (2009) reports that 
among the Dayak, a new concept of masculinity, marked by a lack of respect for women, 
has taken hold as the result of the disruption brought on my logging and oil palm 
expansion.  Additionally, Sirait notes that poor Dayak girls, who used to work for 
wealthy Dayak families as housemaids, while continuing their studies, are now avoiding 
such work in favor of “easier” jobs as prostitutes in the karaoke bars. 
 The region has seen a rise in sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted 
pregnancies as women, lacking basic health care and the power to negotiate safer sexual 
practices, sell their bodies for palm oil money (Colchester et al. 2006; Friends of the 
Earth et al. 2008; Maunati 2005; Sirait 2009).  A farmer in Sekadau, West Kalimantan 
explained to a researcher how the oil palm companies were directly involved in the sex 
trade:   
Once the palm oil is harvested, the company pays the different small holders their 
share of the yield.  On payday, the company sets up a so-called night market with 
stalls offering karaoke, drinks and also gambling.  The company pays local 
women to work as waitresses at the stalls.  With the karaoke and people getting 
drunk, it is the women who get harmed.  For instance, we recently saw a case in 
Sambas district where eight women have become pregnant as a result of such 
night markets (Friends of the Earth, LifeMosaic & Sawit Watch 2008, p. 93). 
 
In the Global South a growing number of agricultural workers are employed in 
casual, informal labor; approximately 20-30 percent are women.  Women make up forty 
percent of the casual agricultural labor in Latin America and the Caribbean, while the 
figure is estimated to be much higher in African countries (Rossi & Lambrou 2008: 14). 
As women enter into outside employment they are subject to disadvantages rooted in the 
traditional division of labor.  Ostensibly, plantations and smallholder out-growing 
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schemes are gender-neutral, relying on only the worker’s productive capacity.  However, 
in reality they are sites overlaid with gendered assumptions. Rossi and Lambrou (2008) 
report that landowners prefer female workers, because they are considered more “docile” 
and can generally be paid less than male field workers.  Women (and children) are often 
employed in what are considered easier, less physically demanding jobs.  As migrant 
laborers women’s health and that of their children becomes even more precarious (Rossi 
& Lambrou 2008). Acker (1990) advances the notion that under industrial capitalism, 
jobs are separate from human beings in that they are reifications, “scraps of paper until 
people fill them” (p. 151).   The person who occupies the job is supposed to be a 
disembodied, rational actor.  Under this construction, the worker is someone with no 
obligations whose needs are met outside the workplace: “The abstract, bodiless worker, 
who occupies the abstract, gender-neutral job has no sexuality, no emotions, and does not 
procreate.”  In essence, the ideal worker is male.  Paramount to job organization is the 
workers’ acceptance of hierarchy.  Yet, while the worker is assumed to be male, that 
gender category is historically constructed and influenced by race and class interactions 
that encompass global, regional, and local contexts (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). 
Agrofuel production areas commonly exacerbate poverty but also capture women’s 
services as a supplement to accumulation both as unpaid helpers to men or as low-paid 
workers. 
The Cane Fields 
 
Working conditions on the cane and palm plantations are hard on all workers, 
whether they are smallholders cultivating their own plots, landless farmers, or migrant 
laborers working in the corporate fields. In some cases agrofuel plantations have simply 
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used slave labor.  A US Congressional Research Service report on human trafficking 
found that between 1995 and 2008 the Brazilian government rescued over 30,000 people 
(mostly men) from slavery.  In 2008, about half of the 5,244 workers that the Brazilian 
government freed from slavery were working on sugar cane plantations dedicated to 
producing ethanol.  Despite its efforts, Brazil’s rural industrial plantations (including soy 
and sugar cane) held 25,000 men in slavery (Seelke 2010). Additionally, sixty-two 
percent of the 1.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 years old employed in 
Brazil are working in agricultural jobs (Suárez, Bickel, Garbers, Goldfarb & Schneider 
2008, p. 18). 
 For those workers who earn a wage, the piece-rate system determines the amount 
of compensation by weight rather than by the number of hours worked.  Brazilian 
cañeros in the state of São Paulo begin their day at 4am when they wake, prepare their 
lunches, catch the company bus, and start cutting by 6am, have a one hour lunch and end 
their day at 4.30pm in the afternoon. They harvest between 10 and 15 tons of sugarcane, 
swinging their machetes 30 strokes per minute for eight hours a day, roughly 8 months 
out of the year. The minimum wage for a ton of cut and piled cane is approximately US$ 
1.26; a month’s work amounts to about US$ 200 (Mendoça 2009).  In 2007, a genetically 
modified cane was developed that is lighter.  The lighter cane increases the physical 
workload of the cutter and makes it harder to obtain enough for a decent wage (Suárez et 
al. 2008).  To achieve the day’s quota, field laborers must work long hours in excessive 
heat, skipping breaks for water and meals, and often pressing their wives and children 
into service in order earn as much money as possible.    The uncompensated work the 
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women perform leaves little time to accomplish the additional daily chores that sustain 
their families (Rossi & Lambrou 2008; Schott 2009, p.14).  
When women do earn wages, they are subject to discrimination, paid less and can 
also become physically debilitated and unable to even perform the unpaid domestic work 
for which they are responsible. In order to maintain the highest level of productivity and 
minimize health care expenses, plantations hire only the healthiest workers.  Most cutters 
suffer back and joint problems. Companies generally refuse to hire women for cane 
cutting, as their productivity is generally less than that of men.  The number of women 
working as paid cane-cutters is about 10 - 20% of the total workforce. A cañero’s 
working life is estimated to be between 15 and 20 years due to occupational diseases 
from repetitive motion. The FoodFirst Information and Action Network (Suárez et al. 
2008) interviewed a 35 year-old mother of two who entered the cane fields at 14 and was 
fired after 21 years when her yields began to drop. Suffering from arthritis and tendonitis, 
she could no longer wash dishes, carry groceries, or do other housework because she 
could not close her hands or raise her arms. The mill doctor declared her debilitating 
condition to be a work accident qualifying her for sick pay but not for retirement benefits 
for a disability  (Suárez et al. 2008). FIAN also found that rural female wage-earners had 
to perform double the hours to earn less than men doing the same labor and that black 
and indigenous women were more disadvantaged than their white colleagues. 
Additionally, Andradina Rural Workers Union (SerAndradina) claims that some 
companies are demanding that women show proof of infertility as a condition of hire in 
order to avoid any costs resulting from ‘unwanted’ pregnancies (Ortiz et al. 2008, p.16).  
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Workers in Brazil have some representation by powerful agricultural unions and 
have won some concessions from companies.  However, in many countries unions 
dealing with the specific problems and working conditions of plantation workers are 
scarce, so the work is usually covered by an umbrella organization with little experience 
or interest in the concerns of plantation laborers.  Because the plantations are in remote 
areas worker education regarding their legal rights is nearly impossible.  In Southeast 
Asia, women have special concerns while working on palm plantations.  One female 
worker told a researcher that the working conditions on the plantations were “among the 
worst in the region, even compared to those in textile factories that receive much more 
international attention” (Schott 2009, p. 15). In Malaysia 50% or 30,000 of the temporary 
workers in the palm fields are women where they are generally chosen to perform the 
“easier” tasks of weeding, and fertilizer and pesticide application (Carrere 2010; Rossi & 
Lambrou 2008; Smolker et al. 2009).    
 
Paraquat 
 
Agrofuel feedstock plantations reportedly use some 25 chemicals to keep down 
weeds, repel pests, and replace lost minerals in the soil. One of the chemicals used in 
both soy and palm plantations is paraquat dichloride (1,1’ –dimethyl-4,4’- bipyridylium 
dichloride), because it is cheap and labor-saving as a weed killer.  Use of paraquat is 
prohibited or restricted in most “developed” countries because of its toxicity and 
persistence in the soil.  Malaysia banned it in 2002 due to concern for plantation workers 
but lifted the ban four years later under pressure from the palm oil industry, while 
Indonesia allows its use (Smolker et al. 2009; Schott 2009:89; Wesseling 2001, p.  275).  
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Paraquat, at its most benign, can cause skin and mucus membrane irritation, 
headaches, and nausea, but it can also cross the placental barrier and has been implicated 
in fetal death in pregnant women who experienced acute poisoning.  Long-term exposure 
has also been linked to Parkinson’s disease, suggesting a synergistic relationship to the 
fungicide ethylene bisdithiocarbamate (Wesseling 2001, p. 282).  Wesseling (2001) notes 
that paraquat is poorly absorbed through intact skin but uptake is substantially improved 
through breaks and prolonged contact with skin. However the leaves of oil palms and 
sugarcane plants are sharp, and most workers are subject to cuts on their hands, legs, and 
heads.  Because of the stifling tropical heat, many workers do not wear adequate cover to 
protect against cuts.  And the fact that they are responsible for purchasing their own 
protective gear and cannot afford to do so increases the likelihood of cuts and pesticide 
exposure (Houtard 2010).   
  A study funded by Syngenta, the world’s largest agrochemical company and the 
manufacturer of paraquat, found female pesticide applicators in Malaysia spend more 
time in contact with paraquat than average agricultural workers.  The women sprayed the 
chemical almost every day (a median of 276 days), and compared with the median 60 
hours per year for all users in the study, they spent an incredible 1,560 hours applying the 
herbicide.  The study also found that a higher proportion of Malaysian female field 
workers had experienced moderate and serious health problems during the study period 
(Tomenson & Matthews 2009, p. 947). In many cases pesticide applicators are not trained 
in the proper procedures and do not report their illnesses for fear of losing their jobs 
(Houtard 2010, p. 92; Rossi & Lambrou 2008; Schott 2009, p. 15). 
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Smallholder Schemes: Reinscribing the Gendered Division of Labor 
 
Advocates of plant-based energy, when confronted with the ugly realities of 
working life on the large agrofuel plantations, have pointed to smallholder outgrower 
opportunities as more preferable forms of “rural development.”  Theoretically, under this 
scenario peasants with relatively secure titles to their land can devote some or all of it to 
cash crops thus earning income for food security and poverty alleviation (Dufey 2006). 
The World Bank touts the advantages of such arrangements, citing stable incomes, 
monetization of rural areas as a way to achieve development, and secure land tenure 
regimes (Carrere 2010; Dufey 2006).  Companies provide technical assistance in return 
for a contractual agreement with the farmer or village guaranteeing a supply of feedstock 
at per kilo prices that the industry sets.  In some cases, contracts can obligate the farmers 
for longer than 10 years.   
While many farmers view the steady income from the companies as welcome 
financial help, the industry is able to shed any responsibility it would have under a 
scenario of total proletarianization – it does not have to provide housing, medical 
insurance, wages, etc.  Moreover, it is the producers, not the industry, that directly bear 
all the costs of production and suffer the risks of market fluctuations and poor harvests.  
And while companies often supply seedlings, fertilizers, pesticides, and technical 
expertise, these services are loans that must be repaid with interest at harvest time 
(Carrere 2010).     
Oil palm and Jatropha are two crops that can be grown on small plots of land 
using traditional methods (hand harvesting) and so are often mentioned for rural 
development and particularly for the benefit of women (Bringezu et al. 2008; Brittaine & 
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Lutaladio 2010; Cotula et al. 2008; Dufey 2006). However, the existing gendered 
division of labor in many rural communities simply means that, in addition to their 
household and gardening work, women are expected to help their husbands or other male 
members of the family in the agrofuel aspect of farm life while seeing little or none of the 
proceeds from the sale of the feedstock.  Moreover, the labor women perform in agrofuel 
processing often increases their unpaid time and physical work burden.   
For example research indicates that the labor necessary in procuring household 
water is extensive and almost exclusively a female endeavor.  In Kenya 70% of the water 
carriers are women and girls conveying 80% of household water.  Some rural areas in 
Indonesia 86% of households rely on women’s water provision (Ahmed 2000). Women 
are responsible not only for water provision but also its allocation within the household.  
This requires precise knowledge of the amount of water it takes to accomplish the day’s 
work which, includes cooking, laundry, washing children and household items, watering 
small livestock, and the family’s garden (Ahmed 2000). In many cases girls accompany 
their mothers with small containers, graduating to larger vessels as they get older.  The 
containers are heavy, generally weighing 20 kilograms (40 pounds), and large amounts of 
the time are required to fetch enough for the household. A survey (Rossi & Lambrou 
2008) of three sub-Saharan African countries found that, not only do women collect 
higher volumes of water than men, but they also spend greater amounts of time on water 
provisioning.  A woman in Ghana spends 700 hours while a woman in Tanzania spends 
500 hours and a woman in Zambia spends about 200 hours a year.   
Cameroon has a long history of traditional palm oil production, and palm oil is 
used in foods, beverages and medicines.  The first extensive plantations were established 
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in 1910 by the Société des Palmeraies de la Ferme Suisse (SPFS), at the advent of 
German colonial rule.  Later, the French took over Cameroon and instituted slave labor in 
the plantations, working with local chiefs for the selection of healthy male laborers.  The 
men were marched away with ropes around their necks and forced to work under armed 
guard; most never saw their villages again.  By the 1980’s 90% of Cameroon’s palm oil 
production was in the hands of five companies. In 2001 the government launched an 
initiative to modernize its palm oil industry, including a sub-contracting system that seeks 
to promote ‘complementarity’ (Carrere 2010, p. 25) between the large agrofuel 
processors and smallholders. 
Tandon (2009) reports that in the village of Kugwe in northwest Cameroon, oil 
palm outgrower operations already dominate agriculture, supplying 75% of the 
community’s income.  Since women in the village grow the family’s food in gardens and 
process all farm produce, the rise in demand for agrodiesel has increased their unpaid 
workload.  Lacking claim to the trees or discretion over the proceeds from them, female 
community members nonetheless process the palm kernels, and convey the oil to market.  
In order to extract the oil from the palm kernels the women use their feet and legs.   
Proceeds from the sale of the oil go to the male head of household who gives his 
female helper seven liters of oil for every forty liters of premium-grade oil she extracts; 
the seven liters are used for household energy needs. Commonly, women and children 
gather the leftover palm fibers and squeeze out additional amounts of low-grade oil to 
add to their share. The head of the household shares the remaining oil with a professional 
harvester if he has hired one and then turns his portion, about 20 to 40 liters, over to 
female family members who carry it eight kilometers (about 5 miles) over rough roads to 
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the main market to sell.  The weight of the oil and the long walk places additional stress 
on women’s physical health (Tandon 2009).     
Out of the food riots of 2008 and rising criticism of the environmental and social 
impacts of plant-based transport fuels, a new rhetoric emerged regarding the adoption of 
Jatropha as a “pro-poor” feedstock that would benefit smallholders, particularly women 
(Brittaine & Lutaladio 2010). Women spend most of their earnings on family food needs.  
In Africa women produce 80 percent of the food, 60 percent in Asia, and 40 percent in 
Latin America.  Moreover, in one-third of all households in the world, women are the 
sole breadwinners (Von Lossau & Li 2011).  In Tanzania, a national agrofuel company 
trumpeted the feedstock as the “dollar tree” (Alweny 2008, p. 1) to encourage 
smallholders to engage in outgrowing operations, while the government of Kenya, 
international and local NGOs, and the agrofuel industry have sought to implement 
widespread development of Jatropha in “food and fuel” interplanting schemes.  
Ostensibly, these developments involve smallholders growing the feedstock alongside 
food crops for local energy use, income generation, and crop protection, but weak 
government regulation and unscrupulous donor activity has led to a ‘free-for-all’ of 
competing interests (Hunsberger 2010, p. 960).   Hunsberger (2010) notes that Kenya’s 
history of contested land distribution and agricultural policy problematizes the multiple 
discourses touting the feedstock as “pro-poor” and a possible solution to climate change.  
Under British colonial rule Kenya’s best fertile land was handed over to settlers for cash-
cropping while indigenous Kenyans were prohibited from growing export crops.  In the 
post-colonial era the government encouraged smallholders to engage in cash-crop activity 
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and opened the country up to foreign investment in agriculture; however, people in the 
countryside still remain desperately poor (Hunsberger 2010).   
Hunsberger found that the primary beneficiaries of the rush to plant Jatropha 
were not the farmers themselves but the NGOs who massaged the discourses of local 
development and environmental sustainability in order to legitimize their early adoption 
of the feedstock and maintain funding from reluctant international donors (Hunsberger 
2010).  Her research also revealed that most (19) of the 25 contacts in her study area had 
interplanted Jatropha with food crops.  Some had uprooted maize, beans, and tomatoes to 
plant the shrub, while others had reduced production of other crops significantly, and four 
had completely monocropped the feedstock.  Most of the farmers expressed frustration 
that their efforts were going uncompensated, as the shrubs did not produce many seeds in 
the initial stages and the promised buyback was delayed (Hunsberger 2010, p. 957).  One 
farmer who had participated in a project to grow the feedstock stated, in regret, ‘If you 
get oil, what will you do with it?  There’s no market’ (Hunsberger 2010, p. 949).  
In 2008 the InterPress News Service Agency (2008) reported that the unstable 
agrofuel market was seriously affecting farmers who had adopted crop-switching at the 
behest of the Kenyan government, NGOs, and the industry. In Naromoru, central Kenya, 
a partnership among the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology in 
Nairobi, a NGO, and the Dutch manufacturer Solarix was encouraging farmers to grow 
castor seeds, but Ann Njeri, a mother of three who runs a small farm outside the town, 
found herself unable to turn a profit as prices dipped and the market dried up.  Another 
farmer, Linet Kanini from Tala, a town in eastern Kenya, lost all of the money she 
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invested when the crop of Jatropha on her five-acre plot failed to produce an adequate 
harvest of seeds – only a few kilos (Bwakali 2008). 
Researchers studying smallholder schemes in Papua New Guinea (PNG) found 
that some initiatives aimed at increasing women’s participation in the agrofuel economy 
negatively altered women’s economic situation due to traditional gendered household 
accounting and ultimately eroded community food security.  Seeking to maximize profits, 
the palm oil industry sought a way to incorporate women while simultaneously 
reinforcing their subordinate role. 
 
Scavenger Wages:  Mama Lus Frut 
 
Ninety seven percent of the land in Papua New Guinea is under communal 
registration; however, the country has undergone resettlement with the advent of cash 
crops. Following endorsements from the World Bank, the government began encouraging 
commercial production of oil palms using the Nucleus Estate-Smallholder System 
(NESS) in 1967 with the aim of diversifying its agricultural export economy.  Fifteen 
thousand smallholders grow half of PNG’s 111,000 hectares of oil palms.  Large 
companies own the milling facilities on which the growers are dependent.  Oil palm fruit 
must be processed within 24 hours of harvest, so the labor requirements are high.  A 
family working for two days from sunrise till dark can harvest about 1.7 tons, worth 
about US$65.  After the costs of fertilizers, transportation of the fruit, and other services 
provided by the company are deducted the payment could be as low are US$20.  Women 
saw very little of this money as the mill owners give preference to male members of 
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families in matters of negotiation and payment despite a tradition of intra-household 
cooperation  (Schott 2006).   
Similarly, altered gender expectations in the community shape the distribution of 
oil palm funds.  Researchers found that there is considerable social pressure on men to 
spend money gambling and drinking with other men.  A husband is expected to pay for 
mortgages, farm expenses, and wages and to disperse either oil palm fruit or money to his 
wife to cover household needs, but after that any money left over belongs to him to spend 
however he likes.  On the other hand, women are expected to allocate money to family 
expenses, and those who spend money on themselves are considered “greedi” (Warner & 
Bauer 2002).   
With an eye toward maximizing profits while officially recognizing women’s 
significant contribution to household wealth and food security, the Oil Palm Industry 
Corporation (OPIC) introduced the Mama Lus Frut program to the Popondetta and 
Hoskins communities as a “poverty reduction” strategy.  The program capitalized on 
women’s subordinate role of assisting their husbands by picking up the leftover fruit. 
Research by the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research found that, in 
reality, a high percentage of fruit wastage was occurring before implementation of the 
scheme and that women preferred to cultivate their gardens and market the produce rather 
than pick up fruit for nothing.  Loss of fruit accounts for as much as 14% of smallholders’ 
harvests representing US$300,000 (APEC 2010; Warner & Bauer 2002).  By rewarding 
the women with a mama card, independent of the male wage earner, OPIC was able to 
recover more fruit.  Mama Lus Frut was hailed as a major success for “empowering” 
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women by bringing them into the oil palm market while simultaneously increasing 
company profits (APEC 2010; Schott 2009; Warner & Bauer 2002).   
By 2000 over 3,000 women were involved in Mama Lus, and supporters cited a 
number of “benefits” to the community that, they claimed, reduced household poverty.  
Among these were women’s ability to earn 93% of the average weekly wage for low-
skilled workers in the formal sector and increased local trade.  They also cited equality in 
the market as women purchased tools in order to harvest fruit from young palms, thereby 
increasing their own share of takings while slightly reducing the amount men could 
harvest.  Additionally, they found that the program improved productivity as women 
tended to clear weeds as they worked (Anderson 2006; Warner & Bauer 2002).  All of 
these benefits, in fact, were positive outcomes for the industry and not the women or their 
communities. 
A 2006 study by Tim Anderson (2006) for the Centre for Environmental Law and 
Community Rights found that Mama Lus formalized the gendered division of labor, as 
the papa card was often 4 times larger than the mama card.  A study conducted for the 
Asia-Pacific Economic confirmed this contention, finding that while women participating 
in the program represented 67% of all smallholders, they earned only 26% of the oil palm 
money, a weekly average of PGK 27.75 or about US$ 7.00 (APEC 2010).  Some women 
also complained of a decline in the amount of money men were willing to contribute to 
household accounts after institution of the program.   
Moreover, in recognition that the mama card is shielded from loan repayments 
(yet another formalization of male decision-making) the mill in Popondetta (Higaturu), 
began making deductions from women’s cards when officials believed men were using 
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them to avoid debt repayment for fertilizers and other expenses. Anderson also found that 
despite pervasive cultivation of oil palms in PNG, Popondetta smallholders were heavily 
reliant on gardens for food but had a low diversity of garden crops.  He noted that the 
refusal to see customary lands as valuable beyond market assessments places 
communities at greater risk for poverty.  Since women are heavily dependent on their 
gardens for both household provisioning and income from marketing food, they are at a 
significant disadvantage in maintaining food security (Anderson 2006).  
Follow-up research of 44 female food vendors in Madang in 2008 revealed that 
informal market activities, particularly roadside vending, earned women substantially 
higher wages than employment in palm oil work.  Growing crops for export and informal 
sale, the women attended markets an average of three days.  Over 85% of the sample 
group earned more income marketing peanuts, mangoes, melons and betel nuts, than they 
did selling cocoa, coconut, and vanilla for export.  Their average income was found to be 
more than four times higher than under Mama Lus and three times the national minimum 
wage.  Diversity of income and crop cultivation, along with strong access to customary 
land, is key to the women’s success in Papua New Guinea (Sukot 2011).   
The particular historical circumstances leading up to the impoverishment of 
nations and their indigenous peoples are not a concern for the advocates of agrofuels.  
Instead policy makers, academics, and economists examining the disruption of agrofuel 
production’s concentration of land, destruction of natural resources, and purposeful 
dispossession of the peasantry and other groups argue that these problems are not 
inherent qualities of capitalism but are the unfortunate consequences of a natural 
evolutionary economic process. They claim that the social, economic and environmental 
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crises produced by agrofuel expansion are simply market failures that can be remedied by 
market-based reforms (Franco et al. 2010).  
Choosing to articulate agrofuel’s effect solely from a structural perspective fails 
to capture the intersections of race, class, and gender operant in local communities.  
Social structures create social positions, yet individuals and groups occupy social 
positions (Hill Collins 1995, p. 492).  Risman (2004) has suggested that, as theorists, we 
must integrate analyses at the level of cultural expectation, individual, interaction and 
organizational structure in order to gain a better understanding of gender in specific 
communities. Women and men in poor indigenous and rural communities share the same 
suffering and insecurity, however, gender dynamics play out differently based on the 
socially acceptable forms of behavior. Agrofuel capitalism’s attempt to bring women into 
the market to augment its accumulation process has not only increased the domestic 
workload of women but also has disrupted gender relations in local communities further 
impoverishing them.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
"Conservation may be a sign of personal virtue, but it is not a sufficient basis for a sound, 
comprehensive energy policy." 
 
- US Vice President Dick Cheney 
 
 
This thesis concludes that plant-based liquid fuels are far from renewable, as 
proponents claim.  Agrofuel capitalism is merely the extension of the general acceptance 
and valorization of the commodity form as the original condition of human relations with 
nature and with one another.  Development banks, university research centers, finance 
capital, oil, car and agribusiness companies, with the eager assistance of politicians, large 
NGOs and celebrity environmentalists, have forged an alliance that advances capital’s 
reach into the rural areas of the Global South.  
This territorial conversion not only affects the natural environments, economies, 
and legal frameworks of the Global South; it also extends to the local social relations 
among groups of people occupying contiguous spaces and also between men and women 
in the rural areas in which the feedstocks are being cultivated. As Marilyn Waring (1988) 
has noted, the non-market activities and of people, particularly women, are seen as 
worthless because they do not contribute to national accounts.  Additionally, capital treats 
the environment and environmental “services” as free gifts to be exploited for the 
purpose of value creation.    
The results of the changing economic and social impacts wrought by agrofuel 
capitalism are disrupting and/or exacerbating local gender relations that disadvantage 
women, both discursively and materially. In most cases, women are disadvantaged 
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because the combination of the masculinist perspective embedded in capitalism employs 
gender-neutral terms while deploying gendered practices.  Gender is also filtered through 
the organizational level of UN agencies, states, NGOs, development banks and other 
institutions (Acker 1990; Jessop 2003).  These entities are bundles of powers, rather than 
unified actors, whose members also participate in gendered policy-making with regard to 
valuation of land-use, knowledge production,  biodiversity conservation and labor and 
project objectives for agrofuel promotion.  
This is in keeping with the contentions of Salleh, Waring, and others’ arguments 
that the work of indigenous men and women is undervalued (even by socialist policies) 
and contributes to displacement, environmental destruction, and the erosion of traditional 
ecological knowledge.  However, the picture of harmony put forward by ecofeminists is 
undermined by assumptions of universal colonial-style oppression uncomplicated by 
local gender, race, and political relations (Cochrane 2007; Nanda1997).  While in the 
past, Northern powers feminized colonial men in various ways and forced a renegotiation 
of local masculinities (Acker 2004), agrofuel capitalism represents a new, more flexible 
economic ethos with the ability to negotiate across continents with Southern supporters.   
Southern governments, consisting of integral bundles (Jessop 2003) of power with 
international connections, impose their own hegemonic gendered regimes with regard to 
land use and what is considered useful forcing renegotiation of local gender orders. As 
Waring (1988) has observed micro level informal local gender orders can a large impact 
on women’s agency within their communities and generally result in their 
disproportionate suffering under most development schemes that privilege market value 
creation. 
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Using terms that characterized the lands as “idle,” “degraded,” “marginal,” and 
thus economically and environmentally unimportant, the message was refashioned to 
portray a win-win scenario where the supposedly empty lands and economies of the 
people living near or on them would be revitalized and made productive.  However, the 
concept of “sustainability” obscures the runaway consumption of the North (McMichael 
2010) and powerful and autonomous forces in the South whose elites eagerly pour money 
into less developed nations while forming partnerships with Northern companies and 
governments (Dauvergne and Neville 2010). Heeding the call to reduce greenhouse 
gases, lessen dependence on OPEC oil, and augment energy security, governments in 
both hemispheres have instituted fuel-blending mandates and other market strategies to 
increase consumption of agrofuels.  The national mandates are resulting in a wave of new 
enclosures in the already impoverished rural areas of the Southern Hemisphere in a rush 
to claim land, labor, and natural resources such as insolation, soil, and water. Agrofuel 
development has led to the exacerbation of historical patterns of land concentration, 
dispossession, and disadvantageous outgrower schemes.  It has eroded biodiversity, 
polluted water and been responsible for deforestation.  
Agrofuel feedstock monocropping expands the agricultural frontier causing 
pressures on rural communities residing or using “wastelands.”  The grasslands and 
degraded forests of the Global South are often communal or state-owned lands to which 
pastoralists, shifting cultivators, small-scale farmers, and hunter-gatherers have informal 
access. Many rural people who depend on the natural resources in biodiversity-rich areas 
nearby have suffered historic discrimination and displacement.  The people living in 
these areas can sometimes be very poor and reliant on informal economic activities, 
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gardening and gathering for market, casual agricultural work and other forms of labor to 
support themselves.  In many cases they possess knowledge of local flora and fauna as 
well as naturalized introduced species and are actively engaged in cultivation, gathering, 
fallowing, and burning on the landscape.  While their knowledge derives from everyday 
practice and is confined to local conditions, the significance of their activities and 
knowledge may have far-reaching importance for global genetic diversity, climate change 
mitigation, and biodiversity conservation (Salleh 2010).   
The destruction of marginal areas affects the poorest people, particularly poor 
women, who use them for additional income, to bolster food security, and also for fuel 
and obtaining other resources such as herbs to make medicines.  Additionally, women’s 
ethnobotanical knowledge is threatened by the combined pressure of sexism within the 
community and with regard to outside researchers who study more prominent figures in 
the community who may or may not need to rely as heavily on local common areas.  
Agrofuel development exacerbates loss of women’s knowledge because in more 
traditional patriarchal societies women’s routine work is often overlooked or 
undervalued.  This is generally due to the differential roles men and women play in 
household maintenance, health care and community participation.  
In Indonesia, researchers found that oil palm plantations are placing great 
polluting local water sources and placing pressure on environments Dayak people 
actively manage in their simpukng (orchard gardens) and umaq (rice paddies) landscapes.  
The highly specialized gardens and fields contain dozens of rice varieties and maintain 
dipterocarp forests that are home to important tree species and pollinators. Dayak men 
practice controlled burning to renew their farms while older men and only a few women 
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possess much of the rice knowledge.  In the case of Anbera, Indonesia, the Dayak people 
lack of any formal title to forest-land meant that community leaders accepted a move 
from inconsistently recognized collective rights to head-of-household registration. 
Hegemonic femininity embodied in Dayak cultural proscriptions against women’s 
participation in politics made invisible to the authorities, enabling the state to approach 
only male leaders.  Motivated by land fragmentation and the need for cash, male 
members of the community traded pieces of land to a state-owned oil palm company in 
order to enter the plantation system.  The shift away from customary adat recognition of 
women’s right to inheritance in favor of individual tenure, extended the state’s own 
hegemonic patriarchal assumption with regard to land ownership.  However, lack of 
political voice did not prevent some women from protesting against loss of access by 
trying various strategies of resistance such as running away from their husbands or 
demanding to have land registered in their names.   
In Tanzania and Kenya Jatropha development has advanced as a poverty 
reduction scheme, aided by NGOs and government agencies against a backdrop of land 
contestation and forced settlement.  Some of the government policies that favor 
indigenous agrarian practices over those of pastoral people have resulted in more 
domestic work for women but less food security.  Among the Maasai gender relations 
have changed as the consequence of sedentarization policies with women spending more 
time caring for livestock thus their unpaid labor subsidizes the family leaving less time 
for them to engage in activities that improve their autonomy within the household.  Under 
this scenario, women must find alternative means of bringing cash.  Encouraged by 
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agrofuel proponents some farmers have engaged in crop-switching and found that there is 
no market for the oil.  
  Women’s cultivation in “female” crops and their undervalued status means that 
important food staples can be lost with the destruction of the marginal areas where they 
do much of their gathering and cultivating.  Moreover, the spaces women are allowed to 
inhabit may also prevent them from them accessing important knowledge possessed by 
male members of the community as land is fragmented or men are forced to migrate to 
work elsewhere.  In addition to loss of land, pollution of resources increases women’s 
time burden and/or results in loss of income for the poorest communities such as in the 
cases of Jatropha production in Ghana and sugarcane development in Mozambique.   
In Ghana, where customary law prevails, Norwegian officials enacted what could 
be seen as a more colonial-style approach to land-grabbing.  Taking advantage of 
illiterate local officials, BioFuel Africa managed to obtain the consent of the community 
to clear a large area for Jatropha feedstock for export.  However, with the help of a 
Ghanaian NGO local both men and women who saw their crops and fields destroyed 
were able to recover their land.  However, this occurred after the company cleared trees 
valuable for women’s economic activities.  After its defeat in one town, the same 
company moved to another community.  In the latter case, they “improved” their 
community meeting process by cultivating elite leaders and winning over many male 
farmers but they still ignored the unofficial but very important claims of women marginal 
areas.   
Women’s access to marginal land was considered secondary to the men’s desire 
for paid work, leading them to assist the company in keeping government environmental 
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compliance officials at bay while the areas were cleared of trees and the fast-growing 
bushes from which women harvested fuelwood. While the immediate effect of loss of the 
common areas was the destruction women’s capacity to bring in more income, it also had 
a general effect of impoverishing families and increasing food insecurity. Additionally, 
contraction of the marginal land contributed to land use conflicts between the farmers and 
the herds-people that also use the area for grazing and routinely burn it. Women were 
most affected because of the increased pressure on their household responsibilities such 
as collecting water for cooking and washing, gathering wood for charcoal production for 
additional household income. 
This can also be seen in the case of ProCana in Mozambique where the more 
powerful Ministry of Agriculture overruled the Ministry of Tourism in the relocation of 
war survivors and herders in favor of a British agrofuel project.  While women have 
formal equality before the state with regard to land tenure, the gendered division between 
productive and reproductive labor and according valuation play a role in women’s local 
disempowerment merges with the state’s masculinist economic agenda.  The activities of 
pastoralists and displaced people engaged in herding, charcoal processing and other 
marginally economic activities did not fall under the rubric of “improvement” of the land.  
Thus, the people occupying the desired area were feminized en masse by the state, as 
their activities were deemed unproductive.  Both women and men of lesser status were 
left out of the process and all lost their ability to farm. Loss of land access is contributing 
not only to loss of biodiversity and rice knowledge but also forcing communities to “sell” 
off parts of their land.  In other cases military action serving the interests of agrofuel 
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industry forces people off the land with grave gendered consequences for men and 
women. 
 In Colombia the obviously masculinist project of war serves as a convenient 
veneer for continuing the state’s racist legacy of economic and territorial discrimination 
against Afro-Colombians.  Additionally, direct US involvement through direct military 
training and funding to pursue the “war on drugs”, as well as subsidization of former 
paramilitary combatants’ resettlement, is key to widening oil palm development in the 
country.  Under this program, paramilitaries have been emboldened to seize land 
guaranteed to Black Colombians, openly threatening male community members with the 
assured implication and knowledge that widowed women’s precarious existence, coupled 
with economic barriers, inevitably guarantees the transfer of communal land through 
murder, intimidation and sexual assault.  Agrofuel production, in most cases, entails 
displacement and land fragmentation and other serious consequences for local 
communities causing an increase in migrant work performed by men and women 
channeled by the racialized and gendered assumptions of large institutions and agrofuel 
companies.  
In Brazil, sugarcane production squeezes indigenous and poor mestizo peasants.  
But in addition to general insecurity, the country’s history of racism contributes to 
increased misery for indigenous people such as the Guarani-Kaiowá who have lost much 
of their land to agrofuel feedstock development and are often exploited in the cane fields 
or as casual labor.  They often come back during the off-season addicted to drugs or 
alcohol.  Guarani-Kaiowá women often have to work farms on their own and suffer at 
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the hands of dispirited male relatives who beat them; the murder and suicide rate has 
skyrocketed largely due to displacement and exploitation in the cane fields.   
In most cases, women’s physical reproductive capacities are considered a liability 
as in the prohibition against fertile women in Brazil for work in the cane fields where, 
instead, they often subsidize capital with their unpaid labor in order to help male family 
members meet tonnage quotas.  In other cases assumptions about women’s “innate” 
abilities comes into play as reason to pay them less as in the cases of Indonesia and 
Malaysia, where the assumption that women are better at lighter tasks requiring precision 
means they are overrepresented as pesticide applicators in oil palm plantations.  The 
result is that they are exposed to high toxicity levels, as they often cannot afford to pay 
for the gear required to protect them from the chemicals.  One of the most widely used 
pesticides is paraquat dichloride, which has been implicated in early fetal mortality.  
Clearly, since female bodies are the ones that produce children, this gendered 
discrimination has far-reaching social consequences.   
In other cases women’s bodies are seen assets by companies or by the women 
themselves. Prostitution has grown in many agrofuel feedstock areas as young women 
turn to sex work in order to survive.  In the case of Indonesia palm oil companies have 
been implicated in actively employing young Dayak women as prostitutes for off-duty 
farmers and plantation workers.  In other scenarios under agrofuel capitalism, companies 
have found a way to exploit women’s position in the domestic division of resources 
and/or labor.  Recognizing the non-pooled nature of households in Papua New Guinea, 
oil palm companies found a way to recover more profit by initiating Mama Lus Frut, a 
program that paid women for scavenging dropped fruit that would otherwise have 
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spoiled.  Since the program paid less than the wages men garnered, the companies were 
able to recover large profits.  For the women themselves the work was a double-edged 
sword, providing them with some money, though not as much as from marketing 
vegetables, yet disrupting relations between husbands and wives and among women in 
the community.   
These changes and renegotiations come as the buzzword “sustainability” spawns 
conferences, focused action and even university degrees in the Global North, all 
accompanied by dire warnings of climate change, biodiversity loss and vanishing oil 
reserves.  And while the words of Dick Cheney may be repugnant to most Northern 
progressives, they underpin the practices embodied by agrofuel development, because 
they do not spark questions of equitable distribution of resources and burdens.  By 
refusing to interrogate its own irresolvable contradictions, capital seeks to greenwash its 
aims by glorifying first and second-generation plant-based fuels as both icons of virtuous 
behavior and equitable energy policy. In fact, their development is simply leaner, meaner 
accumulation masquerading in the cloak of “sustainability.”  The alternative fuels’ billing 
as symbols of environmental sustainability, sound development policy, and progressive 
thinking resonate deeply with the “green” ideals put forward by US and European 
progressive movements that emphasize consumer identity and action over fundamental 
economic restructuring.   
However, to restate the case against agrofuels is not enough. Judging from the 
work on agrofuels that focus on the narrow political economic or agrarian conception as 
well the UN and NGO literature that accepts the current economic system as an 
ontological fact, it is important to highlight the viability of the non-market rift-healing 
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activities of those nominally outside capital’s reach. With regard to the Global South, 
postcolonial and ecofeminist theorists call for greater valuation of their subsistence labor 
and activities in preservation of the environment and they are right to do so. But they do 
not address larger and also infinitely smaller questions such as per capita energy use, 
health/well-being and the distribution of hazards.  Uncritical depictions of indigenous 
men and women engaging in the “joy” (Salleh 2010: 212) of collective work obscures the 
poverty, local elitism and nature of local power relations that fuse religion with political 
power as well as a gendered division of labor that causes rural women and their children 
to carry heavy loads for hours and miles to provide fuel and water for their households.  
There is nothing joyful about being disabled by the age of 35 from carrying water all your 
life, as is the case for some Maasai women (Ahmed 2000, p. 13).  The cruel irony for 
women in the Global South is that agrofuel capitalism not only exploits their lower social 
status but also increases their workload as they walk longer distances for fuel or spend 
precious income to buy it.  Wealth, energy and human wellbeing are linked.   
 
Cathy’s Emissions/Tendai’s Drudgery: The Case for Energy Justice 
 
Studies show a higher Human Development Index (HDI) associated with energy 
use (Martínez and Ebenhack 2008).  The HDI was developed by United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) to measure indicators of human quality of life such as 
life expectancy, educational attainment, and income; the scale ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 
(Klugman 2010).  Martínez and Ebenhack (2008) found that countries with high per 
person energy consumption rates had low HDIs and countries with very low consumption 
had low HDIs.  Significant to this paper, the authors also found that “energy-advantaged 
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countries” (Martínez and Ebenhack 2008, p. 1432) used excessive amounts of energy 
with no increased benefits to their citizens.  Not surprisingly, the countries with the 
highest HDIs and consumption levels were in the Global North while the countries with 
the lower wellbeing and consumption patterns were in the South.  And while the authors 
noted that some inefficiencies in transportation and industry could be realized, 
advantaged countries would not realize any more gain in HDI.  By contrast, they found 
that one major factor contributing to a lower HDI was the quality of primary fuel.     
Lack of access to modern energy services, known as “energy poverty,” forces 
poor families to use traditional solid fuels (biomass) to meet their day-to-day energy 
needs.  Nearly half of the world’s people rely on solid fuels for cooking and heating; 2.4 
billion people use biomass (wood, charcoal, dung and crop waste) while 0.6 billion burn 
coal.  The division of labor, placing most of the household responsibilities on women and 
girls, often prevents them from attending school and participating in community activities 
as a great deal of their time is taken up gathering fuel and cooking food. Moreover, 
women and girls also suffer from problems associated with traditional fuel use.  
Women in the South use cooking fires to prepare and process food, to heat their 
homes and to run small enterprises such as beer brewing and bread baking. The low 
energy content and incomplete combustion of biomass combined with the fact that the 
fuels are used indoors results in indoor pollution of carbon monoxide, particulate matter, 
benzene and other dangerous compounds.  These indoor fires are responsible for 2 
million deaths per year from pneumonia, lung cancer, and chronic respiratory diseases.  
One million of those deaths are children under the age of five. 
 
 
154 
What is needed is not more capital accumulation for the world’s greedy corporate 
giants but fuel for the South’s people.  While the works of many ecofeminists very 
importantly exposes capitalism’s disregard for indigenous populations, their wholesale 
rejection of all development, if heeded, is “defending nothing more than the right of non-
Western ‘others’ to be exploited by their own local overlords” (Nanda 1995).  Moreover, 
ecofeminist arguments do not address larger and also infinitely smaller questions such as 
per capita energy use, health/well-being and the distribution of hazards.   
The energy and environmental picture is far more complicated, as Dauvergne and 
Neville (2010) have observed, with powerful actors emerging in the South and growing 
South-South relationships that obscure partnerships between Southern elites and Northern 
corporate interests to the ultimate detriment of poor rural people.  The energy 
consumption of the least privileged people in the Global South must rise as a matter 
social justice as well as climate change mitigation/adaptation.  Small-scale biofuel and 
solar electrification projects as well as judicious use of petroleum products must be a 
priority. Assessments of the energy-poverty-environment nexus must integrate the role of 
science in tackling the climate change and environmental destruction and highlighting the 
metabolic value just social relations. 
 
From Metabolic Rift to Situated Knowledges 
 
Donna Haraway’s “Situated Knowledges” lays the groundwork for a new feminist 
grasp of the concept of objectivity.  Haraway states that feminist scholars and activists 
have been seduced by two opposing poles of a dichotomy with regard to understanding 
the production of knowledge: radical social constructivism and feminist empiricism.  
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Social constructivism views all knowledge claims, particularly those of science and 
technology, as serving the dominant economic and political interests in/of Western 
society.  On the other hand feminist empiricism draws on the Marxian demand for 
rigorous objectivity while eschewing semiotic or narrative constructions of lived 
experience. Situated knowledges seek to expose the myth of objectivity in the 
“conquering gaze from nowhere” that serves capitalism, military conquest and patriarchy.  
By recreating a metaphorical understanding of vision as an embodied, historical and 
particular location, feminists can subvert what Haraway calls the “god trick” – the 
allegory of a distant, infinite and totalizing representation of truth. These contesting and 
contested partial knowledges link together communities to form a collective subject 
standpoint. 
Clearly, the consequences of capitalist expansion, aided by the scientific 
community, have impacted indigenous cultures across the globe.  Supported by bourgeois 
scientific views that prioritize capital accumulation, agrofuel proponents contend that 
intensive agricultural and livestock production can avert further biodiversity loss and 
deforestation.  However as this paper has shown, the low-impact, intentional activities of 
local people can be responsible for in situ biodiversity conservation.  As this paper also 
demonstrates, the characterization of “marginal” lands as “unproductive” both in 
ecological and economic terms and thus appropriate for agrofuel development is a 
falsification that exacerbates historical exclusions, increases environmental damage and 
particularly disadvantages women.   
 Therefore it is absolutely crucial to heed Salleh’s (2010) call for new “metabolic 
value” (212) relations that take into account the work of people actively engaged in direct 
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interaction with wild areas as well as the unremunerated labor of those doing 
provisioning work in the industrialized world.  She notes that the science of ecology 
recognizes webbed connections, yet concludes that to avoid “exploitation and entropy” 
the South should “delink from the global North and its programs” (211).  This is a 
dangerous idea.  Her reasoning reproduces the reductive logic she seeks to challenge by 
locating “nature” and “indigenous” in the South excluding people of color and working 
class white people in the North whose transnational links have been crucial in the fight 
for environmental justice (Pellow 2007).  Further, the equation of all scientific endeavors 
with capitalist relations hampers important partnerships among indigenous people, 
farmers in the North, ecologists and social justice organizations.  
Scientists, indigenous people and activists in both hemispheres possess 
knowledge and skills of global, not simply local significance. Rather than advocating 
delinkage, we as scholars, must support dynamic knowledge production between 
associated producers and scientists.  I believe that science-with-integrity coupled with 
movements for environmental justice can turn back the assaults on local communities and 
hasten the demise of the economic system that perpetrates them.  Some forms of 
community conservation (Berkes 2004) represents the best of Haraway’s concept. Many 
community conservation ecologists are advocating for a “re-embodiment” (Bradshaw and 
Bekoff 2001) of science, a more socially conscious ecology that can fulfill its mandate to 
uncover the truth while also serving society. Bradshaw and Bekoff argue for a complexity 
theory that integrates the so-called hard (biophysical) and the soft (social) sciences to 
reflect the dynamic relationship between nature and humans where “Observers, science 
and scientists, are brought into the relationship with the observed, humans and nature” 
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(Bradshaw and Bekoff  2001, p. 463).   This form of knowledge production recognizes 
the dynamic role between humans and nature, refuses the mining of traditional 
knowledge by outsiders, privileges knowledge sharing and local empowerment over 
monetary relations and de-centers the idea of conservation in favor of time-tested 
traditions (Berkes 2004).  As scholars, we must demand, not a withdrawal/denial of all 
science but the destruction of bourgeois science. 
 
My Development 
 
The dispossession and poverty visited word upon local communities by the 
greedy corporate giants often has local support, state funding and articulates nicely with 
historic patterns of racial/ethnic oppression and hegemonic gender regimes. What I have 
learned through the researching, contemplating and writing of this thesis is that it is 
vitally important to recognize and identify a multiplicity of connections and tensions 
while not losing sight of the ultimate goal of capitalism and its overthrow. Salleh (2010), 
quoting fellow materialists, Brett Clark and Richard York, emphasizes the need to rise 
above the social relations that create and perpetuate metabolic rifts in the first place.  Her 
specific critique of metabolic rift theorists is that they refuse to make analytic space for 
gender and race.  I wholeheartedly agree with her.  It is disheartening to read gender and 
race scholarship reduced to a limited collection of citations with little textual engagement 
in the actual theoretical concepts.  
However, it is also imperative to recognize the contingent, unstable and contested 
character of these identities/locations. Just as capitalism has a structural form with local 
resonances so do gender and race.  And as Acker (2004) and others (Connell and 
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Messerschmidt 2005; Jessop 2003; Salleh 2009; Waring 1988) contend, the dominant 
voices theorizing and describing globalization are, for the most part, similar if not 
identical to those in academic and activist settings criticizing global capital in general. 
Their discourse assumes gender and race neutrality and obscures the implicit masculine 
and Northern white standpoint of globalization and their own locations.  These 
convergences have material consequences. 
Lourdes Benería (2003) notes that right wing activity in the 1980’s shifted the 
focus of feminist scholars in the North away from structural critiques and led to an 
emphasis on the differences among women and toward productive discussions of gender 
and race as unstable, contestable and renegotiated categories.  She also observes that 
academic exchanges were often confined within the humanities and literary fields but 
also had a strong influence on the social sciences.  The unfortunate move toward defining 
these categories as “culturally constructed” signaled a shift away from materiality.  With 
the exception of feminist economics, the material workings of gender have been largely 
neglected. I agree with her assertion and contend that there is a surprising dearth of 
scholarship linking issues of gender, environment and critiques of capitalism.  This is the 
case despite the ubiquitous presence of women in many environmental organizations and 
the particularly radical leadership of women of color in environmental justice activism 
(Bullard and Smith 2005).  
  As feminist academics we must begin demystifying capitalist relations and the 
metabolic rift by engaging in a theorizing that does not replicate the savage “last man 
standing” competition that characterized early capitalist development.  Capitalism’s forté 
is divisiveness, competition and authorization of commodity relations over people’s 
 
 
159 
needs and aspirations.  Gender scholar Barbara Risman suggests that gender research 
must dispense with the theory slaying she calls the “modernist warfare version of 
science” and instead engage multidimensional, integrative theories that pay attention to 
gendered selves, the cultural expectations that determine interactional relations and the 
institutional rules that inform academic disciplines. To that list I would like to add 
“material realities”.  I have attempted here to move from a synthesis of case studies and 
empirical data toward a feminist political ecology of the gendered impacts of agrofuel 
development pointing the way toward more interdisciplinary research integrating the 
material aspects of energy, environment and gender. I hope this thesis advances that 
mission.  
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